PROLEGOMENA

SABATIEU

Epistemology in the tradition of

Immanuel Kant

by Uwe Flemming

Do you want to read this in German?

Go to http://members.inode.at/prolegomena/

Mr. Uwe Flemming`s philosophical work “Sabatieu” is very intelligently written. The ambitious young man attempts to compare Immanuel Kant`s Theory of mutual dependency between transcendental apperceptions and basic awareness with the central processing unit of a computer and its numerous algebraic operations. In our developing society such thoughts can be looked upon as incentive for further research, especially as regards “Neurophysiology, Philosophy of the Mind, Evolutionary theory of Cognition, etc.” That is why Mr. Flemming`s ideas are both interesting and important. Pertaining to the subjects mentioned, there might be a new “latest” level in the near future.

Dr. Erhard BUSEK

Former Vice-Chancellor of Austria and Head of the ministry of the sciences

Concerning

Sabatieu

The main subjects of this research are as follows:

What does the process of cognition comprise?

From which the following question arises:

What is our cognitive faculty made of?

From which the next question arises:

What can we achieve with our cognitive faculty?

Sabatieu is divided into three parts:

The Prologomena describes in short the main ideas of the research done.

In Part I we look for ever valid conclusions and conditions. This task is based on the outcome of a great number of experiences. We also deal with a wide range of questions, some of them are of quite a controversial nature. The reason of doing so is to find at least some conclusions and conditions of permanent validity.

In Part II we build up on the results achieved, thus being able to prove that there are several new aspects of philosophical thoughts concerning criticism of knowledge. The passage does not include many exemples because abstract thinking is in the foreground. Part II is the center of our work, we present irrevocable results acting as proof of our research.

Prolegomena

Introducing Sabatieu

a way of thinking

if you wish to read “Prolegomena” in German, go to:

http://members.inode.at/prolegomena/

Precis

Thanks to Immanuel Kant and his Categories we realize that we will never be able to see the world as it really is. We make the world to what our Categories enable us to. It means that it is not the world which forces us to see it its way, on the contrary, we define the world the way it appears to us.

We share Kant`s point of view, but we discovered facts that build up on Kant`s achievement.

Imagine you visit filmstudios in Florida. You face a wall with two holes and you are made to look through them. A light illuminates two houses, the rest of the room is pitch-black. You have no idea about the size of the room beyond the wall with the holes. One house is double the height of the other. The width of both is the same and their balconies, each as wide as the other, cover half of the width of the respective facade.

Apart from knowing that our house is double the height of the other, we do not know the real height of the houses, we are totally at a loss to define the exact height of the buildings. Consequently we assume that our sensory organs are not programmed to give exact measurements. However, when a person moves to the site and remains standing in front of the houses, we are suddenly aware of the approximate height of either house.

The question arises as to the factor responsible for our sudden awareness of size and dimension. We deduce from the given situation that the ability to use a graded system to measure things must be inborn, so whenever it is needed, it gets automatically released.

Because of our inner scale we are capable of creating the following:

1st Power of comparison

2nd Numerical series

3rd Units

And what is the purpose of the abilities mentioned above? After some careful thinking we came to the conclusion that they are the tools or means to define whatever there is in our world.

Let us give an example by asking you to look at a tree. First and foremost you see the tree as a whole, its oneness is a Unit. Then it is a Numerical Series, e.g. one branch is a third of the length of the trunk and its circumference is a quarter of the trunk`s circumference. Finally we use Comparison because all the differences regarding length, thickness, etc. of branches, twigs and leaves have to be brought into relation with one another in order to get an overall impression of the tree.

Once more: The three abilities mentioned enable us to define exactly whatever there is in our world. In addition there is another ability within us. We call it CPUgeneral as it combines the three abilities dealt with above all the time. CPU-general creates new units and numerical series, it also compares all its creations with each other, thus presenting us the world we experience day by day.

Another example: A tree is reality for us. A blind man cannot see it, but should he run against it, he is sure to be aware of its reality.

An interesting thought: The tree is real because CPU-general puts together the three abilities within us. When reality is created within us, why is it possible for other people to feel the same?

The only possible answer is: In relation to the reality, each person`s CPUgeneral combines the identical assimilations as all the other person`s CPUgeneral do.

If I go to London and see the city as everybody else does, it is so because any change has been registered by my CPUgeneral even before I arrived in London. It happened without my being aware of it. It means that whatever happens, everybody stores this experience without knowingly or actively doing anything about this process.

CONTENTS

Decisions are influenced by the experiences we have

To get impressions we need more than our sensory organs only

III

Inborn assimilations change any outside objects, which our sensory organs registered, into impressions

Original-assimilations create all other assimilations

At least all people have identical assimilations

CPUgeneral is active within us. A faculty capable of combining the information given by our sensory organs with assimilations in order to get impressions. It also combines assimilations with one another to obtain more complex units.

VII

Describing reality, mankind is in unison because we have identical assimilations and each person`sCPUgeneral, which is capable of combining various assimilations with the information obtained from our sensory organs to impressions, combines identical assimilations. Speaking of reality, the CPUgeneral of each and every man performs likewise.

VIII

Space is an original-assimilation. Whether reality or not, whenever we get an experience, space is there.

Time is another original-assimilation. It accompanies each experience, whether connected with reality or non-reality. Only man`s very first experience can do without original-assimilation Time.

Only via assimilations can we draw conclusions and get experiences. Only assimilations can give an exact and accurate description of any object in our world.

AFF is the faculty of man to notice the Assimilations, which means man becomes aware of what CPUgeneral carried into effect

XII

The activities of CPUgeneral create various Assimilation-combinations which are reflected by the AFF. This process creates experiences.

XIII

Original-assimilation Time is nothing else than the activity of the CPUgeneral and the reflection of this activity by the AFF

XIV

The original-assimilations Time and Space make experiences possible. Further original-assimilations are needed to differentiate the experiences

The activity of CPUgeneral is called Unity of the Self. The activity of the CPUgeneral and its reflection by the AFF create awareness. That means being aware of being an individual and having the chance of innumerable experiences

XVI

In addition, the Unity of the Self is the material for all our experiences. Unity of the Self is the original-assimilation. Each Assimilation consists of various Unities of the Self combined with one another, that is all. The original-assimilation Space is nothing but the effect of the existence of the Unity of the Self

XVII

Man creates his world. The performance of our CPUgeneral and AFF make this wonder possible

Decisions are influenced by the experiences we have

Any form of an impression is referred to us as an experience. It is irrelevant whether we speak of a real experience or a personal (subjective) feeling. A sudden thought, an emotion, a wish - they will be called experiences just as it is with real experiences. Both are listed under the same heading.

Decisions are real decisions only if you get the choice of at least two possibilities. As this choice is given, there must be reasons why we accept one possibility and reject the others. Independent of the many reasons for a person`s decision, one thing is crystal clear. Every decision is made because of certain experiences. When you make a decision you hope to get special experiences in return. On the other hand, you make a decision because of present and past experiences. By the way, apart from experiences, there is nothing we feel touched or mouved by.

We can have numerous experiences. Whatever we feel, whatever touches us emotionally are experiences. In addition we have certain faculties that enable us to have these experiences. In form of experiences we learn about these faculties.

Of what substance are the faculties that help us to get experiences and are responsible for everything we feel, think and take in?

To get impressions we need more than our sensory organs only

Imagine you are in film studios in Florida. There you are made to look through an opening in a wall into an absolutely dark room. The opening is big enough for your head only. Any movement of your head is impossible. Suddenly a faint light is switched on and you make out 4 buildings. The rest of the room is in darkness. You are able to admire the buildings and experience what they look like. However, you are sure to have difficulties to state the exact height of the buildings. Just a wild guess is possible. You definitely cannot know whether it is centimetres, some metres or a considerable amount of metres which make up the height of the buildings.

This fact encourages us to learn more about it, to get to the core of it. The information given by your sensory organs does not contain anything about the real dimensions of the buildings. The width of the balcony and facade is unknown to you. You might just realize that the balcony is half the width of the facade. When a stage hand moves out of the dark and stands in front of the buildings, you suddenly realize that one building is double the height of the man, the other buildings are even four times his height, thus you have get a more distinct idea of the respective size of the buildings.

Because of the capability just mentioned a most interesting question asks for an answer: Who informed you about the dimensions? You might say that knowing the approximate height of the stage hand made you compare it with the buildings, so dimension and size became more easy to estimate.

In spite of your having some idea about measurements, the answer to the question is still unsatisfactory.

After some intense thinking we realize that neither the stage hand nor the buildings looked at seperately, convey anything about size and dimensions. Our sensory organs are not designed to give any information regarding measurements.

Concerning the stage hand, should he be asked to stand perfectly motionless in front of the buildings when the light illuminates the site, he might be mistaken for a wax figure whose size is unknown.

No object seen in the room, least of all the air in the room, can cause our sensory organs to supply us automatically with information as regards size and dimensions. That is why we must conclude that we have got some inborn faculties which are capable of stating size and dimensions.

The faculties in question compare things and know the right proportions, e.g., stage hand compared to the house with balcony equals 1 to 2. Only because these faculties are activ while our sensory organs are in operation, we are able to define size and dimensions.

It may be that you think you know about size and dimensions from experience. After all, you have been taught the average height of a person. However, even in that case you could not have stated accurate dimensions without your inborn faculties. The analysis of your experience in the film studios does not allow for another conclusion.

The fact that we are able to make comparisons and numerical series proves that we are also able to form units. Because only if we are able to form units - that means to make smaller units into bigger ones - are we capable of making comparisons and numerical series. Thus to form units is an equally important inborn quality, too.

This discovery encourages further thinking. We realize that most important and outstanding features of objects are not given to us by the objects themselves. We ourselves connect the objects with their special features. Should we have to state size and dimensions of objects wherever they may be, we now know it is not the object that informs us about its measurements; the work is done by our inborn faculties.

Three buildings are of the same height, the fourth is half the height of the others. Their roofs form a slight angle above the facade and at the sides. The buildings stand close to each other. The first building on the left has two floors. All windows look alike, they are arranged in three horizontal rows of four windows each. The windows are rectangular at the bottom, at the top each window has a semicircle. The space between the windows is half the size of the window itself. The impression you have of the house is a special sensation. Because of its proportions and the way the decorations are placed around the windows, the house is quite different from the other buildings.

The difference lies in the shape of the windows and their proportions in relation to the building as a whole and the diverse decorations. The decorations consist of a number of straight, crooked and curved lines whose forms and length show great variety.

When each line and curve is added to other lines and curves we eventually get a huge unit and we can see the building as it is. It goes without saying that this process is only possible because of our faculties to compare, form units and numerical series.

Only because of our inborn faculties can we have experiences. The information given by our sensory organs is of less importance.

Whatever we want to know, feel and see in life, we need our inborn faculties to fulfil our wishes.

The exact analysis of our experience in the film studios proved the presence of our inborn faculties. Remember we could not define size and dimension of any object shown there. Our sensory organs on their own were incapable of obliging, so it is our inborn faculties which are the most important factors to reach our aim. We repeat once more: To realize a definite length, you have to create units first, then they get compared with each other by forming numerical series. The object itself says nothing about its length, so all particles that make up the knowledge of the true length must be within us, as inborn talent.

Experiencing the above mentioned phenomenon was of great importance to us. It set the ball rolling and stimulated us to continue our research work.

III

Inborn Assimilations change any outside objects, which our sensory organs registered, into impressions

Assimilations is the term used for the faculties performing the task just mentioned. Assimilations make all of an object exept what our sensory organs take in.

Each of our sensory organs (sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch) needs the Assimilations we are talking about. Without them there would be no comparing and no combining of numerical series to create units. And we would not know which instrument is responsible for the sound we hear. Neither would we be aware of duration or pitch of a tone. The senses of touch and taste would also be without any distinguishing qualities. Listing what we cannot do without Assimilations is likely to become a never ending story.

As we have the faculty to form units and because we are encountered by a great variety of objects daily, it goes without saying that each of the objects not only gives information to our sensory organs, but consists of distinctive inborne Assimilations as well.

Original-assimilations create all other Assimilations

Just as complex numerical series can be divided into combinations of smaller numbers, more complex combinations of Assimilations can be made less complex, too. However, there must be certain limits we should be aware of.

Original-assimilations cannot be devided, but they can be combined with other Assimilations.

In order to realize a house means we have to build up a complex combination of Assimilations, which is a process we are never conscious of. When we don`t take into consideration the information of our sensory organs, it is the complex combination of Assimilations that remain.

The result of the above observation leads to the conclusion that the impression of the house as a whole, each proportion and shade of colour, aesthetic aspects, etc. are only possible because of the combinations of numbers and units.

The combination of Assimilations making up the house consists of a vast amount of units which get compared with each other, then by means of a number system they are brought in relation to each other. The next process includes putting all units together till at last there is a huge unit left. This unit contains all Assimilations necessary for the Assimilation-combination typical for the house in question.

Whether or not the faculties to form units, compare and combine numerical series are Assimilations or original-assimilations has not been found out so far.

At least all people have identical Assimilations

All man share the same views concerning certain objects, e.g. they realize that a normal bike is not as long as a lorry and their forms and measurements differ. Such an attitude is obvious proof that our Assimilations are identical, and when we come across the same object, the combinations of our Assimilations are the same.

We have no idea about the number of Assimilations. Whether a lot or only a few, it does not matter. What counts is the fact that reality is more or less the same for all human beings. Due to this fact, we have no other choise but to come to this conclusion: all human beings have the same Assimilations within them, and they use exactly the same Assimilation-combinations when confronted with the same object.

Let us look at an example that shows us what would happen if people did not use their identical Assimilation-combinations when confronted with the same object. In such a case the motorway Vienna - Salzburg would be a distance of 300km for the first driver. For the second driver - if he did not use the same Assimilation-combinations as the first driver - the distance would be 30 km only. And a third driver would be in Paris instead of Salzburg after a 30 km ride.

That means if every person facing the same objects had not used identical Assimilations, the object in question, in our case the motorway, would be of different length, and in spite of starting at the same time and driving at the same speed, each of the drivers would arrive in Salzburg at a different time.

In reality circumstances are different because all people facing the same objects use identical Assimilations, therefore each of the drivers when driving at the same speed will arrive at the same time, provided they also started at the same time. And as regards the length of the motorway, there is no difference of opinion.

CPUgeneral is activ within us. A faculty capable of combining the information given by our sensory organs with Assimilations in order to get impressions. It also combines Assimilations with one another to obtain more complex units.

Assimilations are combined with one another to form more complex units. Only a faculty that is superior to Assimilations can conduct this process. The faculty mentioned is in us, it is inborn, and as it controls the performance of Assimilations, it is definitely an inherited factor.

We experience a diversity of Assimilation-combinations during our life. That proves that combinations of various Assimilations are possible. And because all this happens within us, the decision which Assimilations to combine, is within us, too. The faculty which makes these decisions is th CPUgeneral.

CPUgeneral stands for Central Processing Unit. This faculty within us decides which Assimilation to combine with one another and then it executes its decisions.

As only the CPUgeneral decides, which Assimilations to combine, and we ourselves know from reality that all people describe one and the same object with their identical Assimilation-combinations, so we have no other choise but to conclude that taken the same reality for granted, the CPUgeneral of each person acts in accordance with the CPUgeneral of all other persons involved.

In short: The CPUgeneral combines various Assimilations with each other to bigger Assimilation-combinations, it combines the information received from the sensory organs with Assimilations in order to come to impressions, and it acts in respect to reality in accordance with the CPUgenerals of all other persons within reality.

VII

Each and every person`s CPUgeneral is in his or her inmost self. When people face reality, the CPUgenerals of all of them give rise to identical Assimilations. We, therefore, conclude that all CPUgenerals perform likewise and are in accordance with one another concerning reality.

VIII

Space is an original-assimilation. Whether reality or not, whenever we get an experience, Space is there.

Space makes it possible to join units, but it does not give any information as to the quality of the unit. Without original-assimilation Space objects and experiences could not materialize. Original-assimilation Space cannot define the objects encountered or give details about experiences.

Original-assimilation Space has two important functions. It helps to build up Assimilations and it is an inborn phenomenon.

Original-assimilation Space is always there when Assimilations such as comparison, creation of numerical series and the formation of units, as well as their various combinations are in progress. Space allows for the possibility to join and put units next to each other, so its presence is essential. If Space were not there to allow for putting at least two units together, there could never be any comparison, combination of numerical series and creation of units.

As said before, Space is an essential part of our other three Assimilations. And because those three Assimilations are within us, Space has also to be within us.

Time is another original-assimilation. It accompanies each experience, whether connected with reality or non-reality. Only man`s very first experience can do without original-assimilation Time.

We define the term Time as follows: A chance for a change. Time itself is nothing real, but it makes things possible. That is why one experience can take the place of another or former experience. Details of any experience are not given by original-assimilation Time. Reality has taught us how different impressions can be. Each impression has its particular Assimilation-combinations, so any change from certain Assimilation-combinations to a different pattern involves Time. Let us deal with the three well known Assimilations once more. They can be put together in various ways. The process is within ourselves and Time is needed for this process. That proves that Time is within us, too. The fact that we need Time whenever we get the chance to have Assimilations put together shows that Time is quintessential for having experiences. That is why Time must necessarily be an original-assimilation.

Only via Assimilations can we draw conclusions and get experiences. Only Assimilations can give an exact and accurate description of any object in our world.

Let us look at the film studios once more. The faculties to compare units, combine numbers and create more and bigger units are inborn and suffice to describe buildings accurately.

Colours can be distinguished from one another by saying that a certain colour is double as bright as or three times darker than another colour. Any changes concerning shapes can also be measured exactly. When we enter the room and touch the buildings, we register the quality of the material selected to build them. Its hardness can be compared to other materials and we might describe it as three and a half times more resistant and five times rougher and more uneven than the material used near the opening. This definition is just one of the many definitions possible to describe the consistence of the buildings.

Once more we realize that the three Assimilations are adequate to give enough information in order to see the buildings as they really are.

When doctors declare that our sensory organs receive information from the buildings, they are right. But according to our definition the information received is nothing but a part of this object. A part that itself is only constructed due to the divers combination of Assimilations within ourselves! If we wanted to, we could state: the information of our sensory organs provoke the illusion to have a source independent of us. The truth is that this information is nothing but a special Assimilation-combination, which has its origin in the work the CPUgeneral does within us.

AFF is the faculty of man to notice the Assimilations, that means, man becomes aware of what CPUgeneral carried into effect

Although CPUgeneral combines Assimilations, the Assimilations must also be noticed to become an experience. AFF is the faculty enabling us to register the effect of the CPUgeneral`s performance.

AFF are the first three letters of "affected". Because the expression has been found appropriate, we used the first three letters of the word to name a situation that entails a lot more than "affected" conveys.

AFF is a necessity. CPUgeneral has the capability to create inummerable Assimilation-combinations. But we need a faculty, which enables us get aware of those Assimilation-combinations. Because to create something is quite different from to get aware of it.

The faculty to get to know what CPUgeneral has put together, is named AFF.

XII

The activities of CPUgeneral create various Assimilation-combinations which are reflected by the AFF. This process creates experiences.

CPUgeneral on its own, is independent, that means outside, of every possible experience.

Because it is the creator of every possible experience - and with that everything we ever can hear, see, feel, think, etc. - CPUgeneral itself is not subject to any form of subjugation and it cannot be described in any way by Assimilation-combinations. Because CPUgeneral with the aid of AFF is the reason for every possible experience we can ever have, its creation - the experience - is not enough to state what the CPUgeneral really is. The phenomena "infinity" and "limitation" are also creations of CPUgeneral. And because of it, CPUgeneral is superior and second to none regarding the phenomena in question.

It is possible to conclude the existance of the CPUgeneral due to the fact that various Assimilation-combinations take place. But we never know what it really is.

The above stated is also valid for AFF. The working together of CPUgeneral and AFF is the reason for the existence of any form of experience. So no experience can state anything about the AFF as it really is, there is no access to it. It is, on its own, as independent and not describable as the CPUgeneral.

XIII

Original-assimilation Time is nothing else than the activity of the CPUgeneral and the reflection of this activity by the AFF

We get knowledge about the existence of the CPUgeneral due to its activities. It creates all experiences but it does not leave an experience about itself. But we can describe which effects it has in relation to us, that means in relation to living beings capable of having experiences.

Every activity the CPUgeneral executes in relation to us, is a perpetual performance. That is due to the fact that CPUgeneral itself is independent or outside of any form of experiences. And in relation to us it acts or it does-not-act.

Because CPUgeneral is creating experiences, it will do this forever. And because the original-assimilation Time must become part of every Assimilation-combination at least after the second experience, we can conclude that Time is nothing but the effect of the activities of the CPUgeneral.

XIV

The original-assimilations Time and Space make experiences possible. Further original-assimilations are needed to differentiate the experiences

To find out the specific original-assimilations necessary, we ask ourselves the following question: Which original-assimilations does man need to have his very first experience?

The activity of CPUgeneral is called Unity of the Self. The activity of the CPUgeneral and its reflection by the AFF create awarness. That means being aware of being an individual and having the chance of having innumerable experiences

Only that exists, what can be experienced. From the beginning of our existence onward, we must be aware of our own ourselves.

The experience man gets of himself has been brought forth by the creative activities of CPUgeneral which, as we know, can form units. As we have already shown, whatever CPUgeneral does, it does it forever. Whether or not CPUgeneral has materials for its units, is irrelevant. It goes on forming units nevertheless.

Although the CPUgeneral has no material for a person`s very first experience, it is capable of forming a unit. One unit is referred to us as Unity of the Self.

CPUgeneral as regards its activities has no limitations whatsoever, so even the very first experience of a person might be made up of countless Unities of the Self.

Wherever a unit is created, it is clear that something exists . Something that is responsible for the creation of the unit. The experience of the Unity of the Self proves the existance of a faculty, which is responsible for the creation of this Unit. We call this faculty awareness.

Awareness is the working together of CPUgeneral and AFF. This working together creates the experience of the Unity of the Self. The existence of such an experience proves the existence of awareness, or individuality.

So we can state: the coming together of CPUgeneral and AFF creates awarness, individuality.

XVI

CPUgeneral creates Unities of the Self from the first experience onward. CPUgeneral forms units whether it has building material at its disposal or not. All types of units can be put together. By combining any Unities of the Self to get bigger units, the Unities of the Self themselves act as building materials. Bigger units can be building material for even bigger units, and so on.

The process mentioned above is sufficent to state that even our complex world is constructed in the same way.

Let us give an example. We look at a building made of squared sandstones, each of them is nothing but a special Assimilation-combination. If we crash such a stone, we get a lot of small particles differing in size, weight, colour, internal structure and in many other ways. All these differences can be measured by a special mathematical system. Even the smallest particle of the stone can be called a unit. A detailed information about its contents is given. One unit might contain three sub-units, two of the three may be made up of two Unities of the Self each, whereas the third sub-unit consists of four Unities of the Self.

By means of the system described above differences can be defined exactly and the results are mathematically precise.

Some people might be of the opinion that such a mathematically precise system is good in virtual realities like constructing something on the computer or processing something within our mind, but that we are not allowed to state reality is build up the same way.

This opinion can be cut short. As we explained before, each experience is created by means of Assimilations which are the products of the working together of CPUgeneral and AFF. That means whatever there is in the world and all our inside experiences are created in our inmost self. The marked difference between these experiences is caused by a person`s CPUgeneral which is obliged to perform as the other person`s CPUgeneral do when facing reality.

XVII

Man creates his world. The performance of our CPUgeneral and AFF make this wonder possible

Although CPUgeneral and AFF cannot be described, we know that their team-work brings forth awareness. Every human being possesses these qualities and together with the qualities of other men, we are destined to build up our world.

The Unity of the Self is the smallest building-stone in our world. All other stones consist of Unity of the Self combinations. The building-stones making up reality are the same that create thoughts and feelings. The difference between reality on the one hand and thoughts and feelings on the other hand, has nothing to do with different building-stones. The CPUgeneral of each person is obliged to combine identical Assimilations in order to be in accordance with the CPUgeneral of all other persons dealing with real things within reality. However, this is not true of thoughts and feelings, which are made up of countless diverse Assimilations. Whatever one person does within our reality, everybody in our reality has to reproduce it as identical Assimilation-combination within himself. This is a law of our reality.

Each and everybody in our reality has in his inmost self everything whatever happened within the reality as unconscious Assimilation-combinations. This is proved by the fact that we are in agreement with all other persons in the description of the reality.

All men are the products of two faculties we can neither get to know nor describe. CPUgeneral and AFF do not reveal their true selves, but we are aware of their performances.

The working together of CPUgeneral and AFF has the possibility to make everything we can imagine real. Skills, which we link to God, are all achievable by everybody.

Whatever there is beyond the bond between CPUgeneral and AFF, we cannot comprehend. However, the fact is, there is something there.

Translation by

Inge Falkenberg

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SABATIEU

Part I

INTRODUCTION

Who would think to design and build a house without having a basic knowledge of architetcure? No structural engineer would be given permission to calculate the stability of skyscrapers could he not prove to have had the very minimum of background in this field. The simplest of surgical procedures are only successful when he who holds the scalpel has successfully completed his medical training. No one would practice any respectable profession without employing its necessary theoretical requirements (e.g. knowing what materials are needed to build a house, what the laws of statics are, or how the human body works). If one were to proceed without this base knowledge, simple reality would immediately point out his error.

That is not to say that in the beginning, seen from an historical point of view, the fields of arcitecture, statics, and medicine did not follow the same line of empirical reason. That is, one discovers the rules of the trade through trail and error, and the more practice, the more precise the results.

We have inherited the rules from previous generations, and so it follows that an ever increasing accumulation over time allows those of us who want to practice a particular field to draw from an abundance of theoretical knowledge. This process seems to be a simple one that we have come to accept under the name of "education." It is so accepted, in fact, that it would never occur to anyone to challenge the belief: one learns the trade before one excercises it. This all means, therefore, that we do not have to start again at the point where our forefathers once had to.

What is valid for doctors and architects is just as valid for every science of man. Every scientist will first apply those laws he inherited before researching new ones. And is it not just as true that all professions that require education or training have one thing in common: before one works in the field of his choice, he will necessarily need to come to terms with those laws that regulate his pursuits.

He will further discover what exactly he can do with these laws (i.e. their use) and how far their boundaries lie (i.e. their limitations). He knows, in other words, what tools he has before him, for what purpose they are made, and for which ends they were not designed. A structural engineer knows where he can apply his knowledge and where it has relative meaning. Equally, he realizes that his knowledge cannot be exerted in all fields, for instance, it will not allow him to carry out surgical procedures.

This principle, namely the ability to distinguish where one can apply his knowledge from where he cannot, is successfully utilized time and time again in everyday life. No rational being would swim the ocean without knowing how to swim, just as no one with common sense would attempt to walk through a moving vehicle as though it didn«t exist.

This brings us to the profession for which we were all designed. One which we exercise continually, yet of whose instruments we hardly understand the real functions: that of "Being."

"Being" is the principle ability to do and be all that, which is somehow and sometime possible for us. "Being" includes everything that we can undertake, everything that we busy ourselves with, and everything we can imagine doing and being (being active in "reality" as well as being subjective such as in thoughts, ideas, feelings, and even dreams).

Just as "Being" is responsible for every activity we set into place, it is just as relevant for every job, every science, and for everything elso we do and are. As we already established, individual jobs and activities demand special abilities or principles to be able to carry them out. In order to do this, "Being" has created special sciences, which come to terms with the core requirements of particular activities.

But it is the original and essential "Being" which assigns value to all careers and activities that concern us. Only after this value has been established, does the “Being“ create different sciences in order to deal with the chosen careers and activities in an adequate manner.

This means that a doctor must have the knowledge about the appropiate laws that apply to his specific field in order to be successful. Success is measured, in the case of a doctor, by the ability to maintain the patient«s well-being or by bringing the patient to health. Failure is likewise expressed when health ailments cannot be brought under control, or in unfortunate cases, when careless treatment worsens the patient«s condition. In order to have the opportunity of being a good doctor, “Being“ created a science that deals with this field. Namely medicine.

When we choose to examine "Being" more closely, we don´t intend to look at it to analyze its different form of sciences (e.g. what is required to become a successful doctor) that it created.

Rather, we need to analyze why and how "Being" leads to and is relative to everything we do (and in this way leads to every individual form of science). We will investigate how the original and essential “Being“ functions. It is this part of the “Being“ which gives everything that we are able to do its special meaning (activities in reality as well as those in a spiritual relm).

From this point of view, the question then becomes, why does one choose to become a doctor, and not what are the specific requirements of becoming one.

"Being" is, furthermore, expressed individually, whereby each person sets his own priorities. It is the individual who chooses (though we have not yet established how this "self decision" functions in "actuality") which activities are important to him and which he will exercise.

In order to clarify which part of the “Being“ (namely the original and essential “Being“) we need to look closer within our investigation. Let us observe a simple chain of events within an individual«s day:

A man, who has chosen a career in banking, passes another car going 55 mph on a city street, eats lunch at a fast-food joint, insults his colleagues back at work, brings his wife flowers after work, and ends his day with his wife at the opera.

In order to be a banker, he had to learn the specific laws of his profession. To have been able to successfully pass his fellow driver, he must have had previous experience in estimating whether or not it was at all possible to pass in this situation; he must have learned the special laws of "passing" in the city. In order to eat fast-food for lunch, he had to know that such a thing existed and how to get there. Once again, he had to follow learned rules. To succeed in swearing at his colleagues, he must know that they will understand this behavior, and so again it is necessary for him to follow those rules belonging to this action.

Quite clearly, every individual act listed made it necessary, as long as the individual wanted to be sucessful in doing these actions, to follow the approved rules. Though some actions require more preparation than others, our banker«s success in carrying out each of his actions was totally reliant on the "education" of laws and practice he was able to assemble before the point of action.

To correctly complete these actions, "Being" has developed its own "science" created for exactly this purpose.

But it is the original and essential "Being" that plays the essential role in dictating the banker«s choice to work in a bank as opposed to any number of other jobs. Similarily, it is the original and essential "Being" that guided his belief that passing a car at 55mph was a better idea than simply remaining behind; or that his desire was to eat fast-food instead of trying a closer place; or that he judged it opportune to insult his colleagues rather than try to settle their differences in a peaceful way; or that he chose this day to bring his wife flowers instead of using his time and energy with a cold beer at the local bar.

In all of these cases, his original and essential "Being" is responsible for having assigned a certain level of value for each given action. He has chosen, as each individual will do, one action and not another.

The original and essential “Being“ is responsible for whatever we want to do. In order to do this "correctly", even in the case of actions we do for the first time, “Being“ has designed specific sciences whose job it is to make each action aware of its inherent logic. The science of medicine is, therefore, the task of learning how to better understand the human organism.

We already understand how the sub-sciences operate, which we are not concerned with. We are essentially focused on understanding the original and essential "Being." Namely: Why do we assign specific value to our activities? Why do we judge one thing more important than another? Why do we set particular goals and have certain wishes?

Let us return once more to our banker. His original and essential "Being" leads to certain activities which he carries out, and rejects other possibilities, which he chooses not to do. He could have chosen to take public transport instead of driving, but he rejected this possibility.

At the same time, there are other activities that our banker does not exercise (is not able to exercise) on his own. It is these activities that his original and essential "Being" demands of other individuals of the society in which he lives. He expects that there are doctors who can examine him if he is sick; that there are mechanics who can repair his car when it has problems; that there are farmers who produce the food he needs to survive, etc.

If each of these jobs did not exist in his society, his original and essential "Being" would lead to much different activities. Instead of becoming a banker, he would have possibly become a farmer for simple survival reasons. He couldn«t have passed someone in his car, perhaps, because after his last crash, his car is still sitting there, unable to be repaired as there is no mechanic. Perhaps he would have become a specialist in herbal medicine so that he could compensate, at least in part, for the lack of a doctor«s presence.

Today we are very much aware of the inner logic behind the sciences that we practice, jobs we practice, as well as the diverse actions that we take part in. And so, we should also be able to become aware of the inner logic of the original and essential “Being.“

The reason for this is clear when we see that the architect can only perform with success when he knows how to construct a house--when he knows the laws of statics and what materials are neccessary for its completion--just as the doctor«s skill relies on his knowledge of how the body works.

Similarily, our inherent job of the original and essential "Being" is only well practiced when we know the rules involved. Our success is reliant on the ability to recognize the principles (i.e. laws that are valid for every human being, without exeption) of the original and essential "Being" and knowing where their boundaries lie.

A structural engineer who doesn«t have command of his job (i.e. he doesn«t understand the laws of his science) will construct houses that collapse. A doctor who doesn«t have command will make false diagnoses and will thus harm rather than help his patients.

Our banker, and every other person respectively, will always evoke situations that he doesn«t want if he doesn«t have control of his original and essential "Being" (i.e. when he doesn«t understand the inner-logic of the original and essential "Being,").

If he insults his colleaugues from time to time, he shouldn«t wonder why they seek revenge, maybe even a month later, perhaps, by complaining to his superiors. Or, say, when he chooses to go 55mph in a 35mph speed zone that he could be heavily fined.

What happens to an individual who carries out the techniques of original and essential "Being" in a poor manner can also relate to entire groups of individuals.

If the bank manager isn«t able to uphold his bank«s accounts, then sooner or later the bank will have to face liquidation.

If an entire population (or a multitude of a state«s inhabitants) is poorly informed about the inner rules-of the original and essential "Being," then the single poor performances of original and essential "Being" will be multiplied. Examples of multiplied outcomes might be civil war, war with neighboring states, or dictatorship. It is often the case that the undesireable events affecting an entire group are the direct results of the same individuals who enacted their original and essential "Being" inappropriately.

Our banker has experiential knowledge that insulting those at the workplace can harm his career. He recognizes, in this case, that his abuse could result in a reprimand by his superiors.

If the managers of a bankrupt bank choose to continue in this profession, they will only improve their skills by avoiding or minimizing similar mistakes in the future. In order to accomplish this, though, they will necessarily have to better improve the understanding of a banker«s inner-logic. If they refuse to undergo this step, then the next flop has already been quasi programmed.

Too, if an entire population who is responsible for civil war or dictatorship doesn«t learn how better to command the inner-logic of their original and essential "Being," then the next war or dictatorship is essentially inevitable.

The structural engineer who miscalculates his construction has the chance to improve his inadequate knowledge. Better yet, the very science of statics today has developed to such an extent that his chances to improve are even greater. The bankers will perhaps have it more difficult because the job is more complex and this results in the erection of more and more schools--more schools have been founded to fill a need where the science is unclear, and to satisfy those who demand such a form of education--and they tend to argue continuously with another on the contents of their theses.

It is even more difficult for the population that has just suffered--yet caused this outcome--a war or dictatorship. After a devastating war, a cruel despotic governmnet could convince a majority of the population to avoid another war and also to fight against another tyranny.

Indeed, the overall scheme of events are so complex and difficult to sort out that the actual individuals won«t find it easy to understand how their own faulty utilization of the original and essential "Being" could have led to such negative developments in their society (war and dictatorship).

It is even more difficult to work through because to date there hasn«t been one generally recognized science for the original and essential "Being." Those ready to learn are not able to fall back on an index of Principles (i.e. laws or a set of patterns accepted as absolute) considered valid and readily available, and approved by everyone. Principles with which they could first be made aware of their past mistakes, then improve their individual outcomes of the original and essential "Being," and finally avoid those mistakes in the future.

This index of priciples is absolutely necessary to find.

If a structural engineer falsely calculates the house design due to his defect knowledge, the house will cave in. If a banker operates under inadequate knowledge, it could result in bankruptcy.

When the individuals of an entire population or state function with insufficient knowledge about the inner rules of the original and essential "Being," their shortage can result in war, dictatorship, programs against minorities, etc..

There is one science that does grapple with the principles of the original and esential "Being": philosophy.

This science is different from all other sciences in that it gives priority to the understanding of the original and essential "Being" and in so doing, it explains everything, including the value of all other sciences.

In dealing with the principles of the original and essential “Being“, philosophy gives us more information about ourselves. Because we are the ones who set all of our actions, philosophy can not only give us more information about ourselves, but also more information about that which we create.

This is how philosophy gives us the possibility to be aware of mistakes in our lives. On the other hand, philosophy enacted incorrectly or even consciously misused could result in negative developments (where even the most well-known schools direct their followers toward war and dictatorship). This is not the fault of philosophy as a science, but rather of those who have created and who have accepted such philosophical systmes without having sufficiently scrutinized them.

We are the source of all our own activities, and as a result, philosophy can assign all of the manifestations of these activities into a place of understanding. Philosophy, as we understand it, is the successive uncovering of the principles of the original and essential "Being "

Throughout life, it is continuously possible to discover these principles (again, a principle is a law or a set of patterns accepted as absolute). Once these principles are revealed, they should be mapped so that their meanings and places can be assigned for all to see. Step-by-step we can learn about our activities of the original and essential "Being."

Philosophy, as the science of the original and essential "Being," would only be fulfilled when we reach 100% clarity about ourselves.

As it is now, we know very little about ourselves, so the final and definitive goal of philosophy should be to erase all unclarities concerning our original and essential "Being." In order to accomplish this eventually, we need to steadfastly endeavor to bring more and more principles to light, and to become more and more aware of their constitution.

The more we learn about ourselves, the better we will discover the reason for opposing beliefs. Not that today, in the very beginning of our search, we can claim that all differences of opinion can be settled in mutual agreement--it is possible, but not necessarily so. It is, in fact, too early to judge at this point in time. What philosophy can certainly do at the very least is to explain why differences of opinion exist at all. In other words, if differences and conflicts are at all to be resolved, it will be with the guidance of philosophy.

The task at hand is really to look more closely at our original and essential "Being" by further developing the science of philosophy. In so doing, we can hope to come closer to knowing how we function, and can become aware of our own intellectual process, and even to discover parts of ourselves we are not yet aware of.

The way we will do this is to find, with the help of everyday situations, principles (something that is valid for everyone); to analyze them in the context of their relationships to the original and essential "Being," to determine how much or how little the principles have to do with one another, and finally to test whether or not certain principles are derived from other, more basic principles.

If such principles are derived from other more basic principles, then we will examine these, and deduce even further to determine if they are not still greater derivatives of more basic principles.

A basic question at hand is how far we can deduce, and if we can even come to find the absolute fundamental principles, or "original principles" (principles off which all other principles are built); to ask, too, whether or not original principles exist at all.

One thing can be said: the more principles we can demonstrate, and the more we can uncover of their constitution, the more extensive our knowledge will reach into the sphere of the original and essential "Being," and the greater opportunity we will have to be aware of ourselves.

PART I

In order to survive, all people are continually forced to make decisions. Every resolution established is a choice decision, as we always have the ability to select it or to leave it.

If asked why we deal with an intillectual principle instead of dealing with one related to the actual physical make-up of a person (flesh and bones), the answer is a simple one:

The understanding of the physical body is given to the science of medicine, whereas we want to reveal the very core of our "Being." We want to discover what elements play what roles; to examine our skills of "doing/acting" and "feeling/sensing" (dreams, ideas, feelings).

All action, just as its manifestations are visibly "real" for all, actually finds its origin in invisible, so-called "intellectual" principles.

Everything felt, although it might have "real" causes, also takes place within this "invisible" and "intellectual" world within us.

With every decision we make, we establish a goal, and in order to accomplish it, we are compelled to follow certain rules, which we do "voluntarily."

The very act of making decisions, setting goals and following certain rules are principles that are inseperable from the laws of the original and essential "Being." Human beings have acted according to these principles as long as they have existed.

One is more often not even aware of the decisions he makes, nor of setting a goal, nor of the moment when he behaves in compliance to the rules in reaching that goal (to make it real).

A few examples will demonstrate what is meant by this.

A native Indian living in the deep jungle of the Amazons decides to hunt in order not to starve. This is why he sets himself a goal, namely to kill one or more animals of the jungle. To manage this, he must participate in the rules of the hunt: he tests his weapon, takes care of any malfunctions, leaves the villiage with other tribe members (because multiple hunters will necessarily multiply their success), creeps through the thicket bent over, etc.. He has followed these rules "voluntarily" (i.e. no one has ordered him to conform to these steps) by having learned from experience that this pattern can lead him to his goal.

Another example takes us to the bank employee. He will write a business letter, one of many integral to his job. He chose this job as he needs to earn a living, and he needs money, quite simply, to survive. (Of course there are a multitude of other reasons for his specific choice in banking, but for our purposes it is important to see that one of his main reasons to work at a job is to earn money, which is necessary for his survival).

Following this line of reason, we return to the Indian, who doesn«t want to starve. Instead of hunting, he could choose to gather fruits of the jungle, or even to grow a vegetable garden. All of these decisions change the very matter of his objectives, change, too, the contents of the rules he will follow to reach a particular goal.

What remains constant is that principle that says if he has a decision he wants to make real, he must set objectives, and in order to realize the objectives, he must follow those rules inherent in this process.

We experience the same in the banker«s case. He could very well have chosen another career in order to earn a living. He could also ask a colleague to write his letter and instead of writing, choose another activity. He could even do without writing the letter at all, and instead call his business partner to directly communicate whatever is necessary, etc.

When the Indian now tills the soil and plants the seeds for his vegetable garden, and the banker assembles the necessary paper and typewriter for getting his letter out, we have just seen a basic similarity at work: both of them do these actions to survive.

Many decisions, in following the order of their objectives, lead to sub-decisions. Writing the business letter is an example of a sub-decision of the decision to become a banker. He can now consider on down the line to what kind of typewriter he will use, if his wording will be friendly or more professionally reserved, the letter can be short or long, and he can sign in red, blue, green or black, etc.

Our Indian can dig short or longer furrows in his garden. He can choose from a number of possible vegetables to grow, and plant one or many. He can shape his garden square or elongated, etc. In these cases, the shape of the Indian«s garden is related to the color of pen the banker uses to sign his letter by the fact that each creator has decided to survive in a distinct manner.

II.

The planting of the Indian«s garden and the writing of the banker«s business letter are visible (real) outcomes of the subjugation under the rules necessary to reach a self-imposed goal; namely, that of survival (the fact that the goal to survive is self-imposed is shown in the cases where the individual has the choice to act in such a way that surviving becomes impossible but chooses not to).

The effort to reach one´s self-imposed goal can occur in one«s consciousness or unconsciousness (i.e. in one«s power of reason or in one«s inner driving force).

Even in the case when objectives are not in one«s consciousness, they are still directed by the subject as every set of objectives is the result of a decision he made before. The fact that each person is the creator of his own decisions (we don`t care about the circumstances which lead to to his decision. It´s only important here, that the individual person makes a specific decision and wants to make this decision real) makes him also the creator of the objectives that belong to each decision.

One might ask what the case is if there are no exsisting objectives for the Indian when gardening or hunting. What if his actions are only the result of pure chance?

Let us not forget that by such complicated acts, like hunting or planting a garden, that the acting individual had plenty of chances to act in tens of thousands of other ways (i.e. to decide differently).

In such a complicated process of implementation as "going on a hunt" represents, it is really unthinkable to relate his outcomes to "chance" as the multitudes of other possible acts (e.g. begin singing all of a sudden, throwing one«s head against a tree, or turning somersaults,etc.) were also at the Indian«s disposal, and therefore, rules out a "chance" result.

(If pure "chance" behavior were possible, how would this "chance" "emerge?"

Before any “chance“ occurs, decisions are made which lead to that which allows the “chance“ to occur. These decisions, once again, are made by the individual (consciously or unconsciously). So we see that a decision has to be made by an individual in order for “chance“ to emerge.)

Because the decisions are made by the individual, and because this decision is "followed" (i.e. instead of tens of thousands of possible other decisions, only those are made which lead to the continuation of the act, e.g. hunting), we can say that the fact that something simply happened in the process of survival (and not a countles number of other possible decisions that could even lead to a person not being able to survive) is practical proof that an action bound by "law" (i.e. an action obligated to a set of objetcives) has been carried out.

Let us suppose that our two creators, the Indian and the banker, drop the idea of planting a garden and writing a business letter, but then in order to survive, they will be forced to do something else (It is the principle that a set of objectives that one has decided to reach (in this case to do that which is necessary to survive.) can only be attained by following a certain set of rules). It is clear in the case of planting a garden or writing a letter, that these actions are the result of following essential rules. Both take place with the purpose to reach their goal (to survive), and both are "visible" shapes of the following principle: Every decision to do something automatically puts those rules into place that must be followed in order for the decision maker to be able to reach his objectives in reality.

If one does not comply to the rules, then the objectives are no longer attainable. In this case, it means that if the Indian does not plant his garden, then he will not be able to harvest at the appropriate time. And then, too, if he does not hunt or do anything else to feed himself, then he will be incapable of attaining his objective (survival), and death will be of consequence.

The same occurs in the case of the banker in writing his letter. If he suddenly avoids writing the letter, which is an integral part of his job, and continues his behavior of avoiding the task, and instead, he chooses to just sit around (i.e. he refuses to do the tasks necessary to the objectives of being a banker, and fails continuously to fulfill them) and also refuses to do something else to secure a job--or go on welfare--then he will not receive any money, and, finally go hungry.

Both examples point out that in order to survive, it is necessary to carry through with specific actions. If one chooses to forego these acts, then he must take on other ones, for they are the consequence of the basic decision to survive.

Let us now turn to decisions, which are not necessary to deal with due to daily life reasons. Decisions that I could refuse to make and would not result in interfering with my ability to survive. Remember, every resolution is the result of a decision. If one only thinks of something, then there must have been a decision made to address this subject.

Examples of this type of decision can be seen in the following resolutions: "As far as it is possible, I want to take action against this war" and "As far as it is possible, I want to fight against this tyrant."

It might seem at first that these two examples are incongruous to this type of decision. If one opposes a war, he can either avert the possible terrible outcomes himself or protect others from harm.

It is obvious that every war averted also preserves others from harmful outcomes, and in some wars, one can come out with his life. But this hasn«t to do with the type of decision at hand.

This type of decision, where one opposes a war (or a tyrant)--which poses no direct life-threat to the decision maker, cannot harm him.

What is important to point out is that in special situations, certain people make these types of decisions eventhough they can do just as well to avoid them (war or tyrants) by not making this type of decision or substituting this decision with another similar decision--without this abstention resulting in specified outcomes in their future lives. Their lives are not put in danger as a result of non-participation.

From this point on, we will address the first type of decision (covered in the previous chapter) as Decision-Type Survival (= Decision-Type S ) to represent the examples of the decision type we explored in the first chapter (the banker and Indian in their goal of survival). Decision-Type Non-Survival (= Decision-Type N ) will represent the second type of decision we just touched upon in this chapter, whereby the subject does not have to reach his objectives in order to survive. The Decision-Type N is represented by the statements "As far as it is possible, I want to take action against this war" and "As far as it is possible, I want to fight against this tyrant."

To continue with the Decision-Type N, let us look at the example of Germany«s involvement in the Gulf War (1991). People gathered in front of the American Embassy to protest the bombing of Iraq. Many were there, having made the decision that, "as far as it is possible, I want to take action against this war," and they used their participation in protest to achieve this goal.

There is a large number of protesters in Germany who neither had relatives in Iraq, nor had a job at stake because of the war, and none of the protestors had to worry all that much about Iraqi retaliatory measures resulting in terrorist attacks in Germany--no German troops took part in the active war front, and attacks would have certainly taken place on other nations« soils. The decision "to take action against this war" did not directly help to secure the lives of those who protested. We should ask why a person gets involved in such activity in the first place?

In order to better answer this question, we will take a further look into the differences between Decision-Type S and Decision-Type N.

The main distinction that can be made is that Decision-Type S is noted for its will to survive, whereas Decision-Type N is reached without directly influencing one«s own survival. In other words, we are forced in life to meet Type S decisions, but enter Decision-Type N completely voluntarily.

More empirical differencesbetween Type-S and Type-N decisions will be shown:

It´s a principle that is valid for all sets of objectives: one who wants to reach a particular objective has to follow those rules which are necessary to accomplish this objective.

The set of objectives of Type N decisions are more difficult to reach than the set of objectives of Type S. In the case of Type S decisions, the way from the decision to do something (e.g. write a business letter) to the realization of this decision is often easier to steer than on the path following Type N.

If he wants to write a business letter, he needs only supply a typewriter, paper, an envelope, and to write the address on the envelope to whom he wants it sent, etc. This process is so clear that he does not need to work it out on an intellectual level. Even those who do not choose or want to write a letter would agree that when writing a letter, particular "rules" must be applied.

If I along with others want to thwart the dictator of a particular state, and we all possess the same set of objectives (to remove the tyrant from the state ranks), the way to get there remains unclear.

We must ask if the best way to bring these goals into reality is by issuing economic sanctions against this state, by militarily interfering, by arranging the assassination of this dictator, or by supporting underground efforts in opposition, etc.?

The path is not as obvious in the case in Decision-Type N, as it is with Decision-Type S.

In many cases, an appropriate conversion of Type N decisions is not possible simply because the goals (=set of objectives) have not been clearly assigned.

Take the example of the resolution to get rid of all dictators.

We have to convice many others of the need to follow through with this resolution in order to actualize it. We will most likely find quite a few who agree, but few who agree where this resolution is applicable.

For some, this resolution would apply only to all communist states, and for others to communist and right-wing extremist regimes are both applicable. Some believe Turkey to be applicable because of the Kurd-bombing in 1992. Others believe it is not applicable to Lybia because the Libyan leadership made efforts to better the lives of its citizens, and that this, therefore, counts more than the dictator Khadafi.

Although many might have chosen to bring this resolution to reality, they had strongly differing opinions as to what this resolution meant for them, i.e. those with the same resolution were partly in disharmony with one another because their objectives were different. This fact is, for the transformation process of the Type N decision, even more detrimental because we need the cooperation of a large group of individuals. These individuals can be of the same will to rid the world of all dictators, but as long as they have differing views (different objectives), their decisions can´t be transferred into reality and at the same time please everyone.

Theoretically, it should be possible for those of differing viewpoints to find a solidly defined set of objectives that everyone can accept as their Type N decision through discussion.

It is equally theoretically true that multiple attempts to find a common way for transforming a Type N decision into reality will lead to the discovery of the ways that best accomplish this goal.

The differences between Type S and Type N are not conclusively unalterable discrepancies. With necessary effort, they can be solved at once or over time. The only true fundamental difference lies in the fact that Decision-Type N is not made to result in one«s own survival.

III.

A sub-group exists within Decision-Type N, which is necessary to deal with as it«s practical implementation stands out from that of that of the Decision-Type N itself. It seems to follow the transformation of the objectives into reality as the Type S decision, but in actuality it belongs to Type N because it is not an imperative decision made for survival reasons. In order that we not confuse the three, we will entitle this type of decision Type N-2, and the example we give is when the banker chooses to give his wife flowers and our Indian engraves pictures in the walls of a cave.

It is clear to see that in both cases, the question of survival is not pressing. The transformation of their decisions into reality (bringing flowers and engraving pictures) furthermore, does not issue a problem to complete.

The rules that must be adhered to for each action are also easy to recognize. The banker needs to have money at his disposal, know where to buy the flowers, and be sure to be at the flower shop during its open-hours, etc. Likewise, the Indian needs to have a sharp object, know where he wants to carve, and to be able to visualize the objects as he draws them so that they transform into the figures he has chosen.

There is also no problem of participation from the integral others who must take part in the process to make the decision real. The salesperson at the flower shop willingly trades money for flowers, and the Indian can easily convince the others, if he so chooses, to be left alone during his task.

In Type N-2 decisions, one can learn very quickly how to let the objectives become reality. But the question remains, Why one chooses such objectives (e.g. bringing flowers, etc.)! Our Indian could have been bored, or maybe he wanted to put his unused skills to test, or to try to strengthen the powers of his recollection, or possibly he wanted to hand something down to his descendants, or any number of other possibilities. In the example of the banker, he might have made this decision in hopes to make stronger ties with his wife, make her happy, or even in order to enjoy the flowers himself.

There is one of many reasons possible in both cases, and whether or not the subject is even aware of why he chose this Type N-2 decision is another question altogether. The fact of import is that the subject can avoid this sort of decision without endangering his life.

IV.

In summary, there are two groups of decisions: one group is made in order to survive, the other is made eventhough these kinds of decisions are not necessary in any way to survive.

The first group is the Decision-Type S, and the second group comprises both the Decision-Type N and Type N-2.

How one is able to transfer the decisions of Type S and Type N-2 into reality is generally obvious, whereas a Type N decision makes it very difficult to follow a simple line into actualization.

The inquiry of why one makes the decision in the first place is only clear with Type-S, whereas the second group supplies a multitude of possible bases.

The preferences held by the Type N-2 decision maker can be expressed either consciously or unconsciously. It is easy to understand why one makes these decisions as the preferences are easy to realize--buying flowers, making carvings in stone, going on vacation, etc. At this point we are not aware of why an individual has the preferences he does, but we do know that fulfilling them is simple in this case,

Moreover, one is aware that in making a Type-N decision, the way in transfering the preference into reality is long and hard. Why should one take on such a process, whose attainment doesn«t even lead to measurable returns.

Are those who attempt to bring Decision-Type N into reality idealists--those who fight for the improvement of others« lives, who they don«t even know? Are they moralists who take action against the egoism of others, or do they only want to make others aware of the injustice involved, or possibly even something else? The types of reasons that these reflect do not derive from visible personal advantages, and so the dubious nature of their purpose remains.

Let us now pursue why one makes and follows through with Type N decisions. It can be hoped that by following an empirical line and analyzing it, we can come closer to answering our question.

Look at the example we already provided of the protestors in Germany who were against the Allies« bombing of Iraqi cities in 1991. They fought against the United States as it was primarily responsible for the war-alliance. If we were now to ask the demonstrators why they protested, we might hear, "Because we are against this war!"

"War" itself is a concept, and any concept takes on the meaning assigned to it. For some, "war" is an honorable display of power, whereas for others it is terror, a taker of innocent lives, a massacre and a devastation. We then have to ask why the latter do not like this war, why it should be abandoned, and what reasons they have against it.

Some of those "asked" gave only one reason, but the majority had more than one argument. The following explanations of the protestors are not completely listed here, but are meant to give a cross-section of possible responses:

The reasons why the protesters are against this war:

"Because every war is horrible;"

"Because too much is destroyed in warfare;"

"Because too many innocent are made victims as a result of an action they had no say in (the conquest of Kuwait);"

"Because the right of the powerful is validated (here, the Americans);"

"Violence never solves anything,"

"One cannot just allow others to be killed;"

"War" (in this case the attack of the Allies) produces a spiral effect of fighting being answered with more fighting, and it is absolutely necessary to interrupt this vicious circle."

If yet another answer reads, "It is all in the interest of the weapons industry," we would ask what the protestor has against this outcome specifically, to which he might respond, "Their interests should not be permitted to take the lives of others."

Let us use the principle already listed in chapter one: If one has a decision he wants to make real, he must set objectives, and in order to realize the objectives, he must follows those rules inherent in this process.

We immediately recognize that all of the answers we were given are resolutions that each individual produced. Resolutions are decisions, and every demonstrator came after the first decision to yet another decision: "I want to play my part in bringing this decision to reality." (Of course, there are those who are also against this war, but who choose not to make any efforts in making this decision real.)

Each demonstrator«s resolution (as many examples provide above) is succeeded by the decision to fight against the war.

Their protest against the war is an attempt to employ the rules adequately; the rules are the steps one must take after the decision (i.e. the reason for opposition) has been made to reach the objective. These resolutions develop their own set of objectives, as follows:

The Objectives:

"We should not allow any more terror;"

"So much destruction in the world should not be permitted;"

"Innocent victims should not be forced into an outcome, that is not in their power to make;"

"The power of the strong should not reign;"

"Violence should not be used to resolve problems;"

"The murdering of others should not be put up with unopposed;"

"One must have the courage to break the spiral of violence--violence should not be answered with violence;"

"Industry should not be allowed to realize their interests at the cost of people«s lives."

Because the reasons to fight against this war were formulated in such a way as if the formulation itself would already prove that these formulations are right, so the objectives that belong to the reasons must also be formulated in this way.

That is to say that the reasons of the protesors and the objectives of those reasons are not meant only to be applicable to this war, but rather claim to be "correct" at all times for every situation. Such reasons and their objectives are general axioms.

The concept of self-axiom , for our purposes, is different from a principle in that it is the individual who creates this rule and considers it applicable only to himself in all circumstances of his life. A general axiom is made by an individual and assumed to be true for all people--not just himself--whereby everyone in all situations should be required to follow this axiom.

Those "asked" justify their protest and their own legitimacy to act by claiming that this war repudiates against thier general axioms.

One might ask how is it that the reasons and the objectives to fight against this war have become general axioms, especially when the protestors themselves did not consider them along these lines?

This is because the protestors justified their actions against this war with arguments.

Those arguments (the reasons to fight against this war and their objectives) are used by the protestors in such a way that they believe that everybody (those who have a healthy way of thinking) who hears those arguments, would accept their formulations one hundred percent.

This means that the protestors didn´t find it necessary to justify their arguments by establishing further arguments because with their pure formulation, everything should have been explained sufficiently.

The protestors justified their fight against this war because in this war things happened which were against their arguments. Because the arguments were, in their beliefs, true without any doubt, fighting against this war became a necessity.

But those resolutions and objectives which the subject takes for granted, as we observe in his behavior, are nothing more than general axioms.

Of course, he who formulates a general axiom believes this to be a self-axiom. The general axiom, "We should not allow any more terror" follows the same belief inherent in his self-axiom that "I am not to allow any more terror."

At the very least, we can admit that the protestors have developed wonderful axioms, whereby it is generally accepted that a world without terror and destruction is a good.

It is striking, however, that many of the "asked" didn«t even stick to their axioms. It seems they took their objectives only in this special case seriously, where they could have tried equally as hard to realize their goals in other ways. They considered their objectives as general axioms only in this case, but these--just as self-axioms--cannot only belong to a single case and avoid other situations, for it would not be an axiom in the first place.

Why did we come to the conclusion that the domonstrators (at least most of them) didn´t follow their own general axioms?

To point this out, let«s look at the objective, "The murdering of others should not be put up with unopposed" as an example. It stands on its own and is not a part of other objectives, like the following for example: "The murdering of others should not be put up with unopposed when cruelty and too much destruction is permitted."

This objective as well as the reason behind this objective are formulated by the indidual in such a way that they stand for themselves and need no further justification.

With this the individual shows that the objective as well as its reason are axioms for him. This means that the individual believes that everyone has to do his part to put a stop to every situation when people are killed (general axiom), or at the very least he has the oblication to do what he can in every situation (self-axiom).

Practically speaking (in reality), the subject who came up with exactly this formulated resolution (this is to say, he doesn´t see the formulation of this resolution as part of another formulation, rather he sees it exactly as it was defined above), would also have to take part, among many other things, in a protest in front of the Chinese Embassy to fight against the delivery of weapons to the Khmer Rouge, who after the "killing fields" were further supplied with weaponry by the Chinese government.

But our demonstrator would also have to be involved in a countless number of other protests against states that engage in killing activities against human beings. Further, he would have to protest in front of the doors of all firms that produce armaments and deliver them to countries continually occupied in warfare. But the list goes on: he must hold a fist to the unusually high crime rate in the United States--where too little seems to have been done--and also work to curb the all-too-many traffic accidents that claim many lives everywhere--also where little seems to have been done.

The demonstrators we "asked," who made this resolution (the murderingof others should not be put up with unopposed) readily admit that they did not engage in the other protests (above), even if they would agree to them.

Their reasons for this are manifold. One engages in a protest in front of the American Embassy when he believes that fighting against the Chinese would be a futile attempt. Other demonstrators say that they woud never think to associate "war" with fighting against crime or deadly traffic accidents.

We conceed that whoever lives by the axiom--the murdering of others should not be put up with unopposed--will also attempt his protest at the doors of other states« embassies as well, and if that doesn«t work, he will attempt to use the pressure of public opinion to influence his government to put trade restrictive measures into place. He will do this simply because any axiom requires him to try all possible measures that could succeed in fulfilling his purpose. It is not entirely unthinkable here that the use of trade embargoes could influence certain states to, if not deter their killing of others entirely, minimize their terror, as we have seen in some examples of history.

Of course, war is very different from other incidents such as traffic accidents or crime-related murder. But all are related by the axiom of "the murdering of others should not be put up with unopposed," and therefore, all examples should be given equal attention at least if one feels bound to, or takes seriously, the axiom he claims.

It is really quite obvious that the demonstrators in our examples violate the very axioms they laid down because their behavior indicates that they do not follow those rules to which they are bound to follow if the axiom were to exist at all.

The demonstrators behaved the same in the case of all the other objectives. Every objective together with its reason was shown to be an axiom by the protestors--without actually being one.

What are our conclusions from all of this?

There are good reasons to believe that the demonstrators didn´t lie in telling us the reasons for their protest. They were certainly convinced that they followed those axioms we listed when protesting against American involvement. However, this was not the case.

The many so-called axioms we gave before for the protestors reasons for fighting against this war were not axioms for them and in this sense not the actual causes of their decision, and so, we can no longer retain our previous list.

Their decision to fight against this war is a valid motive for their actions as their very action against this war proves.

Equally as certain is that there are resolutions which trigger this decision to fight against the war.

Because our list of false axioms is not the true cause for their resolutions--eventhough the demonstrators believe them to be--we will have to compose a new list of reasons and objectives.

Remember, first, that the phrase to "fight against this war" is only a concept, from which one gets only that meaning that he himself gave to it. It must possess the meaning assigned to it precisely because without one«s individual associations with "war" (e.g. death, destruction, etc.), the concept would contain nothing.

The attribution doesn«t have to be reduced to "war" in general, it can also mean this "this war." In "this war" we can observe which groups fight against eachother, and in which situations the conflict takes place, and whereby the roles are cast to determine who is the agressor and who is stronger, etc.

Keep in mind that before the decision to "fight against this war," resolutions had to have been made--not those we mentioned to this point, but there must have been others.

The result of our "inquiry" shows that the demonstrators were not aware themselves of the true resolutions they followed because these resolutions are not known by them--we are convinced that they didn«t lie about their supposed axioms--because of this, we know that these resolutions lie in their unconsciousness.

All of the protestors against the Gulf War have something in common. This is the resolution to "fight against this war." Eventhough they have very different reasons to "fight." According to our "polls," they are convinced that they are aware of their resolutions, but we know that their true resolutions have not yet been revealed.

Because the same research in other examples of the Decision-Type N (and Decision-Type N-2 ) gave us similar results, we can be clear that the inquiry into WHY with Type N (and N-2 ), at least with most of the decisions of this nature, should not be directed at the consciousness of of the person, but rather at the unconsciousness.

We can see from this process that the unconsciousness can principally influence decisions. Therefore, the question of WHY cannot be completely and satisfactorily explained without the inclusion of the unconsciousness.

All people have the principle ability to land impressions.

An impression takes any form of a perception from a given event taking place in reality. If one loses nearly all his sense organs, it could happen that the only thing left to him is the sensation of pressure on his skin, and this pressure can be equated, too, as an impression. When a person«s sense organs are in good functioning order--therefore getting a much different picture of the reality around him--this, too, is an impression.

All people are also inclined to store memories.

A memory is any remainder form of a former impression from his own conceived world, even when it is an incomplete fragment of those impressions. If one is not conscious of his whole impression, but has only an indefinable idea of it, this is also a form of memory. Reversely, one can recreate an experience (i.e. a former impression) to a level of realness, but which only remains as a memory.

All people possess an indefined amount of unconscious memories.

It is easy to determine that we indeed store unconscious memories when, for example, we know that we cannot recall particular experiences that we had (e.g. when one doesn«t remember any longer what a good friend«s party was like), and even with the greatest of effort, cannot bring it to our consciousness, and then it finally occurs to us two weeks later (e.g. how the party was).

In this case, a formerly unconscious memory has been transfered to conscious memory.

Let us return to our construction of a decision.

If one were to hear that the country he wanted to visit on vacation suddenly broke out in unrest, then he would not go. If he were then asked why he is not going, he might respond, "because I don«t want to put my health or life at risk."

This example indicates a conscious impression received from the T.V. and newspaper reports of the unrest, from which he has chosen not to to travel in these conditions based on a self-axiom :

"I will not get involved in those situations I know to be dangerous for my health or unnecessarily risk my life." The decision is then not to travel there because of the information given, which stand in contrast to the self-axiom that existed.

(It should be pointed out here, that the self-axiom is a fact, whose contents are formulated not only by his justifications for not traveling to this country, but also by the mere actuality that he wants to survive.

It is clear that this is an axiom, for throughout his life he has tried to stay alive, and too, avoided those things endanger his very life.

He must have made this axiom a fact of his life, consciously or unconsciously, because every decision to stay alive proves that he did exactly those things that he only would do if he had such a.self-axiom.)

To explore unconscious decisions, let us use the following example:

One was repeatedly bitten by dogs as a child, and now, as a young man, whenever he meets up with a dog, his feelings are mixed with fear and loathing. Because he was so young back then, he doesn«t remember his experiences any longer and even to today, no one has informed him of them.

First when he is informed of the events that took place back then will he be able to better understand his own reactions. Then he can begin to analyze how these affected him.

The following had to have happened to him in his childhood:

He had to decide, even unconsciously, that the experiences he had as a child did not agree with his self-axiom to "avoid unecessary pain."

(It is easy to recognize that he must have had this axiom, even if he was unconscious of it. When small children are hurt, their reactions express that pain is far from a feeling of comfort. When a child screams or attempts to escape the object of his pain (or both), they show through their practical behavior that they do not assign worth to the feelings of pain. This in turn proves that they produce--even without knowing it consciously--this self-axiom.)

From his experiences and this self-axiom, he built a further self-axiom: "I will avoid all contact with dogs since they can hurt me, which I don«t want."

This resolution, most likely unconscious, caused him to respond to dogs with reservation. Even still, a chain of unfortunate events fell upon him, whereby he was bitten twice more.

After this happened, his further self-axiom was not only more strongly confirmed, but also, it was given greater value in his consciousness. The axiom was not entirely conscious to him (this actually works in him on an unconscious level), but the axiom brought him to action (such as avoiding dogs).

(The above example is clear to us when we remember that small children and babies--at least unconsciously--also have self-axioms. The previously explained must be true based on the fact of the dog«s bite as well as the fact of his response to the bite).

After this experience, every time this small child saw a dog, he made a decision (conscious or unconscious) to get out of the way.

At the same time, he experienced how others, such as his mother, repeatedly violated his axiom to "avoid all dogs since they can hurt me, which I don´t want" His mother«s friend always brought her dog on visits. Too, his mother never crossed the street when a dog approached, eventhough he would have, could he have converted his resolution into action.

And so, he had to continually observe how his axiom was violated. He couldn«t do anything against it, he could only watch as his axiom was ignored. For him, then, everytime a dog showed up, he felt the immediate threat of experiencing new pain.

In holding up his axiom, he attempted to convince his mother not to allow her friend to come with the dog, and to cross the street when a dog came, but she only dismissed it as nonsense.

His inability to be active in doing what he had to do (in part due to his mother) caused him to break out in fear.

As he grew older, he forgot these incidents. He couldn«t remember (i.e. the memory was unconscious) any of it, and yet he still experienced the fear that remained from these experiences.

This fear went so far as to cause him to cross the street whenever a dog approached, or he avoided those stores, in front of which a dog was tied, etc..

In other words, he made conscious resolutions (e.g. to cross the street because of a dog) based on conscious feelings (namely, "fear of dogs").

The reason for the fear (i.e. for this resolution; since "fear" stems from oneself, just as every other feeling, and is considered a resolution, like everything else that comes from oneself whether it be action or feelings (which are only varieties of actions) ), however, now lies in the unconsciousness.

These examples are meant to show how both conscious impressions and unconscious memories influence our decisions and the actions which result from these decisions.

How do we differentiate between the concepts "conscious" and "unconscious?"

Together, both are the forms in which our awareness has stored everything that it comes into contact with and can store.

The term form means that consciousness as well as unconsciousness says nothing about the actual content which is stored within awareness, but instead describes whether access to this content is possible or not.

Unconscious means that one«s access to the "somethings" (In this case “something“ stands for everything that can be in ones awareness. From now on, we will use this term to represent any undeclared values) is not presently possible (at least not as long as the somethings are in the unconsciousness).

Conscious, on the other hand, is when one can access somethings in such a way that one can remember them at any time.

The childhood trauma of being bitten by a dog is unconscious, whereas the memory of the hotel stayed at on one«s last vacation is conscious, for example.

It should be pointed out that there is a double meaning of consciousness. On one hand, it means "posibility to access at every time," and on the other hand, it is generally used in everyday speech to mean, "everything I am mindful of/sense at the moment." Though, one can always be thinking of more than he realizes at a given time, and so, it is necessary to deal with this double meaning.

Our idea of consciousness, as described above, will be the concept that one has the "posibility to access the somethings at every time," and we will describe that condition when one realizes something at a particular time as total consciousness.

We will presently define awareness as that which is responsible for storing the somethings, in the form of consciousness or of unconsciousness, and which can call up somethings in the form of total consciousness.

We can only define awareness very broadly at this point, as we hope that the better we learn how to investigate our "original and essential Being," the better possibility we have to gain more accurate knowledge of awareness, and with this, a more acute definition will be available to us. This will not change our current definition, but only broaden the understanding we presently have.

The arrangement that one something is unconscious, whereas another is conscious is not final. We know from experience that it is repeatedly the case when one remembers something all of a sudden, which had been unconscious to him over a shorter or longer period of time. It can relate to a dream sequence, for example. One is walking along the street, has particular impressions, and out of the blue the picture of a specific memory pops into his head, which had been present in his dream the night before. But this is a picture that had been in his unconsciousness until now.

Let«s keep with the dream example when asking a further question.

Assume that this person dreamt of a hot-air balloon ride. The question is then this: Was the subject totally conscious of this activity at the time it occured?

Of course, one is totally conscious of the memory.

If he were to attempt to visualize every detail possible of the memory, he will realize that he had much different priorities in the dream as those he orders in his "normal" life (i.e. in his everyday life). He wasn«t concerned about his job--he didn«t even realize he had one--nor did he think about his appartment, he was only interested in the clouds around him.

If he observed himself the moment after he had deepened his memory of the scene in the dream, then he could observe how he now had a much different emotional attitude compared to a few moments ago. He didn«t think (while remembering his dream) about his job; he recalled some of the images and revelled in them, etc. He could, when observing himself, notice that when he went away from these totally conscious memories, and instead, entered a totally conscious dealing with the real world (such as being conscious of the simple action of walking on the street), that actually a small change in his own awareness took place during this transfer. Both the mood he was in as well as the tendency to see the context changed.

A further example. A movie is being shown again on T.V., which one had seen four years earlier with the woman he was totally in love. This movie holds a tender spot in his memory. He knows exactly how much he liked the plot, how funny the actors were, and how great he thought the production was when he last saw it. Anticipating how great it will be to see it, he sits in front of the T.V., without the girlfriend from back then, though, since this relationship fell apart. Now, he experiences the movie to have mediocre quality and actors, and in the last two years he has seen the same plot performed much better in other movies. Quite simply, this time he finds the movie completely different from what he saw four years earlier. He goes so far as to consider what he saw back then completely stupid.

Both times he saw the movie, he was totally conscious of the situation, and yet he judged them fully differently; the one and the same unchanged object (the movie) affected him in entirely different ways.

Another example. Our banker is at work. While talking on the phone, he searches for the right words that will win over his business partner«s trust in order to gain an investment opportunity. He has strewn his car documents without thinking all over his desk, and straigtens his tie after the phone conversation. He does just that what a banker might do.

Another scene. Our banker is on vacation in southern Italy. In shorts, he complains that the Italians are tourist antagonists by not permitting him into the cathedrals. He keeps his car documents in a safe place in an inside pocket, and while he bargains with the guy at the market for some grapes, he is constantly alert that no one will try to steal from him.

Another scene. Our banker is learning how to ski. The boots are tight, the wind is cold, and he can hardly see the ski instructor through the heavy fog. He falls again, and the snow gets into his collar. He curses the winter, and at the same time knows that he´ll be with the skii group the next day anyways.

Now the banker is sitting at home, and in visualizing the situations, establishes that in all three situations he not only acted differently, but also that he had set much different priorities in each situation. In southern Italy, it was important for him to visit a lot of cathedrals. There, in such a short period of time, he went through more museums than he would back at home in an entire year. He thought, when he had made the plans, what more there would be to see, and how he could best hide his money in the night, etc. In other words, he adapted to a much different life pace, which was manifested in his thoughts and feelings of both liking and aversion. He considers it abhorrent for tourists to wear shorts in his home-town Vienna, but when he is on vacation, it doesn«t matter.

All of these examples point to one thing: In the case of a totally conscious activity, one and the same person shifts to different priorities, to different moods, in the most diverse of situations (= gives priority to specific resolutions over others, which are otherwise more important; on both a conscious and unconscious level), without the situation necessitating a decision to survive (e.g. he doesn«t have to pay for another day of ski instruction in order to survive).

These entirely different moods, in whose sphere of influence one has not only totally conscious impressions, but also very specific memories and combinations of thoughts, will be described in the future as awareness levels.

An awareness level comprises one«s entire totally conscious behavior; that also includes every decision (and resolution) which is done totally conscious at the time of this awareness level, for conscious or unconscious reasons.

(At this point in time in our examination, we cannot leave out the fact that it is possible that we make decisions without ever beeing totally conscious that we make those decisions and whose effects we never experience totally consciously or whose effects we experence totally consciously much later and only very indirectly). This means that these decisions only happen in our unconscious and their effects also stay only in our unconscious (or whose effects we experience totally consciously much later and only very indirectly) but still we make these decisions. What we have already experienced, however, is that decisions which we make totally consciously (at least through their effects) are often also (though nearly always) called forth by unconscious reasons.)

An awareness level is a situation in which one--that is, one«s awareness--finds himself, and which shows a particular mood.

An awareness level is a mood with which I grapple, totally consciously , with a very special thematic invention, under which all themes are ordered (see appendix).

Many awareness levels occur within a day«s time. If one is attentive to the news on T.V. he has an awareness level different from that when he eats dinner with his family or when he puts all his concentration into the text of a book, etc. In other words, all changes in one«s priority list within a given time, even temporary ones, are awareness levels.

Let us return to that vacation at the begining of this chapter, which our subject did not take because of unsafe conditions. Before he was informed about the unstable milieux, he was actually excited to go. He visualized the white-sand beaches under palm trees, and thought about everything he might visit in the capital, how much time all that would take, and even saw himself already dealing with a native for cheap textiles, etc. But as soon as he heard of the unrest--seeing on T.V. how killed tourists were being flown back to their home countries, how foreigners only felt safe on the streets in large groups--it immediately changed his image of the country. He imagined himself already having been there, having to face completely different urgencies; his attitude towards this country fundamentally changed with new facts he received. He developed a different awareness level.

Awareness levels can often be easily differentiated from one another (such as the banker«s activities at work as opposed to those in southern Italy), or they can also blend into one another--are minimally inseperable--(such as if one watches T.V. and then eats with his family).

Just as certain situations which often cause one to change his awareness levels, one can also attempt to enter new situations in order to hold on to previous awareness levels. For example, after one«s trip in southern Italy, he can maintain in the workplace, the mood he had while there (= the awareness level from there). He could come to the bank in the clothes he wore on vacation, or not give as much importance to his conversations with the customers as he did before, etc.. Of course, sooner or later he would have to enter an awareness level appropriate to his work, if he doesn«t want to lose his job. But it can also happen that the vacation changed him so much, that he has created an entirely new awareness level for himself.

What we want to show is that awareness levels do not automatically have to be changed within a new situation, but can remain the same. But, in doing so, there is always the danger that one cannot have proper commmand in the new situation if he doesn«t behave in the adequate manner (= the adequate awareness level ).

Let us now approach our inquiry into whether or not our subject experienced the dream sequence in total consciousness.

It is clear that he had a very specific awareness level at that time. It is also clear that this awareness level was rather distanced from his more usual awareness level (He was neither concerned with his job nor his private life, and was probably not even conscious of these (didn«t have any access to the memories of this job and private life) at this time; he had lost quite a lot of connection with himself (the way he is in everyday life) at this time; this means he was at an awareness level that was rather removed from his normal every-day life).

It is also clear that he was totally conscious--in keeping with our definition. This says that all that which is totally conscious, is "everything one is clear of at the moment." There is no doubt that he was clear of his dream sequence in the dream.

The difference between the dream experience and the normal impressions is not that he had total consciousness in the latter form at his disposal and not in the first, but rather that the awareness level of his dream experience is so far away from his “normal“ awareness level (the level he used to have in reality); that it is easy to confuse the dream awareness level with non-totally conscious behavior.

An awareness level is a particular position of one«s awareness at a particular time within a certain time period, which can be distinguished from other positions of the same awareness. It is a position, an attitude, probably a complete--or at least a totally conscious--part of one«s awareness.

We have just discussed the forms in which the possible contents of awareness (= somethings ) can be found. These forms are unsonscious, conscious and totally conscious. An awareness level is, as a position of the awareness, a result of one (or more) of its abilities.

Now we want to give our attention to one of the abilities of the awareness : the Central Processing Unit (= CPU ).

Let us assume that our banker drives home in his car. He had told his wife that he would do the shopping today. The decision to "go grocery shopping" is a Decision-Type S (Survival). It is necessary to buy groceries for their survival. On his way home, the banker has a variety of stores to choose from. The decision to "go grocery shopping" is an imperative one (he cannot escape such an activity), but he can choose any one of the stores as long as he can buy something to eat. It will depend on his and his wife«s preferences, on a money limit, and the fact that they cannot buy everything in the city where they live.

From this, let us assume that his wife doesn«t have a particular wish, only that the groceries should last them the weekend. The banker decides to go to a big supermarket where he can choose from a wide selection. Shopping for three days isn«t a difficult process for him, nor for any of us, and yet, it is actually a very complex process even when he is not totally conscious (maybe not even conscious) that it is a very complex process.

It is complex because in choosing tonight«s meal, there are a hundred different products, and hundreds of combinations between them, from which he must choose those which could be suitable for him and his wife. And what is suitable for them is not just a few meals, but a few dozen, whose combinations lie in the hundreds. In order that he does not regret having gotten something better once he sits down to eat, he will choose those products that satisfy his mood at that moment. And in order to avoid being reproached by his wife for having gotten something ridiculous, he will keep her needs in mind as well.

Let«s assume that he wouldn«t possess the CPU.

Then, he had to visualize totally consciously all of the possible products and all of their possible combinations in order to be able to successfully complete his self-axiom to "only buy that which I and my wife really want for tonight" (whose content may not be conscious to him). Then he would have to become totally conscious of all of the products they liked for what reasons, and in which situations they used the different products in the past. He would have to estimate what kind of mood would pervade at home tonight (in the future) in order to approximate which products and their combinations would best fit.

He would never be able to totally consciously compare all products against one another because every time he is totally conscious of a few products, other products would come into his consciousness (because he is unable to keep hundreds of different facts in his total consciousness at one time). He would have to write a list, or better yet, an entire notebook full of all of the products and their possible combinations, then reduce them to fewer choices, to finally choose the best variations based on his own totally conscious estimation.

This process would take so long that he«d still be working at it when the store closed. In the end, he would hopelessly realize that he had yet to buy three meals per day for the weekend, and that he would have to start again at the beginning with the possible choices.

This is, furthermore, only that selection based on particular taste and health criteria (it might not settle to well with him to eat an entire container of curry mixed with chocolate chips for dinner). He might also need to choose something that can be prepared with minimal time, and which wouldn«t require a lot of dishes since it«s his turn to do the dishes tonight. He also couldn«t entire ignore the financal aspect (caviar and French champagne would not exactly fit his spending capacity). He also wouldn«t want to carry too much. And the list of shopping criteria goes on.

What the banker would be required to do here would hold true for each of us if we didn«t possess the CPU . That is, if we don«t want to eat something whose combinations don«t fit, nor something that tastes bad, nor something that exceeds our finances so far that we have to starve until the next pay check, etc..

The ability of our awareness that has made this complicated decision process easier to manage many times over is that of the CPU.

Although we are only able to be totally conscious of a very small proportion of the data in our awareness, we are provided a quasi CPU from further data, not just totally conscious ones, of the awareness at the same time

This CPU helps to make our decisions in much greater context than would be possible in only our totally conscious considerations. The CPU accelerates decision making to a much easier level, and can even become our life savior. It is our awareness« ability to transfer the conscious and unconscious data (=somethings ) into totally conscious results.

To make somethings totally conscious in the form of a result (= not each of the somethings themselves) means that we do not recognize the actual somethings (the very cause of this result), nor do we even know how many are present in this result. Rather, we experience an invisible (it is only noticable to us through its consequences) collection of all the somethings, to which our CPU then has access (we do not yet know how far it has access) and which we need in particular situations because of former experiences we had with them in order to better manage these situations. These experiences that we had with the somethings do not become totally conscious memories for us, which we consciosly or unconsciously have of them, rather, are pointed out through an adequate decisions.

In other words, we experience the process of the CPU totally consciously through the contents of the decision (e.g. to have fear or to be willing to do something else) we make.

Why?

For without the CPU , we wouldn«t even come to these contents. The very existence of these contents, practically speaking, proves that the CPU exists.

To better understand this concept, let us take an example from everyday life.

The only T.V. Julie owns is in her living room. She«s in the kitchen when suddenly she comes up with the idea that she wants to watch T.V.. The thought is a resolution; namely, "I want to watch T.V.." Before she had this idea though, she was thinking of something entirely different, and so we cannot say that her resolution was established on the grounds of total conscious considerations, but rather as the result of the CPU . This idea is nothing more than the visible outcome of those contents with which her CPU delt with itself..

If she didn«t have a CPU, then without a cause (causes would be, for example, if she found herself in the living room and just happened to have the T.V. in sight, and because of this, was made totally conscious, or perhaps her housemate having brought up a subject on T.V., making her totally conscious) she wouldn´t even be able to think about T.V..

If her total consciousness hadn´t been informed by the CPU, how elce could she have come to the desire to watch T.V.

Because her desire to watch T.V. is not always in her total consciousness, something had to bring this desire to her total consciousness. It is only the CPU that can bring her desires in the form of resolutions to her total conscious attention.

Desires are all those resolutions that one makes and wants to fulfill, eventhough they are not needed in order to survive. If one decides to further transfer these resolutions into reality, then it is done according to one«s desires. But if one does not attempt to transfer these resolutions into reality immediately, then the desire will become a need (in order to see one«s desire converted into reality).

Every desire exists only because there are already somethings in one«s awareness which portray the contents of these desires with adequate experiences. This is to say that if there weren«t memories or thought combinations (= the creations of new ones, which have never existed before), which express similar contents which are brought to surface in later wishes, then one would never develop a desire within oneself to find these situtations (memories, thought combinations) in reality. Simply so, because one«s awareness isn´t able to "wish" about things it doesn«t know about.

Desires are, therefore, the results of conscious and unconscious somethings within one«s awareness (most likely in the form of memories, but there is also the foremost possibility for new thought combinations). It is important, too, to remember that one is informed about his desires via the CPU (without CPU, desires could only be the result of those somethings which one is totally conscious of in the moment which one has this desire).

From here, let«s imagine that Julie had no idea what would be offered in the twenty-some T.V. channels. In making the resolution (= the decision) to "watch T.V.," the CPU worked to process all (we don«t know how many) the possible memories from T.V., and compared them to one another. The CPU considered well- and poorly-made films, how often she enjoyed watching T.V. and how often she felt like she wasted her time afterwards, how many interesting facts and good information she got, etc. Finally, the CPU concluded to watch T.V. today based on the situation she was in today (i.e. the CPU took the conditions of that moment«s reality into consideration).

Had Julie not possesed the CPU when she made the decision to watch T.V., then she would have only come to the idea--to totally consciously think about watching T.V.--by coincidence (such as when she stood directly in front of the T.V. set or when her housemate talked about it).

Without the CPU, Julie would have had to go through every film in her memory (as we pointed out with the grocery store example). She«d have to become totally conscious of all positive as well as negative experiences in awtching T.V.. After that, she would have to compare all the pro«s and con«s in relation to her present situation before she could become totally conscious of whether or not she wanted to watch T.V. at all.

The decision to convert the resolution (desire) to "watch T.V." into reality would have come to her easily with or without CPU.

With CPU, she makes this decision totally consciously without having to respond to the decision«s outcome (namely, to "want to watch T.V.") and without having to deal with counter totally conscious arguments (alternatives) because this was already accomplished by the CPU .

Without the CPU, she would also decide with her totally conscious resolution to convert her resolution into reality (turn on the T.V.).

Now she really needs her CPU : With twenty different channels, there are twenty different programs. When she flips through them with the remote-control, it is the CPU that processes each channel she hits, and determines what type of program is available. In other words, thanks to the CPU she knows immediately if it«s a discussion, romantic movie, action movie, documentary, the news, or whatever. The CPU recognizes what type to best associate the present-shown program with. The CPU also informs Julie right away if she is more interested (= the intellectual shape of desire) in watching sports, news, an action movie, etc. at the moment. That means, as soon as she has registered the subject matter of the program (= the type of program), she is informed if she has any interest whatsoever in the program (i.e. if she should keep flipping through or not).

In contrast, if she didn«t have CPU, she would have to determine totally consciously what different types of programs there are, starting with the first station she would turn to. Once she is totally conscious of all the possibilities (documentary, sports, music T.V., etc.) simultaneously--or, if this were impossible, to write out a list of all the type possibilities next to each other in order to be totally conscious--she would have to constantly compare her chosen program with former programs (she would have chosen former programs to represent a "type" of program) to determine which type it fits with.

After this, she would have to decide if she even wants to keep with this type of program--a documentary, for example. In order to do this, she would have to totally consciously compare the documentaries with all other types so that she could totally consciously remember from all other past films of all types (she should be totally conscious of as many formerly-seen films as possible), which she most prefered in the past. Not only this, she would also have to totally consciously determine which type would best suit her in her present situation.

Let us assume that she decides to stay with a documentary (a purely theoretical example since the program would be over by the time she could finally make the decision to watch it). Her totally conscious decision is not nearly at a close, because in order to stay with it, she will have had to find pleasure with this type of program.

To find pleasure with something (i.e. the impression prefered to other impressions), she must also know the alternatives. She must--because she doesn«t possess the CPU--totally consciously know what else is available other than the one she is presently totally conscious of. For without the CPU, (which constantly informs us of the somethings of our awareness through the contents of our desires and needs (i.e. our moods)) we would only know from reality that which we are totally conscious of! In other words, we would not really know anything at all from reality.

And so, Julie would constantly have to test totally consciously whether her documentary«s subject matter still fits to her situation in order to reject all the other contents of the nineteen possible programs. This means that she has to decide if it is worth to stay with this program, or if she should continue flipping through stations based on her past experiences with the subject matter in these T.V. programs--and would need to be totally conscious of all of those formerly-seen programs simultaneously with each consideration.

Seen practically, without the CPU , Julie wouldn«t have been able to watch any of the programs since she couldn«t make a decision quickly enough. Or, she would have watched something she didn«t want to, because she avoided to decide altogether. For example, she could have even stared at a station«s off-the-air signals run along the screen simply because she didn«t want to decide, and was, therefore, never totally conscious of her alternatives.

As we have shown, without CPU, all of our decisions would take forever--we wouldn«t even have the "ability to live," so-to-speak. The CPU also makes it possible for us to fall back on our unconsciousness, that which we are unable to bring together in our total consciousness. We experience that the CPU is able to this every time we make a decision and the true reasons for it, after much consideration, couldn«t be in a conscious sphere of influence. The decision to protest against the Gulf War is a good example for this.

We do not yet know how much access the CPU has to our consciousness and unconsciousness, nor how many somethings are open to it (are all of them or only a part?). We also don«t know which values the CPU gives to the somethings. Nor which value systems it follows in coming to its results (which are totally conscious to us in the form of decisions). If Julie wasn«t allowed to watch much T.V. as a child, for example, and she has such a strong desire to watch today, how much of this has to do with the experiences of her childhood?

Of course, we cannot demand any marvels from the CPU. If one wants to reach a particular state of being (based on the memories that his CPU worked out), and the CPU determines, based on its memories, how it can convert the decision into reality, then it is still possible that there aren«t enough memories to be able to determine the success of one«s efforts.

It may be that on the way to conversion one is confronted with so many variables in the form of actions of other people, who also determine their actions based on their CPUs, that his own CPU doesn«t even have a chance to say ahead of time with any accuracy what his actions will lead him to. For example, if one has the need to get rich, and he thinks that a good chance lies with the stock market, then he will make his attempt with the appropriate materials. The decision will then be to choose which stocks to invest in, but this will be decided in large part by the CPU since there are a hundred pages of relevant information which he cannot be totally conscious of at that moment. Even if his total consciousness is led by the last pieces of knowledge, it would still fall back on the knowledge which the CPU possesses. As soon as the stocks are put up for sale, one doesn«t know how the CPUs of other people, who also want to buy the stocks, will respond (i.e. how the present rates will influence their further decisions).

On the other hand, when the awareness has enough memories, the CPU can markedly help one with decisions, that lay down how one can best turn a reslution into reality.

If the banker goes grocery shopping with the resolution that "tonight I am going to get something good, and also keep my wife«s tastes in mind, and think of the conditions that will influences the meal at home," then the knowledge of his CPU will be of great help in realizing his self-axiom "correctly" (i.e. appropriate to the axiom) in determining which things to combine with one another, which things take how long to prepare, and will estimate his wife«s mood, etc..

What we still do not know about the CPU is if the conversion of its desires (its resolutions), through which we experience the CPU, is actually good for us.

These resolutions are actually always purely subjective, because they are dependent upon the contents of the somethings of our awareness, and we don«t even know to how many of the somethings of the awareness the CPU has access. That is, the resolutions are the outcome of former impressions and thought combinations. It is unknown whether these are the "right" resolutions for us; that is, whether they can help us to a "higher" and "real" purpose of action (if that even exists).

The CPU works through decisions in two subject areas.

In one area, the CPU informs us, through its "access" to many (all?) somethings of our awareness , what exactly the awareness desires; i.e. which impressions awareness preserved as comfortable.

In another area, the CPU helps us choose the right conversion of decisions into reality.

This means that it points the way, on which we tread, so that our decisions are able to receive the appropriate impression in reality. The CPU gets the knowledge it needs along the way through "analogy conclusions," which are extracted from that which formerly existed or presently exists (which can be either memories or thought combinations).

(Of course, theoretically, the CPU can create an entirely new solution to a problem. One, which is not at all derived from analogy conclusions of those things that formerly existed. But the CPU would at least need access to those somethings with which it can solve a problem, in order to "recognize" this new solution to a problem at all, i.e. in order to know of the solution in the first place).

On one hand, the CPU works with the somethings in order to diagnose our desires at the present moment, i.e. now. We will assign the term now-CPU to represent this subject area of the CPU.

In another way, the CPU works with the somethings in order to help our decisions to become later impressions (any form of a perception in reality) of our awareness. We will call this area of the CPU the future-CPU.

The now-CPU is at work, when while grocery shopping, the banker comes up with the resolution, "tonight I am going to get something good, and also keep my wife«s tastes in mind, and think of the conditions that will influences the meal at home." The now-CPU informs him of his desire.

If he is then told to quickly collect of all of the groceries that fit his resolution, then this is according to his future-CPU. The future-CPU lets him know how he can best realize his resolution.

The now-CPU only expresses one«s purely subjective preferences. It judges (i.e. establishes) what impression one«s awareness desires to have, and what not.

The future-CPU doesn«t judge. The future-CPU, with the help of all experiences stored in awareness (to which it has access in any case), only recognizes the rules necessary for transfering a resolution into reality. It only gives us the facts and does not offer subjective values.

The CPU is the ability of our awareness to allow us to make the decisions we make every day the way we do. We notice its effect in practically every decision.

We differentiate the now-CPU from the future-CPU based on their mechanisms.

What is the difference betwen these two varieties of the CPU ? How far do their different modes of operation reach?

All types of decisions, whether it be Type-S , Type-N , or Type N-2 , are instigated by the now-CPU .

Why?

It is clear in the case of Type-N and Type N-2 decisions. Single resolutions which lead to single decisions that belong to Types-N and N-2 can easily be abandoned without directly endangering the subject«s life. (It should be noted that the intention to make a decision in the first place is a resolution in and of itself.)

The reason that one concerns himself with one specific decision when he could just as easily focus on other decisions within the Types -N and N-2 is because the now-CPU , in having access to (= dealing with) conscious and unconscious experiences, comes to a decision with that which it (the now-CPU ) wants to handle.

(Our definition for the concept "experience" runs as follows: it is everything that one can have through impression, memory, or thought combination; i.e. everything which took place and will go on in the contents of our awareness ).

This means that with the Type-N and Type-N-2 decisions, the now-CPU determines which decisions it will occupy itself with at all.

The future-CPU explains to where the now-CPU decision could lead. The future-CPU points out decisions that could lead to endangering one«s life. The now-CPU will then have to decide whether to take on these risks of a particular decision or not.

The future-CPU would also point out the decisions which don«t endanger the subject«s life, but which work against other resolutions of the now-CPU (both Type-N and N-2 decisions).

In this case, the now-CPU will have to decide which resolution is more important. Whether its desire to follow this decision is so strong that it decides in doing so, to act against its other interests (i.e. desires) or not.

Note that the now-CPU decides twice with Types N and N-2 . First, to work with such questions in the first place (to work with a specific subject (e.g. If I ask myself: Do I want to go to the movies?)), and second to work with these effectively (to decide what its wishes are concerning this subject (e.g. If I decide: I don´t want to go to the movies now.)).

When a resolution suddenly becomes totally conscious , this means that the now-CPU had already chosen a course of direction (made a decision) before the process of becoming totally conscious (e.g. If I suddenly feel the desire: I want to go to the movies.)

Something else to pay attention to:

When we speak of Type-N and N-2 decisions (these include, of course, all related resolutions), we are speaking of those decisions that result at least in practical (i.e. in reality) outcomes.

These decisions are made based either on the fact that we are totally conscious of these decisions, or because we perform totally conscious actions (too, even if we ourselves are not totally conscious of the decisions).

That is, the now-CPU (and future-CPU ) makes connections between total conscious and unconscious (and, of course, conscious experiences as well) experiences. The connections do not make us totally conscious of all the unconscious experiences (that determine the now-CPU in its decision making), but rather, we experience these unconscious experiences through the influence they have on our decisions.

How does the now-CPU effect Type-Survival decisions?

The decision to survive is the most fundamental of all decisions. Without this decision, we could never have all those experiences which we are all quite used to. ( We do not know totally consciously how we are when dead; but we do know that when "dead," we are not the same as we are now).

That is, if the now-CPU is to deal with those decisions with which it is continually faced, it has first to decide that the individual it functions for stays alive.

To "stay alive" is esssential in being able to even deal with anything that the now-CPU has made us accustomed to today.

What is the future-CPU «s task?

As we have already mentioned, the future-CPU is responsible for determining where the Type N and N-2 decisions will be lead. It determines whether or not these decisions could lead to life-threatening situations, and also, if Type N and N-2 decisions could counteract each other in such a way that the now-CPU wouldn«t want to make these decisions under these conditions.

Once the now-CPU has made the decision that it wants to assign particular directions to particular Type N and N-2 decisions based on the facts given by the future-CPU, the future-CPU can then determine how these decisions can be made "real."

If the now-CPU decides, for example, to go to the movies instead of staying home, then the future-CPU would reveal what one needs to do in order to go to the movies.

What are the areas of responsibility for the future-CPU in making Type-S decisions?

If the now-CPU wants to survive (which is the most fundamental of all decisions), the CPU «s most pressing responsibility is to know how one can survive. That is, to know which possibilities there are to survive.

This is the responsibilty of the future-CPU .

Only then can the now-CPU decide which type of survival method it prefers (e.g. the now-CPU could have preferred for our banker to have become an insurance salesman).

It is clear to see from this that the future-CPU has the possibilty to point out the boundaries to the now-CPU . It is also clear that the now-CPU follows these boundaries in reality on a continual basis. The now-CPU always follows the guidelines of the future-CPU . This is because the future-CPU works on that which is in the interest of the now-CPU.

Finally, it is in the interest of the now-CPU to pay attention to the future-CPU since the future-CPU will inform it how best to come to all that, which the now-CPU itself wants to realize.

The question is now this: does the now-CPU participate in all decisions we make? We know that it does in the case of Type-S , Type-N and N-2 decisions, but are there other types of decisions that can be made in creating the same circumstances?

First, let us understand what exactly is meant by this question.

Couldn«t there be something that we should decide upon? That is, that there are decisions, which it is necessary to grapple with, eventhough they don«t comply with the desires of the now-CPU ? In other words, decisions that the now-CPU doesn«t want to make, but must be handled with because of a specific necessity?

These necessities could be anything. They only have to possess the quality that they are necessary, independent of totally consciously wanting to decide for these necessities at the moment or not.

Examples of this might include: If one wants to rob another, and decides not to based on "moral considerations." Or, if one wants untruthfully to swear on the Bible, but then chooses not to out of respect for God.

Through its activities with the diverse questions and its decisions concerning these questions, the now-CPU shows that one deals with those things one wants to. But the question then reads: If there is something that one should want, how does he know that particular necessities exist at all?

Let us not forget:

Everything that we can totally consciously (or even unconsciously) know has to be expressed (in this way, be an experience) through the contents (the somethings ) of one«s awareness . Afterall, that which is not an experience, can also not be consciously or unconsciously known.

This is also to say that when there is a necessity, in which one has something to do even if he might not want to do it, but which has to be done--the necessity must be left to the contents of his awareness to be expressed. (Remember, too, that everything "to do" is only made possible through past-made decisions, for one could just as easily decide not to do this).

One can only be totally conscious of a necessity when one occupies himself with this subject, which contains a necessity.

Who resolves, however, that one will busy himself at all with a specific something? That is, that one decides to deal with one special subject and not any number of other subjects?

In all cases, the answer lies within the CPU , as this ability of the awareness determines with which subjects one will work (and, too, as already stated--to be active with one subject is a decision in of itself).

It is not the future-CPU, as it only concerns itself with the outcomes of decisions already made or the outcomes of decisions to be made.

Can we say that it is the now-CPU which takes care that one deals with such subjects (necessities)? Or does another type of CPU exist for this?

What describes the now-CPU in practical terms (i.e. how it functions in reality)?

It makes one deal with something.

The now-CPU deals with those subjects it wants to, and with this, it makes all decisions for all activities in practice.

Why is this so?

First of all, let us not forget: a decision can be unappealing on one particular awareness level, and yet be attractive on another awareness level .

If one hates to participate in sports in the rain, then he won«t normally take part. If it were then to rain something awful when he wanted to take ski lessons, then he won«t want to go. Only when he sees that by taking advantage of this opportunity to learn to ski for once, he will later have the chance to ski in deep snow under a blue sky, will his now-CPU decide at this time to practice skiing although it is raining.

That is, just because he was not happy about the necessity at the time, doesn«t mean that he wouldn«t want to learn on another awareness level .

If one is totally conscious of a necessity one must follow through with (which one might not find attractive at the moment, but which has to be done), then this necessity must show itself!

This means that it must be expressed with the contents of awareness , why this necessity is a necessity (i.e. has to be done; independent if one wants to do this or not).

If the necessity can be expressed totally consciously , then one has to confront himself with this necessity in order to totally consciously have the slightest notion that it is indeed a necessity.

As soon as one deals with something that reality doesn«t force one directly to do (e.g. if one were not brought to this activity by threat of punishment), then first the "desire" had to have been there. One might not be totally conscious of his "desire," but based on the very things one does proves the existence of his desires in a practical way (through real experience). (One can claim not to like a particular activity, and believe it himself, but his very participation in that activity might prove his desire otherwise).

Too, if one stumbled upon the subject of a particular necessity "by chance" (e.g. if one is made attentive to it because another person points it out), but this necessity did not correspond to the subject matter of his now-CPU , then he would«ve changed the subject immediately; he would have ceased to deal with this necessity (e.g. possibly, by changing the subject of conversation, since this necessity did not register as a necessity to him at all).

That is, without the "desire" of the now-CPU , one couldn«t deal with the necessities in such a manner that he totally consciously understands that something is a necessity at all. Nor could he deal with necessities (necessities are necessities--just as every principal is a principal--even if one does not totally consciously recognize them as such) without totally consciously realizing that those in front of him are the necessities he must deal with.

This brings us to the conclusion that if necessities exist at all, then we can experience them exclusively with the now-CPU. Without the now-CPU, these necessities wouldn´t be a factor for us at all. This means, seen from a practical point of view, whether they exist or not would make no difference to us.

We can, therefore, state:

The desire to survive is the most fundamental desire we have in our lives. (Even when it is not the most important in every single moment of life). Because this is the most fundamental desire (which we experience as with every desire, because of the now-CPU ) we can also say that most fundamental responsibility of the future-CPU (in serving the now-CPU ) is to find the ways through which we can best survive.

Any other type of decision, that does not belong to survival but which we do anyway (even if we only deal with it for a short period of time--a split second or less), comes into being exclusively through the now-CPU.

Again, the now-CPU «s decisions are determined by the conscious and unconscious experiences in their mechanisms. Even in the case of necessities that one deals with which could give one the total conscious impression that they could work against the desire of the now-CPU : they, too, are only impressionable so far as they are desired by the now-CPU . In this case, the fact that one simply deals with them proves that when he deals with them as non-desirable on this awareness-level (and possibly others), there are actually other awareness levels where these necessities are "desired."

This means that only the Type-S , Type-N and N-2 decisions exist.

We can say the following about these types of decisions:

The reason we deal at all with Type-S decisions is due to outside coercions (namely, the need to survive). The reason we are concerned with Type-N and N-2 decisions is due to inner coercions (on the basis of my former experiences and thought combinations).

This all goes to prove that our entire range of activities, which include all of our actions, are nothing more than coercions from outside or within, and, furthermore, that we are, in essence, trapped within a cycle of our already-given determinations.

If we could leave this cycle of coercions in a sensible way or not (of course one can always break the cycle if he really wants to go precisely opposite to it totally consciously --but the question remains if this makes any sense), or if we even should, can first be answered once we have learned more about ourselves.

Another question comes to surface in relation to our present knowledge:

If the now-CPU decides on all of our decisions, then it does this based on what it "desires." We do not know exactly how this "desire" runs, or what the criteria are for "desiring" something, but we do know it functions on this basis.

The now-CPU can only "desire" that which is manifested in the contents of the awareness in the first place (e.g. through thought combinations). All that to desire, which is not adequately found within the contents of the awareness , cannot be desired by the now-CPU .

At the same time, the now-CPU shows us everywhere, where it has a choice in the matter, that it decides for those things that it likes.

This means that the now-CPU would decide even for that unfamiliar or unknown to it if this were more atractive than all that existed before--that is, if it would know of the unknown.

Does this mean that we only establish those desires, and also all those goals we set and, too, all of our actions, based on what we already know in our awareness ?

Or could we lead the now-CPU to "new" desires, which our future-CPU would then track down?

Basically, this would be a good idea. But who knows what is really attractive to us; i.e. what the future-CPU should track down?

Again, this lies only in the now-CPU «s sphere of control.

That is, even if we want to reach something more attractive than that which we are conscious or unconscious of to date, then we have to accept the now-CPU as our guide for direction. The future-CPU wouldn«t know where to look for something attractive without the now-CPU . Only the now-CPU judges what is "attractive."

We can only ever hope to gain more pleasure in an impression than we thought possible when we follow the now-CPU «s objectives (which the now-CPU creates from analogies of the somethings ).

An example comes to mind when explaining how new desire was once created (which was more important to people at a given moment than anything else). At the end of the 19th century, some people who lived in the mountains didn«t want to sink so deep into the snow any longer, nor have to spend so much time coming down from the mountain as they did before (this is a decision of the now-CPU). This is why they came up with the idea (which was the job of the future-CPU ) to tie wooden boards under their feet. Over time, as the now-CPU came to realize the pleasure found in such an activity, skiing developed into a form of leisure activity.

Does this example then show that the now-CPU «s contribution (along with the future-CPU ) created something completely "new"--something that wasn«t a part of awareness , but which created "skiing?"

Of course, the now-CPU , with the future-CPU , brought the possiblity to ski into consciousness.

Still, in order to even come to skiing, all the "components" necessary were already available within awareness .

This means that the now-CPU and future-CPU knew that there was snow on the slopes, that something can slide down the slopes, that there were such things as wooden boards, and that these boards don«t sink as easily in the snow, etc.

Eventhough the now-CPU and future-CPU created something "new" with skiing, all of the "materials" for this novelty were actually already existent in awareness .

From our previous investigation, we can now better understand why the protestors explained their decision to "fight against this war" with general-axioms which they didn«t actually think to transfer into reality.

Only after the war had already begun, did they, through their now-CPU (conscious as well as unconscious somethings were used in the assessment), concern themselves with the resolution: to "fight against this war." Then they strove totally consciously to justify their decision, also to themselves. Instead of making the real reasons for this decision totally conscious (or does it simply exceed the abilities of their awarenesses to make them totally conscious ?), the now-CPU found it more attractive to make a new resolution: "I want to rationalize, i.e. possess generally recognized reasons for my resolution to `fight against this war.« "

The future-CPU then entered the scene as a non-judgemental ability. It made those resolutions which would satisfy the demands of the "second" resolution of the now-CPU totally conscious . Whether or not the now-CPU really wanted to follow these resolutions as an axiom, these wouldn«t have concerned the future-CPU «s area of responsibities at all.

That means that finding out the true reasons for the Type-N and N-2 decisions can only be done by discovering the contents of the unconsciousness.

Conversely, this also means that it is possible through self-analysis, to penetrate unconscious subject areas of the awareness based on the contents of a now-CPU resolution. Afterall, every resolution is a conclusion with conscious and unconscious premises. Zealously, one could try to find the experiences that lead him to those resolutions based on his preferences. In this way, he might even succeed to make unconscious memories, those behind this resolution, totally conscious .

The sense of these types of mind games remains questionable, though. If one wants a better understanding of the mechanisms behind the now-CPU , it is conceivable that so many of the memories of our lives are unconscious, and therefore, it is difficult to be able to make a number of the unconscious experiences, which serve the respective decision (the resolution) as premises, totally conscious again. To succeed in making them all totally conscious again is not really the question, however, for we can never know--as long as we cannot experience all of our somethings in our awareness as conscious--if there aren«t actually more unconscious somethings remaining.

Subsequently, however, we will show how far such examinations (looking into the contents of the resolutions of the now-CPU, deducing the conscious reasons, and discovering then which unconscious reasons could have been the premises) can be taken with the help of an empirical example.

Let«s first look again at a resolution we used in the example of the subject afraid of dogs. Namely, fear. Let«s discuss it on general terms.

Fear, just like every other resolution, develops from "within" oneself. This means that that which arouses the fear must be searched for "within."

Fear itself is a totally conscious response. Totally conscious since we would never realize it if it weren«t so. It is a response because it doesn«t come into being on its own.

It is provoked by an impression. This impression isn«t enough, however. Because if a single impression one is totally conscious of would not be compared consciously or unconsciously with memories (and thought combinations), this impression would be completely neutral because in this case it would be judged on its own.

If there is nothing for it to be compared with, then one couldn«t develop aversions (for in order to do so, one must consciously or unconsciously know that there are other impressions that better suit and comfort the subject).

A fear of storms is one example that illuminates this.

Judged on its own, a night storm means little more than noise, flashes of bright light, and darkness. It is only possible for one to be afraid at all because of conscious and unconscious memories in connection to storms (such as death, burning houses, sudden clashes in the middle of the night, etc.).

Thus, in order to even be able to sense fear (i.e. the resolution to grasp fear), one must first have an impression, which the CPU (both the now-CPU and future-CPU ) then compares with the conscious and unconscious memories and, too, with possible thought combinations, to determine if an unattractive impression is possible in the future. (One knows that he similarily experienced this unattractive impression in the past (this is a memory), or he imagines it possible in the past, or that it is one which could be possible in the future (these being thought combinations) ).

The future-CPU, with the help of memories and thought combinations, establishes which future impressions we could have, based on this impression. The now-CPU , with the help of these resolutions, determines if such a condition would even be acceptable (see appendix).

It is clear that the CPU is absolutely indispensable in at all being able to sense fear:

On the one hand, we have to have first "decided," as is the case in all we do, to sense fear in order to do so.

On the other hand, we first have to compare memories and thought combinations with the fear-causing impression. And to do this, we need the CPU .

The CPU makes it possible to compare particular unconscious memories with a freshly-made totally-conscious impression.

If we sense fear, this means that the CPU--by comparing memories (and probably thought combinations) with this impression--is informing us that the future-CPU at least sees the possibility for this totally conscious impression to result in future impressions, which the now-CPU rejects (either because these future impressions are not attractive to it, or because it judges them to be life-endangering).

Fear is the totally conscious result of a process which does not occur totally consciously. When the CPU compares this impression with memories and thought combinations, one is not conscious of this event (at least not in its entirety). One is only made totally conscious of the process through its result.

Each fear also represents its own special resolution, and therefore, a decision, and a decision is dependent upon the CPU . (As we already mentioned, all decisions which lead to something that we "do" (this includes to sense fear as well) are sparked off by the now-CPU . Nevertheless the future-CPU is involved in those processes due to the information it offers to the now-CPU. (The information itself is also a decisions, for every piece of information could also hold different messages) ). Once again, the CPU decides based on comparisons with memories or thought combinations, and, therefore, can offer "reasons" for its decisions.

As fear comes into being because one«s CPU doesn«t like something that could happen, the following question arises: Why doesn«t one make a total conscious resolution in the place of the fear; a resolution that informs one how to get around that which makes him fear?

Keep in mind that the fear is often the only totally conscious knowledge available; whereby, through an impression, the CPU finds it at least possible that undesirable future events could occur.

The fact that the CPU makes fear totally conscious instead of making a totally conscious resolution (decision) which tells a person how to avoid that which one fears, can occur because of the following facts:

In one case, one«s future-CPU doesn«t see any possibility for him to escape these possible future impressions (this is the case of the boy afraid of dogs, who, despite his experiences with dogs, continued to be encountered with them).

In another situation, the CPU doesn«t "succeed" in making one totally conscious of the solution. That is, a resolution is found by the now-CPU through the future-CPU , but one«s awareness isn«t able to transfer this solution into a totally conscious resolution.

In both cases, one is confronted with a problem either that he cannot solve, or one that would have to (and could) be solved through his actions, but which he is not ready to do because of his totally conscious lack of knowledge as to how he could manage to do so.

(What if one were convinced to totally consciously know how to avoid the fear-causing agent, but sensed the fear nevertheless?

This condition would show him that despite his own totally conscious knowledge, the CPU is not totally convinced that he can avoid that which he fears.

This happens when one doesn«t have the chance to deter the possible future impressions with his own actions, or, because one isn«t totally conscious of all that he would have to know in order to escape these threatening impressions.

That is, we can see that the case we described would fall under one of these two areas.).

One can also have knowledge of a fear that is totally conscious to him without being totally conscious of what the fear is related to (i.e. that which one is obviously scared of). It is easy to comprehend why the CPU couldn«t give a totally conscious resolution as to what he can do to avoid that which he fears. For in this case, not only are the experiences the CPU is dealing with in coming to these decisions (to sense fear) unconscious to him, but its outcome is only partly totally conscious .

An empirical example dealing with the fear will show us how far we can come in examining the resolutions, after taking away the conscious reasons, of the the now-CPU .

Our example relates to a child in Austria in the year 1990.

At this time, Iraq had not yet invaded Kuwait, and war in former Yugoslavia had not yet broken out. And despite this, one child«s worst fear is war.

This evidence is quite astonishing. This child, girl, is only eight years-old and couldn«t possibly have collected any experiences of war till now.

First let us look into whether her "fear of war" means what we normally associate with such a statement.

It is obvious that this girl perceives fear. As soon as the matter of "war" comes up, she shows all its symptoms.

Through multiple inquiries, we learn that for her, war represents all forms of military intervention between individual states or large groups of people.

We can establish what the girl personally fears in connection with war. For her, it means the threatening vehicles in the middle of the night, the sirens which announce attacks, bombs that produce a terrible noise as they fall, etc.

Let«s now look into how she could possess these fears.

It«s obvious that her parents could have had the fear themselves, and simply carried it over to their child. But we also know that neither the parents nor others, who are in frequent contact with her, could have produced these fear symptoms.

The girl couldn«t have even gotten these symptoms from stories, as no one of her contacts gave her detailed pictures of war«s cruelties.

The only way she could have been confronted with war situations would be by watching T.V..

But surely, the child never chose programs that had the least to do with war. If she was coincidentally confronted with war reports, she immediately changed the channel or went to her parents for protection. And yet, she continues to produce fear-symptoms.

Her behavior shows us that aside from this fear, the contents of the following resolution is present: "I don«t want anything to do with, nor even think about war, because I know that I cannot be protected in such a situation."

This resolution is a Type-N (non-survival) decision.

Why?

This resolution could just as easily be abandoned and not carried out without changing the ability to survive. For in actuality, the girl herself could not do anything against a war that suddenly broke out, for example.

It is clear that her resolution reads in this way: Because she cannot do anything against a war, and her behavior shows that she doesn«t want to be a part of any war, the phrase "I don«t want anything to do with, nor even think about the war" is necessary to accept.

The now-CPU perceives it more attractive (comfortable) to busy itself totally consciously with more attractive impressions and thought combinations than to fear unnecessarily.

Therefore, we have to accept that the phrase "because I know that I cannot be protected in such a situation" is a necessary part of her (most likely unconscious) resolution, as we showed.

How does a child, who hasn«t ever had to face war in life, choose to have fear in this incident? Why doesn«t she have fear of strangers who offer her candy? Afterall, her mother told her on a regular basis how dangerous this could be (more often than the matter of "war" was ever discussed). Why isn«t this girl scared of cars? She constantly hears of how children were victims of car accidents. Why doesn«t she fear nuclear power plants, which can contaminate all there is to play with and eat? Chernobyl was an important issue which had direct impact on her life: she wasn«t allowed to play in the yard or eat their vegetables any longer. She even heard about how dangerous, and even how deadly, it was on T.V. at home and at school.

It is most unlikely that her fear of war stemmed from though combinations (dreams, fantasies, etc.). Newly-developed thought combinations would not--with an exception of those thought combinations which resulted from former impressions (conscious and unconscious)-- have resulted in such responses of fear in reality; first, because they have nothing in common with reality.

It is not clear why the girl chose war from all the possible subjects that could instill fear for her life. Subjects such as Chernobyl, car accidents, ill-intentioned strangers, etc. were dealt with at greater depth than that of "war." Logically, we can only understand her choice to concentrate on war and her strong responses (a fear, that often goes so far as to leave her shaking) as if she holds unconscious memories of "war."

We will develop this situation further in the following chapter.

VII

Let us review what the task at hand is, concerning our examination: We want to experience more of what the original and essential "Being" is. That is, experience more of what the principles are, under which we function. Which principles do we already know, at this point in our examination, that are an inherent part of us?

There are the following:

Consciousness , unconciousness , and total consciousness are the three forms, in which the contents of our awareness can be embodied.

Every awareness level is the awareness « way of facing a specific subject matter (particular contents in particular arrangements)totally consciously , and at the same time where awareness , with the help of the CPU , can use the conscious and unconscious material on this specific subject matter. (That is, the awareness considers totally consciously all conscious and unconscious somethings, only in the way in which these somethings can be helpful in a particular subject matter. Awareness does not at this moment (= on this awareness level ) pay any attention to what the somethings could mean for other subject matters. )

It is awareness « ability to decide which subjects it dedicates itself to and which subjects it dismisses.

But the decision is no more than the CPU «s outcome. It is, furthermore, either the now-CPU (which decides what the awareness desires in the first place) or the future-CPU (which decides what is necessary in order to reach set goals, and also what complying with certain goals could lead to).

For a memory, we need first the ability to decide for that which we want (i.e. the now-CPU is that ability), and then the ability to bring this memory into being in our mind«s eye. In this way, we re-create the former impression into a new one, simply because the real one no longer exists. At this point in our examination, we have not yet established which abilities our awareness needs in order to be able to create these memories.

In the first place, in order to have an impression, we need the fundamental ability to receive that, which the specific contents of each impression creates (the somethings ). We need the purely physical, our sense organs, but these are few in any case. Observing our dreams and memories, we realize that our awareness has the ability to formulate new creations (thought combinations) by itself. At this time, we also don«t yet know how this ability functions.

We bring ourselves to action, or to move. After we have made a decision, we can determine (more or less, at least principally speaking) to try to act according to our decision. That is, we can cause physical responses from totally conscious decisions (and unconscious ones, as well). It is not yet clear, however, how all this functions (the connection between "intellectual/spiritual" decisions and physical action).

The CPU is awareness « ability to access the somethings , to be able to combine (thought combinations (=new ideas, dreams, etc.) ), and to be able to decide.

Effectively, the only contents which awareness possesses are the somethings . They are the material from which memories, impressions and thought combinations are made. We do not yet know what the somethings actually are at this point, but we do know that they exist.

Finally, awareness is the ability that comprises all that which we have addressed. It is the ability to be conscious (or unconscious), in all of its activities, of the fact that it is the "ego" that it is "unity“(namely, that it belongs to a single person).

Let us take the time now to establish a further concept. The concept of the "Bewusstsein". As we have already stated, a concept only stands for that which one assigns to it. We should have no problem with a frequently asked question of whether or not "Bewusstsein" exists, for we will only establish the definition of "Bewusstsein" as we will use it within our examination. This definition can be expanded upon, just as that of awareness , depending on how far we come in our examination. Our definition of Bewusstsein runs as follows: an awareness that remains constant in time, and related, an "ego" that also remains constant in time.

That is, the Bewusstsein exists certainly as long as one can remember that he had had a memory. The Bewusstsein exists as far as one is convinced that it was he who experienced a particular memory at a particular moment in time.

According to our definitions, the terms Bewusstsein and awareness are one and the same. We will now strive to make more of the Bewusstsein totally conscious .

All of the most diverse of awareness levels , the events separated by decades of time, dreams, thoughts, and feelings that one perceived have one special thing in common: they were experienced through one and the same person; oneself.

The Bewusstsein itself is not a static, unchangeable quantity.

Every new impression of awareness enlarges the collection of its somethings . This also has effect on one«s future actions. With every new impression, the contents of one«s Bewusstsein is enriched and a further awarness level can developp.

How long has our Bewusstsein been around?

Strictly speaking, we can only be certain that our Bewusstsein (our awareness) was there, where we could have had totally conscious memories. But this would imply that the activities of our Bewusstsein (i.e. our "being of the ego") only positively came into existence at the age of four or five, on average. From then, it still wouldn«t be in consistent existence, but rather only at those times when one can remember totally consciously that he was, without doubt, present.

One could not assume, for example, that he continuously attended grammar school, for even with the greatest of effort, one can«t remember everything (including every individual day).

Similar is the case when one sleeps: what happens if one cannot remember any of his dreams? Would this then mean that his body, which lay in his bed, wasn«t an "ego," nor contained his awareness , nor contained his Bewusstsein ?

If one were to drink too much or have an accident, it could happen that afterwards, he wouldn«t be able to remember anything that went on. Friends who were there might relay how he acted, but he couldn«t know if he were actually the one (i.e. the ego, his awareness , his Bewusstsein ), because he doesn«t have any memory of the events.

We couldn«t blame him if because of such incidents, he would then begin to doubt whether his Bewusstsein is present with his body on earth (because his body was seen by many people, but of which he himself has no recollection).

The following could then occur: All of a sudden, one recalls something he had forgotten for decades. A memory of an event that took place when he was four. Because of this memory, further memories come into his total consciousness.

Then, he thinks about an event that took place during grammar school which he has been conscious of since then. From this stand point (i.e. he tries as hard as possible to understand how he would«ve responded to his present considerations back then), he wonders if he (= his awareness ) had the feeling at that time that he hadn«t attended school.

Immediately, it is clear--if he had doubted it--that he was certain at that time that he went to school every day. Today he has only few conscious memories of all the days he went to grammar school, but now, seen from the point of view of a totally conscious memory from his school days, he doesn«t have to doubt his attendance.

Also when one first wakes up, he might not have any recall of the activities of his awareness during sleep, but then it might happen that sometime during the day, he realizes (possibly, a scene from reality that triggers it ) that he had a particular dream. With that, he will immediately realize that his awareness also existed during sleep, and he will cease to doubt that this awareness--in the time while sleeping--was "dead" or "nonexistent."

Let«s say one is not in the mood, with a hangover, to totally consciously remember something from the night before. He can straighten it out after some days by becoming totally conscious of what happened on this night, and in so doing, not only will he confirm that it was he (= his awareness ) who was there, but also that he behaved as totally consciously as he would have under normal circumstances; taking into consideration, of course, the limitations he had from alcohol. Despite drinking, he didn«t behave like another being, but rather acted with all his strengths and weaknesses (though it«s possible that he revealed more of these than others at this time). He thought about how he got home, and realized that in going against his friend«s advice, he drove with his own car and drove like he always does, despite the restrictions from alcohol in his system. (That is, the route home wasn«t a problem, nor finding the garage, etc.).

If he were then to look into all of the memories that became totally conscious to him, it would be clear that it was he (and not someone else) who had experienced all of these situations. And this, though he couldn«t have really said this was him with absolute certainty before this total consciousness took place.

The fact that he had no recollection at all at first (i.e. unconscious memory), but then was able to remember afterall (i.e.made them conscious again), shows well how varied the awarenes levels are structured, which we continuously change from one to the other. It points out how difficult it is at times for one awareness level (namely, the one in which he finds himself in "reality" right now) to arrive at another one which was long past (in remembering, he takes on a similar position that he had during his impression at that time. If he would not do this, i.e. if he would constantly remain on his actual awareness level , he couldn«t achieve the memory (with the help of the now-CPU ); for in order to do that, he has to leave his present awareness level for a short period of time.).

Let«s take an example that happens to every one of us. One gets up, and in the process of waking, he is reminded of a particular dream. A moment later, when he is totally conscious again of the present situation (i.e. where he is, what his job is, what he has to do next (get ready, etc.), etc.), he can«t remember his dream anymore, although it was perfectly clear a few seconds ago. He can attempt as much as he wants to remember, but it will all be in vain.

This does not only show that are two different awareness levels . It shows, moreover, how far these two are separated.

When one thinks about how far a simple dream within our awareness can be separated from our normal, everyday awareness level, one can better understand that it is more difficult to make this totally conscious again the farther he goes back into his childhood memories. Since that time, the awareness levels have been separated so far from one another that it gets more and more difficult to remember.

We have access to a countless number of awarenes levels that differ from one another only very minimally (e.g. If one sits in front of the T.V. in the evening, then he is not on precisely the same awarenes level that he would have later on during dinner). On the other hand, they can differ so radically from one another that one can hardly be conscious of them at the same time (e.g. the awareness level of the subject«s present life and that of his second birthday; the awareness level of his dream when waking up and the one two seconds later).

We constantly flunctuate between awareness levels . Roughly, one can divide these changes into two kinds: First, the continual change (one«s awareness level changes at least some with every new event in reality (first eating, then watching T.V.) ). Second, we have the change of the awareness level, caused by totally different situations, which is widely distanced from the first (e.g. a vacation in Italy, an errand at the bank, the last dream before waking up, childhood memories, etc.. All of these are totally different awareness levels).

We must know much more about ourselves in order to understand completely why certain awareness levels lie so far from one another that one cannot even remember them. Nevertheless, we will address three possible reasons. These reasons are purely empirical, and because of this, they cannot be held as the only ones nor can they be held as the main ones.

One reason could be that the now-CPU considers certain memories so irrelevant for one«s present situation, that it does«t find it necessary to make him totally conscious of these experiences.

Another reason might be that one had such a terrible experience that he would have avoided had it been at all possible; one that he would have preferred to have prevented. But because it was not preventable, the now-CPU at least chose not to concern the awareness totally consciously with it, since it already happened and therefore couldn«t be undone.

An example of this reason is the story of an American woman, who at twenty-eight when looking at her daughter, becomes totally conscious that when she was her daugter«s age, her own father had killed one of her playmates. Despite having been totally conscious of this event when she was eight, she had suppressed it till now.

The third reason might be that one (his awareness ) is so fixated on a particular awareness level at the moment that there just isn«t any space for other, earlier-dated awareness levels . One (i.e. the now-CPU) is so committed to his present awareness level , that he (i.e. the now-CPU ) doesn«t have any desire to exchange this awareness level for another.

These were, as we already stated, only three possible reasons for the present difficulty of going from one awareness level to another. The true reasons are not presently in our ability to judge. It«s simply important to realize that the dificulty indeed is there.

We may assume, eventhough many impressions are no longer totally conscious to us, that we (our awareness ) have taken in a number of further impressions. Our Bewusstsein «s experiences reach farther than our consciousness knows.

Yet, how are we then convinced to be one and the same person since birth?

We are told that one and the same body has changed since birth, but that one and the same body has stayed its own. For our environment, we are therefore one and the same Bewusstsein , an awareness , because we possess a body. For ourselves, we have in all probability been existent since the time of our birth, because it always happens that unconscious memories become totally conscious , and because of that not being conscious of these memories at the momoent doesn«t mean that a Bewusstsein --awareness --didn«t exist. Besides this, we have adopted the argument, "where there is a body, there is continual awareness ."

The question that then comes up is, When exactly did the body and Bewusstsein become one? When did the Bewusstsein take shape? (We have no idea how a Bewusstsein is created; we don«t know if it is created in the first place; what is important for us is: From what point can one have memories that make him totally conscious that he indeed existed from that moment on?).

Not so long ago, it was assumed that the presence of one«s awareness was tied to the presence of a borne body. That is, a child was granted awareness at birth. Through medical research, we have gone so far as to discover that an unborn moves and reacts to the moods of his mother; too, there are situations that take place around the mother, which the baby also realizes. From this, we can assume that the baby already has awareness within the mother«s womb.

One would have to have totally conscious memories of his existence in the womb in order to be totally convinced that his awareness actually existed when he was still in the womb.

Even if one does not have totally conscious memories, there is still another possibility for one to totally consciously understand that he, as his present body, had awareness even as an embryo within the womb. In order to do this, he would have to figure that the awareness levels he possessed at that time are even farther away from his present awareness levels than those of the awareness levels of his childhood. The chance is even slimmer to remember these. But even so, the chance still exists that he can become certain that he had awareness at that time.

If one is not able to totally conscious remember, then an ability of his awareness can: the now-CPU .

The now-CPU is the ability to have access to the unconsciousness, and with this, it has the ability to process the experiences from that long- ago time in his present likes and dislikes. Through this, when certain situations provoke a response from him that do not seem to be justified through childhood experiences or later ones, he can examine these to see whether something occurred during his prenatal phase that might explain these emotional responses.

If there are people (e.g. his mother), who lived at that time, who can validate that events took place which, from their substance, could induce the same responses, then he has the confirmation that he (his awareness ) existed even when his future body had not been borne yet.

Since doctors today have also come to the conclusion that certain situations in the prenatal phase effected the awarenes of the unborn, we can assume that, at least in most cases, the awareness did exist.

But one can first be convinced himself (that his awareness existed before he was borne) once he either has a totally conscious memory of his existence within the womb, or when his likes and dislikes in certain situations can only be supported by experiences he had within the womb (since he couldn«t find that these likes and dislikes could be supported by any other experiences at any other time in his life other than during the prenatal phase).

Another question arises from the first: Does one«s Bewusstsein only reach to procreation? Or did it come into being much later? Perhaps even earlier? That is, how far back does awareness reach?

There are some who have participated in "re-birthing" and are convinced to have held other lives based on memories from earlier lives. At the same time, there are a number of those who believe to have memories of other lives without even having done "re-birthing" themselves.

We do not want to deal with the pro and contra arguments concerning this area; those interested can look to an abundance of reading material already available. What we want to say is the following:

If reincarnation should exist and one were reincarnated (were at least in his second life on earth); we must figure that his awareness levels from his previous life lie farther away from those today than those awareness levels he had when he was an unborn. Not only that, but "death" lay somewhere in between his present life and his previous one; he could«ve been an entirely different person in an entirely different environment.

Furthermore, when one works on the assumption that he has been reincarnated, and that there are reasons to be found for his likes and dislikes, but that they were not found in his up-to-now life nor in the time he was in the womb, he can conclude that these reasons are from another life. But first, he have to analyze the reasons for his likes and dislikes; that is to know exactly why he likes something and why he dislikes something else. After he has found one of the primary reasons for this, it must be evident that this reason did not take place in his present life. (There could be many reasons that effect his likes and dislikes in a particular situation; it«s only important for one to find the main reason or reasons in a particular situation, without which he couldn«t have responded as he did.).

If he is able to find this out on his own, he would probably assume--that is, if he doesn«t dispute the basic possibility that reincarnation exists--that his Bewusstsein (awareness ) was also present in another life.

One can only gain direct, total conscious certainty to have existed on earth in a past life if he has a total conscious memory (that is, if he is able to get closer to this awareness level he had at that time this memory was his impression), in which he sees himself functioning there, just as he would through a memory in his present life. It is important to see himself functioning there because when he does so, this gives him greater certainty that he, in fact, has a real memory of a former impression that he himself experienced, and not simply another impression that he misinterprets at the present time (e.g. a scene from T.V. that one considers a formerly-experienced memory). At the same time, he could also only totally consciously believe the memory (i.e. the particular form of memory) when he sees it quite clearly, after having distinguished the impression from dream, real life, T.V. images, newspaper reports, thoughts, etc.. One who cannot distinguish these, will not have the inner force to tell the difference between "real" memories from a former life (ones that one actually experienced) and imaginary memories.

He who is able to distinguish memories by their "sources" (i.e. where they come from; e.g. if they are experiences in their own right or simply scenes from a movie) will be convinced to have "lived" before based on a totally conscious memory that he himself was active in, but which was not in his present life (as long as he does not reject the possibility of reincarnation).

What we cannot say here, and do not want to imply, is that reincarnation exists in all certainty, whereby every person has already experienced one or more lives. What we could say is that every person--assuming that reincarnation actually exists, and that that which we just pointed out (to have memories which do not fit into one«s present life) would bring us to the conclusion that the individual truly lived another life--has the primary ability (the now-CPU can function as his tool) to "store" those memories. Or: that every person can logically understand through his likes or dislikes, whose moods could not belong to particular situations in his present life (after this was clarified), that these moods could have resulted only from memories that he experienced himself in a former life.

In both cases, it should not be argued that reincarnation exists or exists for everyone. Rather, only that one who is convinced that reincarnation is possible can become convinced that he existed in another "life" according to having correctly categorized all of his memories (that is, he knows precisely which memories belong to T.V., a speech, a news report, an experience he himself took part in, etc.), and by having a memory. Or, secondly, that he has likes and dislikes which are not in any way connected with his present life.

This is, we do not want to claim that "reincarnation is a fact for everyone;" rather we will approach this inquiry from another angle. We want to say the following:

If reincarnation should exist, then one can collect knowledge as we demonstrated.

A good example of how to realize the likes and dislikes which come from another life and existence, is the story of the eight-year girl we mentioned in chapter six. She focused her fear on the outcome of the war, such as the bombing of cities. The child never had any experiences relating to this in her previous life nor in the womb. Equally so, her genes could not have caused this fear, because neither her mother nor her grandmother, who only experienced war without bombs, experienced any terror of bombing. The only possibility left is that we are dealing with an individual whose previous life had to face a terror of bombing.

One could ask why we should look into the existence of previous lives; especially when the subject recalls frightening occurances such as the girl displayed. We will not inquire into whether or not we should recall previous experiences here. We only want to state that there are many traces which suggest that we have former lives, in such cases as the girl«s case shows--this is to assume that one holds reincarnation as possible.

VIII

With an exception of decisions, when transferred into reality, that don«t allow us any room to manoeuver, i.e. where only one feasible way exists to survive (the diagnosis of which is left to the job of the future-CPU), all of our decisions are dependent from former impressions or thought combinations (= everything which is not an "impression" or former impression (= memory) but which takes place in awareness ).

We will probably not be able to ascertain exactly why we act the way we do; that is, we will probably not be able to identify all of the precise reasons of our actions. This is simply because (even if we believe to know totally consciously all of the reasons behind our decisions) there are so many unconscious experiences in our awareness, that we can never truly determine whether other unconscious experiences are also responsible for our decisions.

From time to time, our likes and dislikes (experience has shown that it is easier to determine the dislikes) can specifically match a particular subject matter, that one (we will again use the example of the eight year- old girl from the last two chapters) can rather easily surmise what type of events led to these likes and dislikes.

Still, in these cases, the entire truth remains hidden (taking the example of the girl, this would have been all of her memories, in detail, that influenced her decision to perceive "fear" with the subject "war"). Perhaps the girl experinced even more terrible memories. Perhaps less so, but which nevertheless increased her fear even more. For example, the eight year-old could have had fear of loud noises (how, we will not attempt to clarify here) in a former life before the war took place, and the experience of a bombardment not only confirmed her fears, but incresed them considerably (assuming that reincarnation exsists).

In any case, we cannot assume that when we observe how likes and dislikes match a specific subject matter--and probably because of this, even assume that reincarnation exists--that we can totally consciously understand all the reasons for these likes and dislikes. That is, it is not clear which memories arouse which or how many precise values in the decision to perceive fear.

We do know that in nearly all of our decisions, and with this, all of our future experiences (impresions as well as thought combinations) are dependent on our former experiences. We do not know, however, how this dependency works exactly.

(If someone said that in our inquiries we have established that the influence on our decisions is centered solely on that which we experience, and that we disregard the influence of heredity (i.e. the "gene"), then we would respond in the following way:

Heredity only influences effectively if the influence is identifiable in something else. That is, if heredity takes at least a small part in making a decision to act (i.e. in reality) or in thought combinations.

A shared decision must express itself in some way (in order to be a shared decision at all). Because every expression is an experience (in this case, that "one senses what one has to do"), "heredity" does not express itself in any form other than an experience itself).

If we were able to have definitive knowledge concerning our unconscious events, then we could much better understand (probably even know) how this dependency operates. In looking at the very possibility of the influence of genes or of reincarnation, i.e. that which extends beyond one life-time, our attempt to totally consciously experience everything from our former life (or from our genes), ignoring the fact that this could be above and beyond our own abilities to carry out, would last longer than the actual time we have in a single life-time.

Does this then signify that we--trapped within our past--are always characterized by the coincidence of the likes and dislikes in our decision-making? Or, are there perhaps "truer" and "greater" designations within our existence? Is there a true purpose that goes beyond "surviving for the purpose of simply indulging in our own desires as best we can?“

(The axiom to "survive" cannot be an attainable purpose in of itself. Afterall, we die sooner or later, and if there were no substance to our existence outside of survival, then it would be rather unimportant if we were to die at this moment or one-hundred years from now, for the sole purpose directing our life would be unattainable. Furthermore, the desires we feel show that our awareness goes far beyond just "survival.").

Simply indulging in one«s own desires does not alone satisfy some. Many feel the need to assign greater purpose to their actions, as this general axiom states.

But what is the purpose they seek?

Is not the need to attribute life with purpose instead of simply following their basic desires, a desire in of itself?

Let us not forget that all resolutions of this kind (= to designate one«s life differently from that assigned to it (which is done by the now-CPU) by his past) directly involve the now-CPU , which tells us exactly what we should do. And as we«ve said, the now-CPU is dependent in its decision-making upon the former experiences of one«s Bewusstsein.

One could agree to accept that only the now-CPU can relate what one has to do. Nevertheless, by analyzing his desires, one could dig deeper for a better understanding of what the "true" (assuming there was one at all) purpose--probably hidden behind the surface of desires of our life could be.

In order to make use of that we have learned to now, let us look at Decision-Type N-2 .

Let«s look into why the subject actually went on vacation in Southern Italy. Why would he have put so much energy into skiing in bad weather? Afterall, neither activity is necessary to survive. In most cases, it is not probable that one obtained the desire to ski from a previous life or from his genes, since this sport isn«t at all that old in the first place. In addition to this, if the desire would have been transferred over from a previous life or from his genes, then the question arises how one could have found it enjoyable back then to travel down the slopes on wooden boards.

In order to apply those possibilities of awareness we have indentified, one could assume that the sense of the Type N-2 decisions is only to atempt to change the awareness levels . That is, that awareness wants to improve its own abilities (namely, that awareness could develop by repetitively changing the awareness levels ). Aside our own speculations, it remains to be seen, however, why awareness should have any interest in doing this.

To somewhat better be able to answer these questions, and to eventually come to further questions which belong to such a subject matter, we simply have to know more about ourselves.

Why don«t we take another example, whose existence again relies on the now-CPU ; namely, the concept of "art."

Everything that is not directly necessary for survival (in its substance, as well as in its form) is art.

If one lives on bread and water (and just the most necessary of vitamins), then this cannot be associated with a form of art. At that moment, though, when one chooses to prepare his meal with a combination of different ingredients in a variety of different ways, then this is an art form. It would not be an art form if one were to eat with his fingers from a common pot, which is made to meet his demands (e.g. to be able to pick up the food without the pot crumbling apart) right away, and which meal is simply the staple food of his region (e.g. rice instead of bread). As soon as one decorates the pot, or makes it into forms that goes beyond its utility factors, or when one eats with a fork instead of his fingers--then art is the function.

Just as in the cases of going on vacation and skiing, we can ask, Why since mankind has been around, have we gone through further cultural developments?

Of course, this also leads to a shift in the awareness levels, even if more slowly and less frequently. Could the purpose of our exsistence lie in becoming more and more sophisticated in our activities which are necesarry for survival?

If this were the case, wouldn«t the sophistication process be never-ending?

That is, could we ever reach a point where the awareness levels wouldn«t change any longer, simply because there weren«t any more? A point where sophistication is no longer possible, becasue we have exhausted all of the variations that exist? Doubtfully.

We could come up with a hundred speculations of which hidden but "true" purpose exists behind our desires, even those unconscious to us. This would not only go beyond the structure of our investigation, it would also tell us nothing more than: in order to understand all this better, we have still so much to know about ourselves.

Good, one could say, let«s just completely skip the assistance of our now-CPU in settling what the purpose of our existence could be. Instead of the now-CPU , why don«t we substitute the future-CPU in its place.

If we do this, we would immediately see that we have no idea where to position the future-CPU . We would have no starting point from which we could maintain that it functions without at least the minimal of help from the now-CPU . Such a starting point is what we would need, however, in order to be able to discover--assuming that such a thing exists at all--an independent, true purpose of our life beihnd our present desires. Even if we were to arrive at such a starting point (which in any case, would only be possible with the help of the now-CPU ), due to whatever awareness level we are on at the present moment, we cannot be ensured that the now-CPU would be prepared to take the path that the future-CPU might offer it for finding the "true purpose" in our life.

It remains to be seen if there is any other purpose beyond the general-axiom : "surviving for the purpose of simply indulging in our own desires as best we can;" but, too, there is nothing to say that this axiom isn«t perfectly right, since it stems from personal preferences/desires. This is not to say that the desires one busies himself wih day-in and day-out are the desires he "truly" wants. Afterall, we have established that every awareness level creates its own likes--and who is to say that one is on an awareness level on which he can best feel the true desires of his awareness ?

The fact that we are even concerning ourselves with such questions (the purpose of existence) indicates that it lies in our unconscious interest (this interest could only occur because of the now-CPU) to want to totally consciously to deal with this question. The question must also belong to our desires since we have established the resolution to even occupy ourselves with it. Because of this, we have the same right to deal with this question as he who wants to go skiing, for example.

How shall we move on in getting closer to experiencing the true purpose behind it all?

We can say that no matter if there is a purpose in life that goes beyond this general axiom , or a purpose that is concealed within it, it is indisputable whatever the case may be that the more we know about our original and essential "Being," the better chance there will be to come up with answers (if there are any) to these questions.

At this point the following question could arise:

Instead of looking for a vague "purpose" in life, of which no one really knows if it really exists or not, maybe it would better to understand this general axiom (i.e. an axiom that should be relevant to all) through the future-CPU so that it might be applied at once to everyone.

Afterall, history has shown us: this axiom was never applicable to only the majority of human beings. For those who the axiom did become reality for, it did not remain so over the course of their entire lives. Even if this is the true purpose of existence, or there is another purpose, or if there is none at all--if it were possible to understand this general axiom and then learn how best one can transfer them into reality, then the possiblity would exist that human beings could see that they possess so much happiness, like never before.

Would this not certainly make all of our inquiries worth something?

Nothing can be said against that. Of course, it would be good if such a general axiom existed that all people possessed. But history has shown time and time again how one group of people has attempted to put this axiom into reality, but in so doing, actually produces the opposite effect for many as a result of their actions.

One might then think that in order to come to better recommendations for converting this axiom into reality, with the help of the future-CPU , one should anaylze those situations in which one attempted, but failed, to realize this axiom, to analyze, too, the undesired results.

Of course, one could reply that every conversion of an axiom that turns out bad should be critically investigated to be able to avoid these mistakes in the future.

Here it is important to point out that all undesired situations ended up this way because before these situations occurred, people made the wrong decisions (either in deciding to carry out a particular axiom or not (now-CPU ), or in converting the already-made decisions into reality (future-CPU ) ), as the future situation later showed in not achieving the axiom (conscious or unconscious) "to aviod all things not desired". (Even if a house were to cave in due to a landslide--the wrong decision would lie in having built the house in the wrong place, regardless if one couldn«t have calculated this catastrophy with modern equipment.).

If politicians who make bad decisions land a place at the top of a nation«s government, this could result in negative repercussions for the socity they run; but it is also the result of a wrong decision that the citizens made in putting these people in such important positions.

Let us return once again to the substance of this axiom: “Surviving for the purpose of simply indulging in our own desires as best we can.“

It is quite clear that every person has different preferences, and that the realization of the preferences of some would hinder those of another. As long as people have different desires (but even if this weren«t the case), it will not be possible to fulfill all of them. To now it has been unthinkable, and is really not very likely to happen in the future, that the desires« transformation into reality would satisfy everyone, for the simple reason that the realization of some people«s desires often lead to the opposite effect for others.

At this point, we can say: we know why something cannot be realized (this general axiom we have addressed)--whether another, "greater" purpose in our life exists or not, this axiom remains a seemingly logical axiom--but we do not know where to go from here.

In making all of our decisions, not only are we totally dependent on what our previous experiences prescribed (with the now-CPU ), but probably, not all of us will be able to carry out the dictations of our pasts at the same time here on earth. From reasons we gave, this would be impossible.

Therefore, not only are we captive to our own pasts, we are also imprisoned in not being able to act out our desires as we wish.

If some have been so fortunate to fulfill their desires thus far, they cannot be sure that still others won«t get in their way in the future, for others« desires could still be in the process of becoming, and in their realization, could obstruct the contentement of those first fortunate (i.e. by displacing their desires).

Of course laws are made to ensure that everyone has equal access to the possibility to fulfill their desires, without hindering others to do the same in the process. However, not only do these laws more often than not (nearly always) prevent people from totally (unobstructedly) living out their desires, history has shown us that these laws do not even come close in managing that everyone«s desires be satisfied.

Aside from this, we should remember that desirs and preferences change.

What one likes one day, he may not the next. This means that one can establish a precise goal, but in reaching it might not desire it as he did before. The path before one actually reaches this goal could be filled with new impressions that could change the importance it held before.

Therefore, if one were so powerful so as to be able to fulfill all of his desires without being impeded, he would not able to know beforehand whether his desires will remain the same once they are fulfilled in reality.

It is not entirely unlikely that all of one«s desire for preferences is lost, and he is instead faced with a terrible feeling of emptiness, when the inability-to-desire sets in; a feeling that everything is dull, a feeling expressed in a way that the subject no longer desires anything.

It is not settled that this general axiom (surviving for the purpose of simply indulging in our own desires as best we can) is the final and greatest principle of our Bewusstsein (our awareness ), and with that, that it is the only "true" purpose of our life. On the other hand, we can also not say that there is any other purpose.

We are, therefore, as clever as before. In order that we can better understand these events we must figure out exactly that, what brings them about.

What or who causes these events?

That is us.

Who are we?

We are awareness (or Bewusstsein , or the ego).

How then does awareness bring about these situations?

Through its activities.

And how are its activities determined?

Through decisions.

And how are these decisions made?

Through--with the help of the now-CPU--the past.

What is then the past?

The past is all one«s experiences (i.e. all of the activities of the awareness (impressions, memories, thoughts, feelings, dreams, etc.) ).

We can thus maintain that the key to a better understanding of all of our desires, passions, activities and their translation into reality (but also into our awareness as the substance of dreams or thoughts is also dependent on former impressions) lie hidden in the activities of our awareness .

If we hope then to know more about "the original and essential Being", we will have to better understand the happenings that take place within our awareness .

This is exactly what we hope to do further into our investigation. We do not want to scrutinize the substance of individual experiences, rather understand how our awareness functions. How we even come to experiences. How we arrive at all that our awareness does.

SABATIEU

Part II

All Type-S decisions are made for survival.

These are the most primary of the decisions from the now-CPU , for the survival of it«s individual is imperative in being able to decide on any other desires.

The now-CPU also makes Type-N and N-2 decisions. Here, however, its set of objectives are not as clear as in the case of Type-S decisions. Afterall, this has to do with doing what it "likes" to do. This sort of pleasure is, furthermore, dependent upon all of its former experiences, for the now-CPU can only "like" that which it can "know" through awareness.

The future-CPU has a say in all of the now-CPU «s decisions (see appendix).

In Type-S decisions, the future-CPU informs the now-CPU from what range of possibilities it can choose from in order to survive.

For example, the future-CPU knows that one could become, for example, a banker, but that he hasn«t a chance to become a pilot with an airline carrier. It knows this for the simple fact that no one has the chance to pass the admission exam when he is legally blind, with an eye prescription of minus 8.

Once the now-CPU has decided how it will survive (e.g. by becoming a banker), the future-CPU will then make those necessary rules totally conscious (as good as our awareness is able to do so--at least as many rules as awareness is able to make totally conscious ), which he has to pay attention to in order to be a banker.

In Type-N and N-2 decisions, the future-CPU points out to the now-CPU where the consequences of its decisions could lead to. The now-CPU will then determine if it wants to make this decision under these circumstances.

That is, the future-CPU would report if Decision-Types N and N-2 could result in the endangering of one«s life (e.g. One might want to fly to London every weekend, but in so doing, he wouldn«t have any money left for food, clothes, or the rent). The future-CPU would also point out when Decision-Types N and N-2 could lead to situations that contradict other Type-N and N-2 decisions of the now-CPU .

If the now-CPU then made an effective Type-N or N-2 decision, then the future-CPU would inform it how this decision can best be converted into reality. (If one, for example, wants to go to the park, then the future-CPU would iform him how he could best get there.).

In other words, the now-CPU gives all of our decision a set of objectives.

The now-CPU «s choice of objectives is dependent, however, on all former impressions (i.e. memories); the present moment where one finds himself (i.e. impression), as well as all thought combinations such as ideas, feelings, etc. (that is, everything that takes place in our awareness as new arrangements (= that different from the reproduction of former impressions) ).

Because experiences are decisive for our entire Being, we want to give attention to them now. There are three basic types of experiences:

First, there are those we get through reality. These are simply the impressions (from now on, we will call these "real-experiences," whereas "experiences" will stand for all types of experiences).

Second, we have memories (from now on, "recall-experiences"). They are nothing more than modifications of former impressions ("modifications" because in practice, hardly anyone is prepared to bring an experience back to reality based on the exact guidelines of the former impressions (i.e. in all its details) ).

Finally, there are all the thought combinations of our awareness . That is, all that which is neither impression nor memory (from here on out, they will be called "extra-experiences"). These include dreams, ideas, thoughts, and all feelings, etc..

Recall-experiences are nothig more than extensions of former real-experiences from in the past. That is, without an impression, recall-experiences would not exist at all. The shape of all extra-experiences« contents are influenced by previous real-experiences . Dreams, ideas, thoughts, and feelings consciously and, even more so, unconsciously assimilate all the contents of former impressions. We can say, therefore, that real-experiences strongly influence recall- and extra-experiences .

For this reason, we want to look more carefully at real-experiences (i.e.the impressions) as events of our awareness , whose contents influence all other contents of awareness (at least from our present standpoint).

Impressions are, as far as the contents are concerned, all determined by that which we assimilate from reality. Based on our present level of knowledge, how would we best define "reality?"

Reality is that from which we, with the help of our sense organs, receive information. Reality is where all people--provided that they are able to use the same sense organs--have the principle possibility to similarily take in (i.e. nearly identically) the same somethings .

Considered purely practically (i.e. in everyday life), reality is that, from which we--depending on the state of our senses--can take in the most varied of impressions (where one who is blind will describe the way from his home to a store much differently from one who cannot hear).

Even in the case of those whose senses function in the same way, different people will often totally consciously perceive the same incident in very different ways (this doesn«t mean, however, that this incident was not unconsciously stored identically in everyone). If a couple went to a bar together and were asked afterwards what they noticed on the way, then each would most likely not have had the same exact experience in their consciousness. Each would have noticed particular small details, which the other failed to obsreve.

A chemist would describe an event differently than a physicist, who would describe it differently than a "normal" person with his "normal" senses. That is, if a wall is a solid mass for most of us, a chemist, who observes it in lines with his profession, would see it as a porous mass. Where we see it as unmoving, he sees it--by means of the wall«s structure of atoms--as an indescribably fast-rotating object.

Let«s make a thought experiment: Let«s take a living being, whose only possibility to sense impressions from outside is through the colors surrounding objects at different temperatures. It has access to the same brain functions as we do (which must, however work with different sense impressions than those we work with); but whose physical exterior form is so constructed, that the atomic structure of its body is able to pass through objects that are solid for our bodies. This being would give a much different description of the same reality which we are in. Furthermore, it would act in a much different way than we would in this reality (= our world).

The stated points do not say anything more than the fact that we should not accept that reality that we perceive through our senses be the sole possible and true description of our world. Our impressions, which subsequently influence everything else in our awareness (and in this way also our future actions), are determined by a reality which our impressions do not even experience "accurately." That is, they don«t experience reality as it "really" is.

The question is then as follows: What is the true description of reality?

Or, is it not necessary to know for discovering more about our impressions? Can we leave it as such: The structure of our sense organs determines how we "see" reality, and therefore, how our impressions are made. In combination with reality, the structure of our sense organs create that, which first produces an impression and then consequently influences our decisions and with that determens which experiences we will have.

Is everything that takes place within us, therefore, the result of this interaction?

We do know though that, seen from a medical point of view, the sense organs are "forced" to create special signals in the presence of an object. But signals, however, are finally processed in the brain as impressions.

The signals of our sense organs, which can only exist because of the presence of objects, cannot alone (i.e. every signal on its own) effectively declare anything concerning the object (or objects). For without an ordering of the signals in a particular pattern within our brain, the disordered signals couldn«t result in any definitive message (= an impression).

(Because the presence of an object is responsible for the signals of our sense organs, we will describe the term "signal" from now on as that which our sense organs transmits to us from the object, as well as that, which the object matter can "force" our sense organs to work on.).

We maintain, that the sense organs alone cannot process the signal (of the objects of the future impression) to that, which we then receive as an impression.

Why do we believe this to be the case?

It is apparent that when one, for example, stands in front of a building that he can estimate (provided that he "sees"; i.e. that he has the needed sense organs at his disposal) how "tall" this structure is.

How can he estimate the size of this building (i.e. know whether or not it is smaller, bigger, or the same size as he, etc.)?

If the building itself (i.e. the signals one«s sense organs records from it) contained the information of it«s own size, then still, the signals would not give the viewer the "real" (that is, if we assume that the building is "really" as big as what it seems to him) information concerning this, because the "real" information would exceed the very dimensions of his own body (since the building is much bigger than his body).

What do we then receive from the signals (assuming that the signals alone would give us the information we needed for the impression we have)?

The signals would then at least give us the proportions measured against one another. They would say how large the balcony is in comparison to the the window, the window compared with the doors, the doors with one«s body, etc.. The signals, therefore, would at least determine how everything is connected to each other.

Neither a door, nor a column, nor a balcony, nor anything else--if this object stands on its own and cannot be compared with something else--can say if this object is built as a miniature-reproduction or as one oversized.

One needs comparison in order to do so.

This comparision is not supplied by the signals of the object, however.

If the signals of objects would have comparisons within themselves, then they would have the same exact measurements within themselves. But the measurements are not given with these signals.

Thus, the ability to compare is "in us" ourselves. Furthermore, this ability to compare is independent from that, which the signals of our sense organs supply us.

With this knowledge, we can now say: not everything that we "really" see is "made" from the signals alone (which are taken in by our sense organs) into the objects as they appear to us.

Let«s look further.

An airplane doesn«t determine on it«s own where it is located. If we were to see one in the sky, then we would only know where it is with further reference points (e.g. from where we are observing it), for the plane«s position cannot be deduced from the plane alone.

If two planes were then to fly by eachother, how would we know (or at least estimate) the distance?

Neither the signals of the planes nor the signals of the air tell us the distance between the two planes.

Why not?

Because also the signals of the air cannot determine the "distance" without being compared to others.

This means that also in this case, the signals (which our sense organs take from the air and the plane) are not enough to give us a picture that we can then "really" experience as we "really" experience it.

But not only in comparison are the signals of objects too few.

If we look at an object alone (this means without comparing it with other objects) it cannot, based on its signals alone, be made to that as it appears to us at all times.

Why?

Because we view a building, for example, from a specific standpoint at a particular time in certain weather conditions.

Let«s assume that the only thing we "see" (= as it appears to us) are what the signals of the building give. The following would occur: Only these materials, put together into this context, seen from my standpoint, can transmit those "signals," which we can interpret in that way which we "do" in reality.

But now we can look at a picture that was taken at the same time, with the same weather conditions, and from the same perspective, and with this, have a very good impression of the building. We cannot "smell," feel the wind, or "hear" what was there, but if we first saw the photo and then later see that building in "real life" from the same position and under the same conditions--then we could say, from a total visual standpoint, that this building looks just like the one we saw in the photo.

But the picture of the building in the photo is made of completely different materials than the building materials of the actual building!

In addition to this, the "actual" size of the balcony, for example, is different than that in the photo. Furthermore, everythingis two-dimensional in the photo, and still, we "know" from the photo that a tree is in front of the building, etc..

This means if all objects were to send out their own special signals, and these would lead “within us“--without the smallest amount of "processing"-- to that which we call “reality“, the photo would never be able to transmit the same identical information that the object expresses in reality.

Although all the sizes were smaller in the photo, it is impossible that that, which in reality we call from its form a "balcony“ can be transmitted only by the signals of a chemically-coated paper and can lead to the same message (namely to that which we identify in reality as "balcony") (with the exception of smaller measurements).

If the object«s signals alone were responsible for the establishment of its appearances (and the sense organs would have only to read these signals in the "right" way), then the signals from chemically-coated paper would not be able to give the same exact "message" (= "this is what the building looks like from this angle") that the "real" building does.

This fact proves that in addition to signals, there must be an ordering-function "within us."

When observing reality unbiased, it is necessary to accept that the signals, which our sense organs transmit, are not alone able to give us the reality we "see."

Instead, we need something for all the forms we "really" see: "assimilations".

Assimilations are ordering-functions "within us" that arrange the signals that our sense organs take in into those forms, which then appear to us as "real" objects (as the comparison between the photo of the building and the "real" building proves).

That is, we need the most diverse of principles (assimilations ) that can be applied, based on practical necessity, in order to combine with somethings (= totally undeclared; "containers" for everything--here, for the "signals" of the object ) to "produce" particular forms (objects) that we are familiar with through our impressions.

In consequence, this shows that the assimilations , without which the signals of our sense organs could never be put into any kind of order, are not only valid for all individuals (i.e. at least, all people), that also means that all individuals must have "identical" assimilations.

This is because we will only be able to come to total agreement on a description of reality once all individuals have access to identical assimilators. (Even if this agreement is not absolute, it is still far-reaching.)

If everyone would organize his sense impressions based on his own purely subjective form (= the assimilation that is only valid for each one), then each of us would get a completely different picture of reality.

If no one were able, neither through the assimilations nor through subjective forms, to harness the signals, then no one would ever be able to even have an impression that he could consciously or unconsciously work with; i.e. seen from a practical point of view, he wouldn«t have any impression at all. Awareness couldn«t even make sense of the sense organs« signals without some kind of ordering of them, to each other and within themselves. This kind of ordering is only possible because awareness possesses assimilations.

Assimilations (actually, inherent laws concerned with the design of the sense impressions valid for everyone) and not purely subjective forms must be responsible to get an impression of reality.

The question then becomes: What exactly are these assimilations and where do we find them? (They must at least be valid for all human beings; otherwise, there wouldn«t be any kind of reality that we recognize). Can we find these assimilations in reality?

Hardly ever. How can something give us these assimilations, when it itself "comes into being" (for reality "comes into being," as we know it, only then when the sense impressions are put together within our brain) through these assimilations ? How can we dervive assimilations from reality, when we first need the help of the assimilations in order to create this reality? This is simply impossible.

Because these assimilations could not derive from "reality," they must be inherent within us. And because, we as human beings with the same sense organs, receiving the same (or at least very similar) impressions, we have to have assimilations and not purely subjective forms.

We will have explained this so far. There is one instrument that provides an excellent example of how this process works. It helps us to better understand that the assimilations only take place within us, and no where else. That instrument is the T.V..

Let«s take the example of a live-broadcast. In this scene, we see a camera pan, as seen from the top of hill, of a small town that reaches as far as the foot of the hill. We assume that we haven«t seen this town before, neither in real life, nor in T.V..

Everyone watching will say: Look, the have great weather-- blue skies and sun, beautiful houses, etc.. Everyone will be convinced, and rightly so, that the scene (the place and its suroundings) of this area looks exactly as the camera has presented it.

And yet, "in reality," all we have seen on the screen are hundreds of thousands of colored dots, each of which is the combination of three primary colors. in addition to this, the dots change their color scheme every second up to twenty-five times (so many individual pictures can be shown within one second of viewing-time).

Every one of these dots, from which the picture is created, actually has nothing in common with the real scene (the real scene that all dots combined have transmitted).

In "reality," therefore, what we see on the screen is only a vast number of the very diverse and quickly-changing colored dots. Furthermore, none of these dots, considered on their own, give any evidence of the "actual" scene of the small town.

The fact that one, just as all people on earth, can recognize structures on the screen, doesn«t at all have to do with the truly exsisting objects in the town, since he actually doesn«t come into contact with these objects.

Because of this, one can not be forced by those objects in some way to register (however this would work) these objects to that as they are in reality.

This leads us to the conclusion that he recognizes these structures because of assimilations (= principles we are subjugated to in producing impressions).

That means that T.V. requires more than simply a sensory recording of colored dots.

(In order to "really" see these dots on the screen (i.e. see them as they appear to us), we need an ordering function as well (namely assimilations) for this process within us that establishes exactly which colored dots take what position.

For our explanation of the assimilation «s mechanisms, it doesn«t matter if we use the processes that take place in the "conversion" of that (whatever that may be) which comes before the presence of an impression--a "pre-reality"--into reality (in this case, it is the "two-dimensional ordering of the colored dots in an arrangement that we can all see"), OR if we use the conversion of artificial "pre-reality" (in this case, it is the “two-dimentional“ ordering of the colored dots in an arrangement that we can all see) into artificial "reality" (in this case, the T.V. picture as it "appears" to us).

In both cases, "pre-reality" into reality or artificial "pre-reality" into artificial "reality," the assimilations are necessary. This is so, because without assimilations, we couldn´t produce any pictures from already arranged dots (and therefore, expect that other people could produce the exact same picture) just as we couldn´t produce any impressions of the screen with specially-ordered dots.

The fact that we take the example of artificial reality instead of reality as it is to explain how these assimilations function is because the artificial reality allows us to make this processes more visible.)

Let«s assume that we are not yet convinced that we are actually the ones who, by going through assimilations and with the help of our sense impressions, can construct reality. Let«s assume, furthermore, that reality is as we register it. Let«s consider the operation of a T.V. in this aspect.

From a vast number of possible combinations of dots, we are able to create that which corresponds to "reality."

One thing that helps us to do this is an ability within us which allows us to order somethings (in this case the dots) in their relationship to one another.

To understand the fact that an ability within us is responsible for this ordering, we need only to show a pile of rocks that fills up the entire screen. One wouldn«t know if certain rocks occupy a space of twenty centimeters or twenty meters until another element (e.g. a person) came into the field of vision, which we could then use to to determine the proportions.

That on the screen, we are able to experience a house as a house, a car as a car, or a hill as a hill is because there is a grouping of the dots into a form that corresopnds to our ordering of a house, a car, or a hill.

The dots on their own say nothing of what forms can be made of them. Which dots are integrated into which units (some dots make a house, others a car, etc.) is not obvious simply from a two-dimensional ordering of the dots.

Forms (which are nothing more than assimilations ) are therefore necessary.

Because we cannot deduce these forms from the dots, but on the other hand in reality we know that the picture which appears on the screen corresponds to the area (e.g. the town) in "reality," we must have assimilations, and these can only be found in us.

We cannot say, moreover, that the colored dots correspond to our sense organs (eyes) in such a way that the sense organs can compose the dots themselves. Our eyes could register the dots well, but composing them in the right proportions (i.e. that the composition corresponds with reality) from all the hundreds of thousands of possible structures first takes place in our brain (i.e. awareness ).

The point is: How can someone compose something in such a way that one is able to develop pictures from it, which are identical with reality, but with which reality he has never had any exposure to? This is only possible because there are particular principles (assimilations ) within us that allow us to put certain forms into being.

The points of light are first composed within us into units (e.g. a house, a car, etc.) and classified (e.g. that is a house, that is a car, etc.). It is us who first determine which colors belong to particular objects, and which do not.

Let us say that a red and white flag is in front of a multi-colored house among other houses in our camera shot. Those of us who are watching T.V. say that the red and the white in this case, do not belong to two different objects, but rather to a single object. We claasify this object as a flag. We also observe a red on another white, but decide that in this case, they are two seperate objects--two houses. Etc., etc..

If a two-dimensional figure ordered from colored dots is suddenly seen as three-dimensional, this also shows that assimilations exist within us.

For example, let«s assume (and rightfully so, since such is reality) that the flag in front of a primarily red-painted building is there, and a more subdued white building is hidden in the background. In the foreground, a blue car with black stripes drives by from left to right. If no assimilation (this could be a fundamental assimilation or one which developed from the fundamental assimilation ) existed, whereby "an object can be next to, in front of, or behind another object," then we couldn«t understand a two-dimensional ordering of the dots as a three-dimensionally classified object.

This cannot simply occur within the eyes alone, where we would only at best have unordered ponts of light. No, only we classify objects to that as they appear to us.

And what does this then lead to?

First of all, in our search for assimilations, we have found another principle with which we are already familiar. This principle is responsible for doing that which is necessary for a picture to appear on the T.V. screen at all. Namely, putting together and making the "right" combination (i.e. in our last example, this would be that combination which corresponds to a real picture of the small town) unbelievably fast from a vast number of possible combinations.

This principle is nothing other than the CPU.

Remember our definition: The CPU is the ability of awareness to access the somethings , combine them, and make a decision.

Here, the CPU takes the somethings (namely, the points of light); combines these according to assimilations (the CPU itself is an ability of awareness , not a "visible" (= recognized by the senses) expression of awareness (for we only experince the CPU through it«s effect) ); sees which assimilations with the past (= former impressions) could be adequate to determine which assimilations (actually, which special organization of the signals should be combined with special assimilation combinations) it will accept as "real" (i.e. those which would also be met in "reality").

This means that the CPU can also "order" assimilations. That says the CPU has "control" over assimilations, in so far as it constructs our "reality" from combining them every day.

This CPU (remember, although we distinguish the CPUs based on their effect (now-CPU , future-CPU ), all CPUs are a "single" ability of our awareness ) is similar to the future-CPU in its effect. Similar in that this CPU first goes through the possible principles and chooses them based on the chance that they can also be found in reality.

At the same time, this process is a decision, for when the CPU assigns particular dots to certain objects, it decides on something that could have just as easily been ommitted or simply have been carried out differently (assigned other dots to other objects).

Why does the CPU even want to get a picture of reality from T.V.? Why doesn«t it arrange the colored dots in different combinations (i.e. another grouping of the assimilation )? It«s persistence to arrange only "real pictures" from T.V. is not necessary for survival. It is a Decision-Type N-2, therefore, that the now-CPU makes to want to watch "reality" on T.V.. As often is the case, the now-CPU «s reasons for this are unconscious.

In order to make it clear what the CPU , now-CPU , and future-CPU stand for, from now on the term "CPU" will stand for everywhere where the CPU functions in two ways (manifestations). First, where it creates impressions from the signals of the sense organs through diverse assimilations . Second, where the CPU compares all possible arrangements of the most diverse of assimilations with former impressions (e.g. when watching T.V.), and in so doing, comes up with a single arrangement that most likely corresponds--i.e. comes closest--to "reality."

We will use the term "CPU-general" where the CPU functions without specifying to which result this will lead; that means that the term "CPU-general" stands for a "general way of contemplating all of the possible CPU -mechanisms."

Eventhough the consequences of the CPU and future-CPU are rather similar, we distinguish the two because the CPU shows even more original modes of operation: the CPU is awareness « ability to first be able to reach impressions by transforming signals with combinations of assimilations into impressions.

One could accept that the assimilations are within us, but still argue that this is only because we can find former impressions (i.e. our memories) and derive our assimilations from these.

There are two possible answers in response to this.

The first answer would be that we have the assimilations with us and, therefore, we can bring the signals of the sense organs into forms, through which the signals can become impressions.

There is a convincing reason for comparing the vast number of possible combinations of the signals with the most diverse assimilations on T.V. with former assimilation-combinations (that is, former impressions): through vast number of possible combinations from assimilations, one must, if one wants to experience the picture of reality on T.V., order the assimilations watching T.V. in the same way as one orders them in "real life."

This is why the CPU has to carry out the most diverse of assimilation arrangements in order to test all of them to determine which assimilation arrangement would best fit at the present moment--based on former impressions--to show the same thing as that which is found in reality.

The CPU can, for example, draw a circle, or from other dots a square, etc., from the many dots on the T.V. screen based on the assimilation: "One can draw a circle," "One can draw a square," "One can draw polygons," etc.. (All of these assimilations are randomly chosen. They do not claim in any way to be original-assimilations. (= assimilations which are in no way assembled from any other assimilations, but which assemble other assimilations)).

The CPU doesn«t have to follow a border which are bound by the colors in the picture. It can draw a circle within that which we describe as a "real" flag; that is, draw a circle and simply arrange the other red and white dots of the "real" flag differently. With the help of further assimilations , the CPU can take the left-over dots from the flag and make parts of houses, etc.. In other words, the possible combinations are endless.

(We should be reminded here of what we already said concerning the application of the T.V. picture as an explanation for the existence of the assimilation : namely, that the existence of certain "two-dimensionally-ordered dots that change their colors on the screen continuously"-- first comes into being from particular combinations of assimilations .

We are not concerned here with the condition of this "reality" stemming from "pre-reality" (whatever this might be), but rather with the creation of "artificial reality" from "artificial pre-reality" (here: an already made combination of the most diverse colored dots). We are not concerned here because both are cases of the same principle; namely, the combining of the most diverse assimilations .).

Because the assimilations (according to which assimilations the CPU combined and what was the outcome of these combinations) can put together the form of circles, squares or polygons, etc. instead of a flag--that is, instead of a flag that could just as well create a bike, a car, or something else from the same dots (or at least a part of these dots)--the CPU not only has to be prepared to use the most different kinds of assimilations, but it must also (if it wants to find "reality" through the T.V.) compare all the possible combinations of the assimilation with each other, as well as compare them with all the possible memories in order to find which combination of the assimilation could best represent that which is found in "reality."

We can see well here what an incredible data processing job the CPU manages (because of the huge number of possible varieties). It«s not only impressive that the CPU in doing so uses mainly unconscious data, but also that it almost always lands the "right" (i.e. that which corresponds to "reality") result from such a huge quantity of information.

The first answer only shows that it is necessary (at least for watching T.V.) to possess assimilations within ourselves. It doesn´t help us to find facts to prove the assumption that awareness hasn´t possessed assimilations from the very beginning.

The second answer would maintain that we are only able to have impressions because we had already recorded similar forms necessary in creating a picture of "reality," for example, from the T.V. picture.

This possibility does not claim that there are no forms (i.e. assimilations ) in our awareness . If we didn«t have any forms, then we couldn«t put anything in order. Instead, it claims that this assimilation is simply deduced from former impressions.

(It is clear that this possibility actually refers to deduced assimilations and not simply to the whole of a specific object (e.g. these specific shoes, this specific flag): if it were simply the specific objects that we recognize and not the assimilations which make these objects possible in the first place, then we would only be able to identify the exact same objects in the T.V. that we had already had as impressions. In other words, it would be impossible to see a house if its appearances were in the slightest way different than those one had already recognized as houses.).

If the assimilations are derived from former impressions, then this means that one can always store assimilation in his awareness. This does not tell us whether there are assimilations that belong to the fundamental principles of one«s Bewusstsein prior to all impressions, but it does say: one can hold on to and store assimilations .

The question then arises how one even arrives at impressions, from which the assimilations would want to derive (for without--at least subjective--assimilations, one can never hope to arrive at the impressions one needs in order that assimilations be derived from them in the first place).

The second answer shows that it is impossible to derrive assimilations from impressions. Because of this we can now say: There must be specific original-assimilations (from which the umpteen assimilations can stem, which we need for everyday life) that have been with our Bewusstsein (our awareness ) since the first experience. Otherwise, we would have never even arrived at impressions through our sense organs alone.

Why must there have been original assimilations? Why must have countless other assimilations have stemmed from these?

On the one hand, we know that all assimilations which we deal with every day, are formed themselves from sub-assimilations. (The form of a car, for example, is constructed from the forms of tires, a steering wheel, seats, etc.).

In other words, further investigation should prove that we can deduce these assimilations into even smaller sub-assimilations , and then these sub-assimilations into still smaller sub-assimilations , and so on.

On the other hand, we know--as we have just ascertained--that all assimilations have to come "from us." This also gives rise to the fact that at least the possibility for all assimilations , that we can have, had to have existed "within us" (i.e. our Bewusstsein , our awareness) since our first experience.

"New assimilations" could have only come into being after this "point," when all possibilities were "within us" already at the beginning (i.e. from the very first experience of our Bewusstsein ).

We still do not know, however, how we even arrived at assimilations , but we do know the following: We can deduce our assimilations into smaller and smaller sub-assimilations. This can go on until we arrive at sub-assimilations that can no longer be taken apart. These we will call the original-assimilations .

That does not say that we can assume that the original-assimilations on their own are enough to form the world how we perceive it nowadays. It means only that these assimilations that we experience today necessarily consist of original-assimilations (and others that we did not sufficiently analyze to this point, such as the CPU that integrates individual assimilations into connected-assimilations , and, moreover, is responsible that normal-assimilations derive from original-assimilations ) that are with us (or, at least, their possibilities) from the first experience.

One could still object. All recall- and extra-experiences need assimilations which are in ourselves. Otherwise, we would never have memories. No ideas, thoughts, nor even feelings (in order to even perceive feelings, we need assimilations (i.e. an ordering) ) would be possible.

But what do the impressions of "true reality" look like as opposed to the "artificial reality" in the T.V. picture? Could it not also be possible that reality itself has an effect on us, whereby it can force us to to order its signals (which we receive through our sense organs) according to the assimilations within it?

If this were the case, no one, who has the same sense organs that everyone else has, would be able to describe an experience (e.g. a street scene observed from the patio of a restaurant) differently from all the others.

On top of that, it wouldn«t be possible--when reality had direct access to us--to concentrate on one«s own ideas, to sleep and not register "reality" totally consciously (as one does when awake), nor to dream instead of being continually influenced by reality.

If reality were to compel us to perceive according to its rules, then we wouldn«t be able to escape its grip. That is, our entire totally conscious awareness would continually be at the beckonning of the "real world," and wouldn«t have any room left for something else.

If there were asimilations that were forced on us through reality, then we also couldn«t watch T.V. nor have recall- and extra-experiences .

What would the case then be if it were possible for us to break away from reality«s control over us (how it would work is difficult to determine, for there wouldn«t even be a control if we could escape it), and instead deal with recall- and extra-experiences according to our own pleasures; that is, to confront the consequences of our own assimilations.

We wouldn«t be able to, for example, develop an idea in the first place, e.g. to draw a dog--that is, have a precise image in our thoughts of what this animal looks like so that the idea can be transferred to paper (assuming we can draw a corresponding image), and where the produced picture would be expected to match the same image.

For the idea and the form it generates would be produced within us from our own assimilations. And how could we recognize an idea in reality (which only exists because we use certain assimilations (which were ours) ) if this idea, made "real" is dependent on completely different assimilations (namely those from reality) to become our impression (Namely, the dog drawn on the paper)? This is not possible.

Not only the signals of the sense organs, but also our own assimilations are, therefore, absolutely necessary for all impressions.

No impression would exist without assimilation. It is, therefore, only understandable that our contact to assimilations (i.e. at least original-assimilations, from which all other assimilations today stemmed) began with the very first impression of our awareness (our Bewusstsein).

A contradiction--nevertheless, one that seems like it--arises here, for we have shown that the CPU combines the most diverse of assimilations to make an impresion, which then appears to us (i.e. the signals of the sense organs are combined (from an infinite number of possible varieties) in a way that are revealed to us then as an impression).

By coming to agreement with other people in reality, that shows that all people have to deal with principally the same assimilations . If this were not so, we would not be able to create classifications that everyone can understand as classifications.

If one were to, for example, draw a circle and a square, then everyone would immediately know that they are two different geometrical forms that were given two-dimensional form on paper.

We would never be able to meet up with other people on a frequent basis in reality if we did not have the basic ability to have the same assimilations . In other words, every individual should have access to the same original-assimilations no matter if they all have access to the same number of connected-assimilations (At this time in our investigation, this is an assumption taken from the experiences in reality; we cannot say with certainty that this assumption is a general principle applicable to every human being).

We cannot come to a permanent agreement with our felow human beings based on this alone.

For, because the assimilations are in us, their compositions can also only take place within us. That is, just as we put them together. How, though, can we come to agreement with other people when every individual arranges his own assimilations from within, i.e. without the influences from outside?

Because reality consists of objects, from which each gets its own special form through the manner in which the signals of the sense organs are combined with very specific assimilations (from a vast number of possible assimilation-combinations)--objects cannot determine their own "arrangement" (i.e. decide exactly how they are composed). The objects, and therefore, reality, cannot influence the particular way in which we combine assimilations in every case.

Who or what does then?

For at the same time, there is agreement among the Bewusstseins. There must, therefore, be a reciprocal form of influence. Because we make every object, as it appears to us (the sensory manifestations of other Bewusstseinn are clearly applicable here as well), and at the same time see "reality" similarly (or even the same) as other Bewusstseins, so the agreement between Bewusstseins has to concern the effects of their CPUs !

This agreement concerns the effects of the CPU because it is "responsible" for how the most diverse of assimilations are combined (i.e. which assimilations are combined with which others).

Only that just explained makes it possible that the contradiction,--on one hand, we make objects into that as they seem to us, while on the other hand, we come to an agreement with our fellow human beings--can be solved!

And now it is also clear why we can similarily perceive in reality, and yet sometimes (always?) have not come to a hundred percent agreement with others. Because we are the ones who can arrange the assimilations differently, we can also always leave this agreement; or even can add further somethings (=purely subjective ones, extra-experiences ).

We do not yet know how this agreement functions.

The following summarizes our knowledge to this point:

Assimilations take place "within us" (whose original-assimilations we first have to find). We need these for all real- recall- and extra-experiences. They are combined by the CPU and produce the experiences as we perceive them. In the case of real-experiences, the CPU uses the same assimilations as all other Bewusstseins, with which we are in agreement .

We can now dedicate ourselves to the following question: Which original-assimilations (those which give rise to all other assimilations ) are there, which have been in our awareness since our very first impression?

We said that it is us who puts our world together as it appears.

We carry assimilations within us which first "process" the signals of the sense organs into that, which then appears to us as impressions. That means, we do not produce objects in our world stone by stone, mountain by mountain, out of nothing--but we give everything in our world its shape, as that which appears to us.

This means that we do not know, at least not at the present time, how all of the objects in our world are "truly" structured, who has created them, nor why all of the objects are present. We only know that we are the ones who make them as they appear to us; and we do this with the signal«s most diverse of combinations within our assimilations .

We will not attempt right now to explain how we (i.e. our CPU ) put the assimilations together in detail; rather, we will first try to see if we can track down the original-assimilations (i.e. assimilations from which all other assimilations are derived).

In other words, we are set in search for the original-assimilations in order that later, once we understand which and how many original-assimilations there are, we are able to figure out how far we can hope to understand how their application "builds" our world.

One concept that immediately comes to surface in this context is that of Space . This concept is the premise for us to even be able to come into contact with objects. For without Space , there wouldn«t even be a place for something else next to us.

It is necesary to point out here that in common day use this concept has become accepted to represent something that doesn«t exactly correspond to that which we intend here.

In everyday life, this "concept" is not only sometimes synonomous with "room," it also signifies a measurable size. One makes the connection between space and the qualities of being "three-dimensional," "measurable" (this is a meter, this a kilometer, etc.), etc..

In it«s most original definition, however, assigns its meaning as "the possibility of being side-by-side"; and this is the conception we will employ (of course, based on the hierto results from our examinations).

Why the "possibility"?

Because Space itself is not something measurable. Space itself cannot be an object. All objects that could exist, all somethings that are accessible to us must, so to speak, be "within Space". Space itself, on the other hand, is never something. It always remains so to speak "invisible."

When we see a room with a wall, then we do not "see" Space , but rathers pecific objects with specific forms of expression. That means, for example, that the walls stand at right angles to one another, that a chair is there, etc.. Space itself is only the possibility that these objects can even exist for us, and as a result, that they can be described by us at all.

It is important to understand that the description of the objects (= whose composition is made form the signals of the sense organs, and whose form is created from diverse combinations of diverse assimilations ) is only possible based on the original principle (= original assimilation ) of Space , but which however does not contribute in any way to specific descriptions of the objects. Several other assimilations are responsible for this.

In other words, the fact that the walls stand at right angles to one another, that the chair is red, etc. is only possible because--in addition to the original-principle of Space--further assimilations are at work in combination with the signals of the sense organs (these further assimilations are not like Space --only assimilations that make other things possible--but rather are assimilations that effectively arrange (i.e. those that make very specialized statements) ).

One cannot purely derive anything from the original-principle of Space (because Space only "makes possible"); neither a color, nor a right angle, nor anything else.

We see here how Space on its own does not contribute at all to the actual "description," i.e. to the "shaping" (which form will be taken) of objects. Rather, Space only provides the possibility of the objects« existence in the first place (namely, the objects next to us).

This also means that no impression (real-experience ) is possible without Space . For without the possibility of being side-by-side, nothing else could possibly exist beside our Bewusstsein .

It has to be made clear that Space--which actually on its own "is nothing," but which "makes everything possible in the first place"--is nothing material.

That is, that even if one were to regard his Bewusstsein only as something "spiritual" and not as "physical" (here, we will only make the assumption, but not claim, that this is the case), then nothing could be beside him; i.e. next to his Bewusstsein ; i.e. the Bewusstsein and something else--even if it were purely spiritual (e.g. another Bewusstsein)--without Space.

For Space is not something physical, but rather only that which makes side-by-side possible--it is irrelevant how these somethings, which are side-by-side (in other words, are not one and the same) are constructed.

Even the existence of the signals of the sense organs would not be conceivable without the Space beside our Bewusstsein. It is also not imaginable that those assimilations , which first make the signals into something that appears to us as this object, is possible without Space . This, because it is first the combination of precise assimilations (their precise order) that creates a very specific object (e.g. a car, exactly in that way as we take it in).

But because these assimilations are classifications (Actually, Space as an assimilation which enables, is not a classification--though the majority of assimilations must be classifications, for otherwise, no determinations could have been made, i.e. no possibility of differentiation would exist) their forms are at least (i.e. are, as we perceive them as "real") (probably also their pure "existence"--but we cannot say that at the present moment. For Space, too, is indescribable in its pure "existence," but first only shows its possibilities through its effects (something, which Space has in common with the CPU-general ). Nevertheless, the fact that assimilations create various forms in "reality" is enough for our assessment that assimilations could not be possible without Space (those assimilations which classify) ) of different natures (= the assimilations are not exactly one and the same without any differentiation). And as a fact, at the same "time," i.e. "simulataneously." If Space exists, only then can more than one form of a single (classifying) assimilation exist.

From that which we just explained (that not more than a single assimilation would be possible without Space ), it also follows that there couldn«t be any existence of recall- and extra-experiences without the principle of Space .

This, for we need assimilations for the construction of every recall- and extra-experience . Every assimilation (with the only possible exception being the original-assimilation ; but we also know too little about this to be able to determine anything at this time) however, is based on other assimilations .

In this way, every assimilation is created from several other classifying assimilations (a car, for example, is constructed from the classifications which make up "tires," "smell," "drive," etc. A tire is constructed from the classifications which stand for "round," "rubber," etc.).

Without Space , however, nothing more than a single classification would be posible.

A single classification without another, though, is not comparable to anything (since there is nothing else). The practical worth of a classification, however, is that, which it conveys very specifically. To convey something, however, only occurs where something comparable (i.e. more than "a single X") exists, i.e. where something is distinguishable. Since this is not given from an individual classification, such a classification conveys nothing. It is not in any way "useful," just the opposite, it is"unusable."

But not even a single classification could "possess" our Bewusstsein without Space . For it itself (= the Bewusstsein ) and a classification are actually two different somethings .

This means that without Space , not even a single, non-coveying (and in this way, therefore, "worthless") classification could be next to one«s Bewusstsein .

Nevermind then, the recall- and extra-experiences .

That means that the very fact that one can remember something proves alone that Space is necessary.

All that which we have just covered is just as applicable for all thought combinations. Every idea is a specific picture (one that is distinguishable from others). Differences are only possible, though, when variety exist. Variety is only "variety," however, when more than one and the same exists. And Space is necessary for the existence of more than one and the same.

The same is true of dreams, thoughts--everything, in fact.

Not even feelings are conceivable without Space . This is because feelings, at the moment in which they occur (when they are perceived), are triggered through the effect of the now-CPU ; which--more often unconsciously than not--compares former impressions with one another.

This effect of the now-CPU --in which it makes the most diverse of assessments (= the most diverse of memories (although even a single one would be enough) ) is only possible though, because the original-principle of Space is always there.

In this way, nothing that we link with Bewusstsein (as its forms of expression (i.e. as we "experience" it. (namely, in having experiences) ) ) would be possible today without Space .

Essential in understanding the concept of Space (concept because the term Space (which we have assigned) is also only a classification. A classification of something we do not "see," which we cannot "notice"; but of whose "existence" we are informed through its effects (namely, that there is something more than an "indistinguishable unit"), however. We cannot "see" it because it is only that which makes possible; i.e. enabling.) is that it doesn«t only make possible, for example, that a chair is next to a chair, but also makes it possible that a thought in us exists.

And this is the case because both a thought as well as a chair first appear to us in their definitive forms given through the combination of assimilations . One (thought) with or without the signals of the sense organs (we will have to uncover this in the course of our investigations); the other (chair) with the signals of our sense organs.

Space is by far not only limited to "outside manifestations" (chair), but rather is also responsible for all which takes place in our inner (e.g. thoughts).

In other words, through all of our experiences (i.e. all that we do, sense, are, etc.) the original-principle of space is present.

At the same time, due to its characteristic composition, it does not participate in defining diverse determinations (= the combination of diverse assimilations which together compose a special statement). Although it makes all of this possible in the first place. Space is, therefore, a very special original-principle. One which "enables" and does not "classify."

The fact that we have recall- and extra-experiences is additional proof that Space is an original-assimilation within us; that is that it had belonged to the "original elements" of our Bewusstsein from the beginning (i.e. since our Bewusstsein is that, as we are about to understand) onwards. For this is the only way possible to develop a thought. To perceive a feeling.

But not only this proves that Space is within us (i.e. a part of our Bewusstsein (we are not dealing with what value the Bewusstsein assigns "this part" in comparison to other parts) ).

Let us keep in mind that since Chapter IX we know that assimilations are put together inside of us; there must, therefore, also be Space in us (= an element of our Bewusstsein ).

If one were then to challenge that Space is in us, and believes that only the classifying assimilations are within us and not the enabling ones (Space ), what then?

If Space would be independent of us, it would still remain undisputed that the CPU-general would be "a part," "an element" of our Bewusstsein ("in us"). It is the CPU-general which is responsible for all experiences (i.e. also for all descriptions; actually, for all that is possible). In that it put assimilations together (classifying assimilations as well as enabling assimilations (to this belongs Space ) ).

If Space were something that existed on its own, then the CPU-general would not have "possessed" Space "before" the first experience of one«s Bewusstsein. The CPU-general would have to have "gotten a grip" on Space with the first experience.

The CPU-general can only "get a grip" on something that it knows of in the first place. For if absolutely nothing of the something is within awareness (i.e. awareness "knows" of nothing), then this something does not exist at all for awareness (in this case, it would be the independently existing Space ). The CPU would, therefore, first need the "knowledge" that there is Space, which is independent from its awareness in order to be able to link Space with its classifying assimilations .

If the CPU needs knowledge of an existing Space which is independent from its awareness , then it has to (and respectively awareness ) already have possession of an assimilation (or assimilations ) which makes this Space existent for awareness in the first place (for without assimilations , one«s awareness cannot know of anything; i.e. nothing exists for one«s awareness ).

The CPU «s own existence (respectively, the existence of one«s awareness ) and an assimilation (let it be an original-assimilation)--which is necessary to make the "existing space independent of awareness " at all existent for awareness --are actually two different somethings . Therefore, to be able to exist at all, these two somethings need Space.

This means, in order to have the chance at all to possess an existing Space, independent from us, in connection with our classifying assimilations (whereby it is incomprehensible how the CPU should be able to do such a thing), we must have possession of space as an element of our awareness (actually, as the enabling original-assimilation of our Bewusstsein ).

This means that if Space existed "outside of us" as something independent from us, then we would need the Space "within us" in order to even be able to know of its existence.

This all means that Space must be "within us." It must be an element of our Bewusstsein. The very fact that we can even put assimilations together proves this!

The must that Space is in us can be explained clearly with the T.V..

For when we "create" the most diverse of objects (the flag, the house beihnd, another house, etc.) from the most diversified of dots (returning to the camera pan of the village on T.V.), we can only do this because we apply the original-principle of Space (as the possibility of being side-by-side) in every determination (all impressions).

If this principle were not in us, we would not even be able to derive this principle of Space from the given dots (these are once again our artificial "pre-reality" ). We wouldn«t be able to make a distinction between the individual dots and couldn«t be put them into the most diverse of groupings (these dots are a house, these dots another house, etc.).

It is first and foremost that Space exists within us that we are able to see the flag in front of the house, that the second house is in the background, etc..

(It should always be taken into acount here that in "reality" we, of course, would never be able to see different dots without Space ; but here, we consider the already "given" dots as if they were "pre-reality." We are able to do this because we see the same assimilations in operation as those we would face in the "real pre-reality.").

The specific differentiations, however, of what is "behind," "to the right of," or "in front of" the flag are determinations which are only possible because the principle of Space operates within us, but also because these determinations must exist from further (namely, classifying) assimilations. For concepts such as "behind," "to the right of," etc. are not pure derivatives of the concept of Space .

Seeing a house "behind" the flag shows that we must also have the original concept of Space within us. For nothing three-dimensional can be derived purely from the dots alone.

(At the same time, "three-dimensional" or "two-dimensional" is all the same to Space since the difference first results from Space and further (classifying) principles. For Space as the possibility of side-by-side (= the ability to simultaneously exist of more than just an undifferentiated unit) does not differentiate between "where" or "how" the "side-by-side" is defined. This determination is first made from the classifying assimilations that work in combination with Space.)

If on T.V. one sees, for example, the house behind the flag, Space is not solely responsible, but rather a determining factor. Since Space cannot be derived from the dots, one can see that Space must be within us, and nowhere else.

The picture on T.V. shows, therefore, that the original-assimilation of Space is within us, and only there.

We can, therefore, summarize: Space is a fundamental element of our Bewusstsein. It is one of the original-assimilations which must have been present since one«s first experience, and with which further connected-assimilations can be constructed. Space by itself does not only not "exist on its own," neither is it a forming (= classifying) element (most of the other assimilations have forming character), but rather an element enabling the form.

XI.

Another original-assimilation is easily identified. That of Time .

Here, too, we must distinguish between the concept of "Time" as it is used in everyday use, and that concept as it "really" is within our examination.

In everyday language, "Time" is a rigidly fixed measurement. It is measurable and stands on its own, independent of whether humans or another living thing are present.

What is Time "really" based on our examinations, though?

Time itself is, just as little as Space is, a "comprehensible object."

We cannot notice it by itself; only through the existence of several experiences are we able to recognize Time indirectly. In having other new experiences, we know that Time passes. In other words, originally Time is nothing more than the mere possibility of all further experiences. Without Time not even the slightest change could occur. And every change is nothing more than an experience, no matter if real-, recall-, or extra-experiences. Everything is change: each new thought, each new emotion, each new memory. And this needs Time . In the same way, every further impression is only possible through Time .

The definition of the concept of Time , as we understand it from this point on, runs: "The possibility of every change."

"Possibility," just as with Space, because Time itself is nothing "conceivable." Nevertheless, every change is only possible through Time, even the smallest variance in our awareness (even if something suddenly becomes conscious instead of unconscious (when one doesn«t totally consciously notice it at all at the time); or when another matter becomes totally conscious ; or when one looks at an object differently in even the slightest way, and this for only a fraction of a second. In other words, even when the smallest, invisible (yet still a change in the contents of awareness ) activities of awareness are included in this.

We see immediately that in addition to Space, we are dealing with another enabling assimilation here.

An assimilation , which says nothing about the somethings (which we can only recognize through Time ) regarding their contents nor their technical manner (i.e. absolutely nothing about the somethings themselves), and only contributes to making it possible (similar to Space ) to have experiences beyond the very first one, and moreover, which makes it possible that our awareness "lives," i.e. is "turned on."

Even when we experience a "single" impression, this usually yields a multiple number of awareness activities. Let us take, for example, an empty and white room with a chair as the only piece of furniture. In a room where "nothing" is done and nothing "happens."

If we were to consider this room, continual changes (even the smallest of changes) would occur with our impression: Once, we concentrate on the chair, another moment on the wall. Once, we are totally conscious of everything in the room; later, a thought comes; later, our awareness alternates totally consciously between the wall, and a split second later, the chair; then, the heart beat can be heard (= the heart beat has become totally conscious ); etc..

In this way, Time effects a "single" impression. Simply because awareness doesn«t stop doing all of its activities. The activities wouldn«t even be imaginable without Time .

Let«s consider the following sketch:

If one observes it for a while, then he--with a check on oneself--will realize that his awareness is in continual "motion." Eventhough this impression itself contains little "matter," the groupings within the contents of awareness (actually, experiences) are constantly changing.

First, one may observe this geometrical figure from one vantage point, then form another one, then he may concentrate on specific "lines" (depending on whether one views them at this time as perfectly "straight" or as a lateral edge of the object), and then later on others; until finally, scarcely a more noticible or clearer thought will arise. Usually, if one sticks to the sketch long enough, several things will run through his head (unless one tries to practice concentrating on only one individual thing (a single way to look at it); but even then, it is hardly possible to maintain a single unalterable thought the entire time); i.e. awareness will always continue to function.

These changes of awareness, however, are first made possible through the effect of the CPU-general. And the CPU-general can only operate "in Time ." Without Time (i.e. "without the possibility of change"), the CPU-general wouldn«t have any outcomes.

(In other words, certainly there wouldn«t be any changing experiences (a decision, for example, is just as a particular changing feeling (even if the similar feeling was already there before), a new further extra-experience .) ). But because we do not yet know the relationship between the CPU-general and Time , we do not yet know if the CPU-general can also "function" in the same way without Time . But even if it were able to function without Time , this would have little effect since we couldn«t then have new experiences. For these new experiences are exclusively possible "in Time.")

(If we now point out that: Eventhough not even one experience is possible without Space , and a further (second) experience is not possible without Time , but nevertheless, nothing can be said concerning the possibility of the CPU-general «s outcome without Time (but, too, without Space ) (even though--whether or not the CPU-general can function or not without Space and Time--we couldn«t have any experiences without Space and Time anyway), then it would be because of this:

We experience the CPU-general only indirectly, i.e. through experiences which we first experience through its effects.

In other words, we know of its consequences, but know nothing specific of it. And because of this, we cannot assume this a premise (we first have to examine this) that the CPU-general itself cannot work without Space and Time (i.e. that it needs Space and Time to function it is just as plausible as if this were not the case. In either case, however, without Space and Time we couldn«t have any experiences (that is, awareness would have "nothing" in its contents; i.e. as though it itself were "nothing." In a practical way, this would mean: Awareness itself would not exist.) ). ).

If we "measure" "Time" in its everyday use, this is an impression we get (for otherwise, we wouldn«t know anything of the "measurement").

This impression itself is not a derivative of the original-principle of Time alone. For this principle is only "enabling" and not "classifying" like other assimilations. Just as the "measurement" of "Space" does not derive solely from the original-principle of Space , so too, the measurement of "Time" does not solely derive from the original-principle of Time.

Any "measurement," "determination," or "establishment"--as far as these have nothing to do with a condition of one«s awareness, which is without any change--is only possible based on the assumption that the original-principle of Time effects everything (namely, only possible "in time"). But these determinations themselves need further assimilations (precisely, the "classifying" ones which then, with Time and the signals of the senses (when we watch the clock) are combined through the CPU).

This is also where many of our misunderstandings of Time could be (and still are today) found. When one "measures `Time«" (e.g. through a clock), he normally does not make the distinction that this "measurement" is only made possible through Time in the first place (because this "measurement of `Time«" goes beyond a "timeless" state of awareness without any sort of activity; simply because in order to make a comparison of two clock-times (which one needs in order to be able to determine the change in the clock-time), he needs the "activity" of his awareness at least twice (of course, in practice there are many more) ), but in order for this “measurement of Time“ to become reality, it is first necessary that the original-assimilation Time was combined with other classifying-assimilations .

For, from Time alone, as the "possibility of every change," it is not possible to derive a fixed "measurement" from the "normal time." (Why would anyone want to derive something "concrete" from a "matter," which is "enabling", but "on its own" does not in the least bit "comprehensibly" exist? This is impossible.) The "measurement of Time " is first made possible in connection with Time and the classifying-assimilations .

The CPU-general determines the recall- and extra-experiences (because of its access to former experiences; and every form of of thought combination (decisions are also a part of this) ), as well as the real-experiences (by combining the signals of the sense organs and the assimilations together), and therefore needs Time --at the very latest, at the moment of a second experience of the Bewusstsein (= as we describe Bewusstsein here, i.e. what we will become more clearer as we progress).

But in this way, Time cannot exist independently from us. For if Time were something independent (which is already a contradiciton within itself; since Time is first existent for us with the exchanging of the experiences of our awareness ; that is, without awareness , there wouldn«t be any exchanging of the experiences, and therefore, too, no Time could exist for our awareness (and in this way at all, from my point of view). )from our awareness , (and therefore Time would not, from the very start of all experiences, belong to my Bewusstsein) how could the CPU-general function in using the Time--which is afterall, not with the CPU-general in the first place?

Similarly, when we assume that the CPU-general can operate without Time itself, awareness --starting with the second impression--nevertheless cannot .

That is, the CPU-general , in order for the second experience (i.e. that experience which is added to the first experince of the Bewusstsein ) to occur, had to procure Time for itself (that means, for the awareness ).

If it procures Time (as a something independent from our awareness (which, just as in the case of Space , it is incomprehensible, how the CPU-general would want to "notice" and "register" such a purely enabling assimilation ) ) in order to be able to have a further (= second) experience--this procurement of this something (= Time ); if the process of procurement would be run in such a way, that our awareness gets "knowledge" (conscious or unconscious); i.e. that through this procurement, Time develops; is already a change.

In other words, the CPU-general (the awareness ) would already need Time (as an element of itself, that means of awareness ) in order to be able to carry out the "procurement" in such a way, that it becomes conscious or unconscious to us.

For even when the CPU-general could be effective without Time , awareness could never experience its effects without Time (for awareness would need Time for this). And because the awareness couldn«t have any further experiences without Time (i.e. without having Time "in awareness "), awareness couldn«t "experience" anything of the "captured time" without Time ; so that consequently, it would lead to "no Time " (i.e. have no access to Time ) and, too, to no further experiences.

For Time expresses nothing less and nothing more than the possibility of change; i.e. the possibility of awareness« activity (as we already know, the activity of awareness causes every change). If awareness could make Time conscious or unconscious "without" Time (i.e. to get "captured time" through the CPU-general, and then "newly register" this) (although, we do not know how such an happening could function), then awareness would do exactly that, which Time determines: namely, to be active, and through its effects, to change the somethings with whom it occupies itself with.

If awareness could be active (i.e. to bring about concrete outcomes (what awareness could unquestionably do if it could simply "capture" Time ) ), then it already has Time within itself. It would, therefore, be unneccesary for it to then capture Time .

Awareness would need Time after the first impression, therefore, in order to deal at all with something else (in this case, to "procure" a Time which does not belong to it).

In other words, awareness must have possessed its own (= not foreign to it) Time, at the very latest with the second impression.

One could object, with right, here: How should Time not be "measurable"? There are clocks around the entire world which are operating, and even which show the same time. How does it work then, when everyone possesses his own purely subjective original assimilation of Time ?

Time, as we understand it, is not even subjective, but rather simply enabling. Time , though, belongs to the Bewusstsein from the very beginning. The "measurement of `Time «" is naturally possible. Eventhough one needs further classifying assimilations for this.

Fine, it can be argued, if every single assimilation can be combined in this way--how then do we have objects (e.g. clocks) which all (more or less) show the same identical time? When everyone can supposedly establish his own measurement of time?

This is explained clearly in Chapter IX: Our CPU first produces "measurements," "hours," etc. through the combinations of the assimilation of Time along with still other assimilations. This special grouping of specific assimilations enables the "measurement of time " in the first place.

If one wants an "identical measurement of time" for all, then everyone must have the same arrangement of the diverse "clasifying assimilations"! This, however, is the job of the CPU-general. That is, the "exact time measurement" is a combination of Time (as we define it) and other (clasifying) assimilations; whereby the CPU-generals of all people use the same combinations (namely, the "construction of the clock-time impression") of assimilations.

(As we pointed out in Chapter IX, we can conclude--based on the experience, that over a large area of the world there is an agreement concerning people«s impressions; and based on the results of our previous research--that more or less people must have access to the same classifying assimilations (this shall still be proven, but for the time being, based on our experience, we have at least good reason to assume this).

The “identical measurment of time“ is therefore, as by nearly everything concerning "reality" (as has already been shown in Chapter IX), because of an agreement of the CPU-generals of all people. An agreement of the CPU concerning the combination of assimilations in order to process an impression.

Because it was possible to reach an agreement on all (nearly all) impresions, and an agreement on the succession of impressions was reached as well (first, the car is 200 meters away from us, then 100, etc.) so, must just as much of an agreement on the establishment of a "measurement" be obtained. It doesn«t matter if these "measurements" are "created" with the combination of classifying assimilations and Space or Time (or both).

With Space, specific classifying assimilations , with the help of the CPU , would make "meters," "kilometers," length," "width," etc.; and with Time , special classifying assimilations would make "Past," "future," "second," "hour," etc.

We can, therefore, say: Time is a fundamental element of our Bewusstsein . It is an original-assimilation , which had to have belonged to the Bewusstsein since its very first impression. Time is the "possibility of change." That is, not a classifying assimilation , but rather an assimilation which enables all the activities of our awareness.

XII.

Let us summarize what we have learned concerning the "reaching of impressions."

There are somethings (they are indefinable and we are unable to conclude anything concerning them as long as we haven«t "experienced" from them (= have received no impression). It is only possible to assign a value to these "yet indefined future impressions") from which we are "affected" (for the present time, we will define this as the ability that allows us to get the "signals of our sense organs") which we combine (as signals) with classifying and enabling assimilations (Space and Time ) into an impression.

Further, we must "decide" during these processes.

First, to we have to decide whether to register the signals or not (afterall, who is to say that we have to take them in at all?). And then we have to decide, once again, while the CPU orders the signals into impressions. We have to decide which contents the impressions will become (because each time the CPU could also order the signals based on completely different assimilations than those it does at the time).

It is clear that we need classifying assimilations:

In order to even have impressions we need Space and Time . Also the signals of the sense organs in order to know that a something is. But just as Space and Time are only enabling and not classifying, so too, are the signals of the sense organs not classifying. For the signals are first "prepared to become an impression" when they are ordered; when it is "determined" what is linked with something else.

For each determination--such as what the border between a "house" and a "flag" is, for example, or what is a "house," what is a "flag," etc.--is not comprised within the signals of the sense organs. If it were, we could not have obtained a T.V. picture, among other things, since the points of light on the screen could not transmit the "same" signals as those the "real" object projects; provided that the signals themselves would already have their order. For the points of light are "procured" much differently.

From the fact that we can have memories and thought combinations, we can further see that these determinations must be within us. For how else could we--without the signals--develop new ideas? This would be imposible without the ability of determination. (We have dealt with these already in Chapter IX).

Every classifying assimlation in connection with Space is a determination.

The objects will take "form" depending on what the message of the determination is (the objects of which we first receive as somethings (through the signals of the sense impressions), and which are described as classifyed somethings as soon as they are "determined").

The object«s "form," however, is always dependent on the respective combination of a particular determination.

Because the CPU could always make other special determinations, every determination is a decision. We could therefore say: Every object that we register (which we see as it appears to us) is the product of a decision.

Let«s look at an example to show that determinations do not only decide what we ascribe to an object, but in addition also lay down its precise manifestations (i.e. the exact appearance).

Let use the example of a car.

Everyone a part of our examination knows exactly what the concept (= determination) of "car" stands for. All would immediately connect several sub-concepts (= always those which together "construct" the concept now in concern) which include: A car has tires; paint; a steering wheel; a windshield; at least one wing mirror; the rear wheels have the same spacing between them as the front wheels; the wheels are closer to the street than the top of the car (because all of this "spacing" is not even possible, as we have said, without the enabling assimilation (Space ), but rather additionally needs the classifying assimilation . And it is first the CPU «s combination of both types of assimilations that results in a determination.); etc..

In other words, a multitude of determinations construct the chief-determination (= in relation to those "constructing" sub-determinations. On the other hand, the chief-determination of a "car" is itself, for example, only a sub-determination of the determination of "traffic.") of "Car" (there are also purely subjective determinations which are individually connected with "car" suh as: Driving to Mexico, going to a drive-through, etc.). The sum of all of these "characteristics" (i.e. determinations) results in a determination described as "car."

We can also examine a sub-determination of the determination "car." Let«s take the example of a wheel. Among other things, we connect the following characteristics: Round, flexible, compressed air, appx. 30 cm. in diameter, etc..

We can see in all of these determinations (= combinatios of diverse classifying assimilations and Space ) that each is made from still further sub-determinations . We have the possibility with the CPU to connect the simplest of determinations into more complex ones. And these more complex determinations into still more complex ones, etc..

This also means that we need nothing more than determinations to define our world precisely.

Because the signals of the sense organs--as we have already shown--cannot carry any determinations with them; i.e. cannot say anything concerning the future object as defined by a determination; i.e. cannot even make any sort of statement--the sum of all of these clasifications and Space (= determinations); which we describe as "wheel"; must be responsible not only for the meaning of the concept "wheel" but also for the appearance (as it appears to us)!

For signals do not contain any determinations. They do not say anything concerning how long, wide, high, of what material, etc. something is. In other words, they alone do not at all express a determination.

And because on one hand, everything distinguishable (i.e. considered practically actually all of "reality" as we experience it every day) is only distiguishable based on the determinations. That means that nothing can be distinguished other than determinations themselves.

On the other hand, we see so much distinguishable in reality--which leads to the fact that everything "visibly distinguishable" is only distiguishable "visibly" one and alone through determinations.

If we see a wheel in reality, then we can do so because our CPU has had to make an agreement with other people.

An agreement so that all CPU s can use the identical determination with the arrangement of "wheel." (We know that for all people Space is valid as an enabling assimilation, and we have good reason to believe that even the determining original-assimilations --which construct all other assimilations--are the same for all people (for we have proven that only the CPU arranges all experiences, and that reality can, therefore, only take place via an agreement; it is also a necessary conclusion that all people at least have similar classifying assimilations (otherwise no reality would exist as we know it).) .)

The CPU in order that we can come to the impression of this "wheel.“

In other words, we could say: What we see in reality is nothing more than the condensation of the classifyng assimilations with the enabling assimilations . (Only with Space in an--absolutely unchanged--impression. With Space and Time as soon as even a slight change in the condition in one«s awareness occurs. For example, when the wheel rolls, etc..)

What is the result of this?

Due to the fact that differentiation can only occur with assimilations, it follows that our thoughts, dreams, and memories are fundamentally just as "equal" as "real" impressions (that means, all experiences are equal). "Equal" meaning that all forms of experiences are precisely decided upon by the determinations and the effects of the CPU .

There is actually no principle difference between recall- and extra-experiences on one hand and the real-experiences on the other.

The difference lies only in that once (in the case of recall- and extra-experiences) only one«s CPU "creates" particular determinations, and that another time one«s CPU "creates" specific determinations in agreement with the CPU of other Bewusstseins (See appendix).

This principle can be applied to everything from which we can have experiences as a Bewusstsein (in the meaning as we are getting to know more about it through this investigation). The same is true for all impressions. In order to be able to "recognize" something, in order to even know about the existence of somethings at all, we need classifying assimilations.

Let us observe this from another perspective. What would occur if we were not to "classify" (= have classifying assimilations) anything at all?

If we were to do without the determinations (i.e. the combination of enabling and classifying assimilations) in the impression of a something that we want to turn into an object (actually, to change into a classifyed something ; i.e. want to "define")--if we were to be content with only its pure existence--then we could not differentiate anymore between this something from other somethings.

Because we simply would not come to any determination. (Because we would also not make use of the determinations of how "high," "wide," "colorful," "round," etc. (all of these are determinations).) And nevertheless, the fact alone that something is would also be a determination. If we were to do without this as well, then we couldn«t register anything anymore.

In other words, we need "determinations" (= classifications and Space ) for all experiences of our awareness . It is the determinations, with their combination from the CPU , which first give the awareness its "contents."

The CPU-general itself is an ability of awareness and makes it possible through its effects (the combination of determinations among other things) for us to be able to have experiences (to have contents in our avarness) in the first place; this ability on its own, however, is clearly not a content of our awareness .

This means, however, that we have had determinations since our very first impression. As shown earlier, all of these determinations have to belong to our Bewusstsein , for otherwise, the experiences, as we have them, would not be possible.

At the same time, we know that we continuously find determinations that are composed time and time again from other determinations (e.g. a car from a tire; a tire from round; round from a circle; a circle from Space, and whatever other (which we do not explore here) specific classifications).

We have determinations that, through the CPU «s effects, are put together from other determinations to form a unit.

Because we could not have received the determinations through an "outside" experience (for how could one get that something through an experience which first makes the experience possible?), the determinations must always have been with our Bewusstsein . By analysing the existing determinations (which are composed of several other determinations), we should be able to discover the very origins of determinations.

Why the "very origins of determinations"?

Because the CPU can compile new determinations from formerly existing determinations (e.g. a tire, mirror, and countless others (all of which also came into being from countless other determinations) "make" a car).

This merge of individual determinations to more and more complex groups can be extended indefinitely. But in order to have begun at some point, there must--from the very first impression--have been a minimal measurement of original-determinations, from which all other determinations (through a combination of the same through the CPU ) have been built.

Original-determinations (classifying assimilations and Space ) must, therefore, exist, which influence (i.e. assemble) all other determinations.

(It is necessary to point out here, that we use the concept of "assimilation" in two ways.

In one way, "assimilation" will mean the composition of classifying assimilations with enabling assimilations .

At the same time, "classifying assimilations" as "enabling assimilations" stand for somethings which first in combination with eachother become effective assimilations.

This means, for example, that the concept "original-assimilation" stands for the union between "classifying original-determinations " and "enabling original-assimilation."

("Enabling original-assimilation " because with every original-assimilation , only Space (and not Time ) is involved.

Why?

Because, whenever Time appears, this means that this assimilation can be broken into sub-assimilations .

The quality of the original-assimilations is to be those assimilations which cannot be broken down any further; without one arriving at a single classifying and a single enabling original-assimilation. In other words, to come to "parts" of an original-assimilation which, seen on their own, without being connected to one another, do not declare anything.

Because a classifying original-assimilation cannot arrive at a statement without a connection to Space , since awareness wouldn«t even be able to "notice" it, it doesn«t exist for awareness (and in this way, not "at all").

This is why Space is necessary for every original-assimilation. First, through this configuration (= Space and a classifying original-determination) does awareness arrive at the "smallest" of somethings; at the "smallest" possible part of its contents.

If Time were also there with such an assimilation; this would mean that this assimilation can be broken down into sub-assimilations (at least per sub-assimilation into Space and at least one classifying original-assimilation )--and in this way, cannot be an original-assimilation.

That means, every original-assimilation , on its own, i.e. not viewed in context with other assimilations , is without Time .) ).

The possibility would exist to examine all (or at least several) determinations which serve us in order to discover the original-assimilations . For they must exist. This route is, however, a painstaking and time-consuming one. In addition to this, one can never be sure that some determinatins to examine would be forgoten, which would lead to till-then unknown original-determinations. We will--a bit later--endeavor to see if there isn«t another better possibility in acquiring the original-assimilations.

Until then, we can say that everything we can have as an experience can only acquire its special significance through the special combination of the classifying asimilations with Space (and Time ).

(With "experience" here we don«t only mean exclusively the union of Space and classifying assimilations, but rather "experience" can also represent the union of classifying assimilations with Space and Time.

A determination can make an entire experience as well as a tiny neglected part of an experience.)

Every determination gets its entire "individual" significance only through other determinations. First, through those sub-determinations which comprise it; and, too, through its meaning for other determinations.

It can also be said, that every determinationonly gets its special meaning only through the comparison with other determinations.

In combining the most diverse of determinations into a single determination (an "object," i.e. a classifyed something ), the CPU-general allows that this determination (object) can be differentiated from other objects (which consists of other sub-determinations ).

This applies to all determinations, with the exception of original-determinations ; and applies, therefore, to everything.

The significance of every existing determination results first from the most differentiated arrangements with the most diverse of sub-determinations . And the significance of these sub-determinations originate again from their further sub-determinations . And so on, whereby all determinations receive their "final" signifiance through the relationship to us. For without this relationship (if the determinations could stand on their own without a relationship to us (which they cannot) ) they would hold no meaning for us (i.e. our awareness; and from this vantage point, we are dealing with everything). And so, too, they would be meaningless themselves.

This was explained through the example of the car. We will now show a determination which might not at first seem to fit to this principle; but, of course (as it is a determination afterall), it does belong to the principle we just explained.

Let«s look at the color "green."

On its own, as is the case for everything we register, it is a determination. A determination which obtains its very special meaning through the comparison with other determinations. The color "green" (i.e. that which we "really" see as "green") is nothing other than unconscious knowledge of the differentiation of its determination (namely, from classifying assimilations and Space ) from other determinations.

The color«s special significance is caused in reality by further determinations which are combined with it.

For example, a green, round-shaped body in the fruit section of a grocery store is a watermelon. If this object were yellow, we would know that it isn«t yet ripe. If particular ovally-curved forms (we mean bananas here) are green, then we know that this fruit is not ripe. If, on the other hand, these forms are yellow, then we know they are ripe.

That is, on one hand, "green" (as all determinations, with the exception of the original determinations ) is constructed from sub-determinations ("green" from, among others, "color," "light," "expression of the superficial nature," etc.). These sub-determinations make a pure difference from other determinations (e.g. "yellow") first possible without saying more than "green" is "not yellow."

On the other hand, "green" first takes on it«s special significance with it«s respective application in reality. Not considered on its own, but in connection with further determinations. And all of these are, once again, seen within the context of oneself.

That is, on one hand, the CPU "creates" "objects" ("units") through combinations of the assimilations. It doesn«t only have the ability to combine, but also is able to integrate these different assimilations into a "unit" and to give these "units" "duration" (that is, they are subsequently found as their own determinations). (Let«s think of the picture from T.V.. We do not know from the signals of our sense organs what the flag post is, and what the house).

On the other hand, it is precisely because of this that the CPU-general is able to differentiate the "units" by comparing them to one another. This differentiation is valued neutral. First, particular applications of these units "in reality" make certain "place values" possible, which we connect with ourselves. Through this, they become more than just pure differentiation for us--they also hold particular place values for us.

That we are able to, on one hand, "create" objects on our own, and on the other hand, to consider them as though they were independent of us is the ability of our awareness . Perhaps we will come to undertand this ability better in th ecourse of our investigations, but for now, we can only make this fact clear.

We also know that we can arrive at ever more complex determinations, and with this also more diversified objects, from the union of "simple" determinations. That is, to even be able to form the world in such a complex manner as we experience it. It is not the world, however, which allows us through pure observation to come to these determinations, but rather originally, there must have been original-determinations in order to even have been able to arrive at the "simplest" (considered from our present "real" point of view) of determinations. And through this, to construct our world.

Let us now turn to a further activity of awareness in "coming to an impression." Namely, "to be affected."

"To be affected" (= "AFF") is the ability to receive. That is, to even have the possibility in our awareness to experience something.

We experience becoming "affected" by the somethings (which we then convert into classifyed somethings ); from their "signals" which we "perceive" through the sense organs.

Because all determinations (i.e. classification) run through the assimilations (nothing declared, not a "unit"; "more than a something"; etc. i.e. effectively, nothing can be classified without assimilations ), "signals" cannot "express" anything at all.

For if we were to register them or not, we cannot "experience" through them (i.e. with them) at all. For "experience" (i.e. to have impressions) only takes place through determinations (which are assembled by the CPU ). And for determinations, no signals are needed.

In this way we can, therefore, say that AFF is a purely chimerical power.

Is AFF at all necessary? Does this power even have to exist? Not only can it not register signals (if it could do this--i.e. if "signals" even "existed" (as somethings , which exist on their own) then based on the nature of our Bewusstsein, we would never know anything about it); we can additionally not come to an agreement with our fellow human beings (an agreement, which decides that the world is built in that way as we "perceive" it) through the AFF . For only the CPU-general is able to come to an agreement--because we first assemble the assimilations within us.

What is then the role of the AFF ?

(To avoid a misunderstanding:

When scientists inform us that diverse objects (a house, an office, etc.) send out "signals," these are not the signals which we are concerned with here.

For our signals--as we have shown--cannot say anything concerning objects (determinations are solely responsible for this). Because our signals cannot do this, they do not exist for our awareness (and, therefore, do not exist at all).

The scientists« "signals" on the other hand, which are "measurable," are not signals at all according to our definition, but rather objects!!

The simple fact that we can know of the scientists« "signals" makes them objects. In other words, these signals are a part of the object itself! Belongs to this. We can recognize them as well as this part of the object, which we describe in everyday language as an "object." (Namely, the part which is "tangible"; which is "easier for us to notice"). Namely, through determinations, which are put together with other Bewusstseins within the scope of the agreement.)

We notice something here: We do not only construct the world (through the effect of the CPU-general ), we also take it in, without being totally conscious of this ourselves, where the world comes from (namely the combinations of assimilations).

That is, Awareness has an ability to see the world in such a way, as though the world as it appears to us, was not first constructed by us; but rather as though it was something "on its own"; something "different" that is not in any essential bond with us.

This ability of our awareness shows us that there must also be more abilities of our awareness than we had uncovered up to now. (To now, we have the CPU-general and the decisions (whereby these are just a variety of the CPU-general ) ; we will leave it open for now as to whether or not we also need to define the original-assimilations as an ability, or to consider it specifically different within awareness .)

Through its effects, the CPU-general allows us to first "construct" the world as we find it today.

This ability itself, however, doesn‘t say at all that we can also "notice" its effects (the assimilations). For the CPU-general compares, assembles, decides. Out of this, though, we can not deduce that we can also consciously or unconsciously put its results "into our knowledge" (for the CPU-general doesn«t allow itself to be "seen", "noticable").

But also the classifying and enabling assimilations cannot make anything from themselves that we (our awareness ) can then get "knowledge" from. For they themselves (the determinations) have belonged to our Bewusstsein since the very first impression; but neither from Space nor Time nor from connected-assimilations (and in this way, also not original-determinations), such as, for example, "hard", "light", etc., can "knowledge" be derived.

For the assimilations first ensure that awareness has "contents" for impressions; but they cannot themselves give us "knowledge" of experiences (i.e. to make conscious or unconscious).

We do know, however, that we can "receive" effects of the CPU as assimilation combinations (simply based on the fact that we can "think", "grasp" totally consciously, and also because we know of unconsciousness through the effects of the CPU-general.)

That is, there must be an additional ability of our awareness. Namely, the effect of the CPU itself to even be able to "receive", "sense." And that is more specifically the AFF .

The AFF is not the ability to come into contact with other beings (this is the job of the CPU), but rather the ability to "sense", to "receive" the effects of one´s own awareness (in other words to "recieve" the effects of the CPU-general). This ability had to have been a further ability of our Bewusstsein (in addition to the CPU-general ) from the very beginning (= from the first impression) and with every experience of awareness.

The CPU and the AFF as the abilities of the Bewusstsein first make it possible through their effects for us to even be able to create experiences (= that our Bewusstsein receives the contents). The CPU in that it puts the original-assimilations together, and the AFF in that it allows this to become conscious or unconscious to us. The AFF is something like the "reflection" for the effects of the CPU .

Both of these abilities together, however, have some decisive "characteristics" (i.e. outcomes, from which we can then experience them; for both on their own do not have the quality that they can be "experienced"): Both on their own are not "noticable," both are "invisible"; they are only noticable in their effects; and both must exist "outside" of Space and Time (whatever and however they are there).

In the case of the CPU-general , it is clear, for even the first impression of our Bewusstsein (= the ability, which we will become more totally conscious of) must come from its effects.

Space and Time , on the other hand, are nothing at all on their own--until they are combined with classifying assimilations by the CPU (because they themselves are only "possibilities" and not determining).

Because Space and Time are first conceivable at all, through the effects of the CPU, (and also through the subsequent "reflection"; in connection with classifying assimilations; in the AFF) (through which (= CPU) the two assimilations of Space and Time are connected with classifying assimilations to become determinations)--the CPU-general is independent from both Space and Time .

Or observed from our present perspective, it is "outside" of Space and Time .

If one understands "Space" and "Time" as it occurs in everyday life (namely, as something "absolute"; or at least as with all relativities, also to remain constant without awareness ), then it might seem bizarre and even unbelievable to have the abilities of awareness (Bewusstsein) at hand (which we cannot "see" and "perceive", but whose effects we constantly notice in our "lives") which are totally independent from "Space" and "Time." This means to go beyond them.

If one is to understand Space and Time as we define them (based on our examination), then the ability of our CPU-general takes on a purely logical trait, one which is not at all surprising. What is important to understand is only that the CPU-general is the ability which lies "outside" of all determinations (whatever it might be there). That means, on the one hand, we can “see“ all of its effects in all of our experiences (all of which are constructed from "determinations"), and on the other hand, it itself is not subjugated to determinations at all.

This means that differences such as "once", "many times", "not once" "endless times," etc. are not permissible descriptions in relation to the CPU-general . That is, one cannot even ask: Is there only one or more CPU-generals ? For the CPU-general is not governed by any of our determinations.

The same is true for the AFF . It, too, is not so spectacular. Simply because the AFF itself does not "function" to "assemble"; i.e. "create"; but rather only "reflects the assembly"; i.e. allows that something becomes conscious or unconscious.

We first arrive at the contents of our awareness through the "reflection" of the product of the CPU «s effects (= the combination of assimilations ). Without the contents of our awareness , there wouldn«t be a connection between the classifying and enabling assimilations in our awareness (and in this way, nothing at all); without this determination, considered on its own, Space and Time would mean nothing. In this way, AFF lies "outside" of Space and Time ; even the "Space" and "Time" as we understand these two terms in their normal language usage.

It is also clear that the AFF is "invisible" on its own; that it remains "incomprehensible." For when we get the contents, we also know through this (when one examines all of the facts, as we have done to now) that the AFF must exist as the ability of our awareness, eventhough we cannot "identify" the AFF as such, i.e. we are not able to come to a conclusion about its existence because of its appearance. It doesn«t work to "sense" it, but rather can only be "sensed" indirectly through the contents, which are "made" within it consciously or unconsciously.

Just as is true of the CPU-general , the AFF is not subject to Space and Time . For it is first through the AFF `s effects that make determinations at all available to our awareness . First with the reflection of the CPU in the AFF, Space and Time come to form (namely, in connection with classifying assimilations), with which our awareness can first make something out of them. There must be the AFF, therefore, in order to even be able to make this possible, "outside of" and "independent of" Space and Time (and in this way, of course, too, "Space" and "Time" as the concepts as we understand them in everyday use).

Here we want to point out that throughout our investigation, we have to realize that we describe abilities of awareness whose true and complete quality goes beyond our own comprehension. Simply because the determinations which we need for this have no meaning for this ability (cannot be applied).

Nevertheless, these abilities can be "described" from our present standpoint on the basis of their effect on us (specifically, in the manner that they give our awareness its contents).

This decription can tell us how these abilities function here. From this, we can come to conclusions as to how these abilities of awareness are at least "procured" here (= seen from our standpoint as Bewusstseins); and also determine where these abilities must "come from" (considered from our present standpoint (= the possibilities of being able to recognize something corresponding to our awareness) ).

But we are unable to define how and what these abilities are like there (= there, beyond our possible experiences).

However, it is possible here to describe the abilities« results (that is, also to find out how the abilities occur) and also to assess to where they reach beyond these outcomes.

Certainly all concepts which we use in our description of the abilities, as they are here with us, (= within our possible experiences--based on their present outcomes) have to be understood according to that which we mentioned concerning this ability thus far. In other words, these concepts cannot be understood literally, but rather in the context of what we reached thus far.

How is it then in the case of the classifying as well as the enabling assimilations? Are there assimilations which exist before the first impression?

In any case, assimilations belong to our Bewusstsein .

Our Bewusstsein first "exists," however, (the Bewusstsein as we have understood it throughout our investigation as well as how we "find" it to be today) since the first experience. (Even when the CPU-general and AFF "are" "previous to" or "beyond" as the abilities of our Bewusstsein, the Bewusstsein is no longer capable to have "experiences" there as we have formerly considered them).

The assimilations could not at all have "existed" "previous to" the first experience.

For then they would be "independent" from our "Bewusstsein ." And this is, as we have already shown, an impossibility. In addition to this, Space and Time first have an effect through the union with classifying assimilations through the CPU, from which we, once again, first "experience" through the reflection of the CPU «s determination in the AFF .

The problem, thus, in the case of Space and Time is that these two cannot exist "before" or "outside" of our experiences (neither "before" the first experience nor "outside" of any other experience); but nevertheless, Space had to have been with the first experience, and Time at the very latest with the second experience.

How is this for the classifying assimilations ?

Although we have not yet established the classifying original-assimilations , we can still say that these must equally be "elements" of our Bewusstsein. For they cannot "be" "on their own," independent of us. They themselves can first become the "contents" of our awareness through the combination with Space (and Time ). And first when they become the contents of our awareness can we receive any knowledge of them.

That is, they cannot be individually on their own, independent from us; moreover, not before the first impression. But they had to have been with us starting with the first impression.

Let us hold on to the fact for the time being that we must have all of the original-assimilations with the first impression, but these can not be "previous to" the first impression, i.e. "independent from us". (This is different from the case of the CPU-general as well as the AFF ).

Let us turn again to the CPU-general and the AFF.

Since both the CPU-general and the AFF on their own are "independent" from Space and Time, it is understandable why the CPU-general has such "quick" "access" to so many memories. And why it is "successful" in "processing" them so fast. The reason is that the function of the CPU-general (totally consciously (or consciously), we are only informed about the function of the CPU-general in the form of an experience which contains the outcome of this function and not the whole process of this funcion) is not subjugated to any determinations. It cannot deal with the memories "quickly" or "slowly." Rather, simply "deals with" them.

Who decides what we register (i.e. to which specific contents our awareness comes)?

The CPU-general . For the AFF can only "reflect"; "be sensed."

As we did at the beginning of the chapter, we can say: First, it is decided (while this, too, is a variety of the CPU-general as well) what will be assemled, then the CPU-general puts this together.

Let us look more carefully at this proces of assembling. How does the determination of the sequence take place, as we totally consciously register it, in such detail?

On one hand, we know that the CPU-general decides what it will assemble next, and that it is the CPU-general which assembles it. With this process, the AFF can then only "reflect" ("allow to be sensed") the product of the effects of the CPU-general.

On the other hand, we need a further something of our awareness with the function of the CPU-general (namely in assembling one classifyed something after the other): namely, Time .

From the standpoint of the CPU-general and the AFF (as the two abilities of our Bewusstsein , which must be there before the first impression) Time is only the possibility to store more than a fixed, unalterable CPU-combination in AFF .

Time is, in other words, the possibility to first receive a determination which came to life through the assembling of the CPU (with the help of the reflection of the AFF ) and then the other determination.

Time is not here before the first impression, but has to be here at the very latest with the second impression. How can it appear? (For it must "appear").

Since only one possibility is left to us, the answer is simple:

Because the CPU effectuates and this effect first becomes conscious or unconscious in the AFF --the CPU then "continues to" effectuate, and this effect again first becomes conscious or unconscious in the AFF -- this conscious or unconscious knowledge to have a "present" and a "past" impression (through the CPU-general , which stores this consciously or unconsciously in "memory," and this "memory" can at least be sensed at another time (which is all only be possible with the existence of the AFF ) ) is only possible through Time .

Since Time, such an outstandingly important enabling instrument of the awareness« activities, cannot emerge out of nothing, it must have been "created", “be brought to life“.

And the absolutely only thing this could be is the effect of the CPU-general on the AFF !

That is, the CPU-general and AFF "create" "Time" through their "activities." Otherwise, Time would never come into being.

That is, Time is "created" through the two abilities of our Bewusstsein , which together first make that first impression possible by their "practical" (i.e. simply "subsequent") mechanisms.

Why is this conclusion the absolute only one possible?

As we have already pointed out, Time cannot exist on its own, but must belong to our Bewusstsein . At the same time, we know that the CPU-general is first able to create all experiences through the reflection in the AFF. As the CPU-general and AFF are "outside" (considered from our present standpoint) of Space and Time , and must be "before" the "formation" of our Bewusstsein ("how" and "what" they are "exactly" like there is beyond our ability to experience), we know where (and "how") these two abilities of our Bewusstsein "come from." For eventhough we cannot have any experiences (that means here: cannot understand) which tells us what these two abilities are like "there," we do know that they come "from there."

Time, on the other hand, cannot come from anywhere; Time was not at first in awareness (and in this way, not at all); and yet at the very latest, it was in awareness with the second experience.

The only plausible conclusion, therefore, is that it is the practical effect of the CPU-general in the AFF that "creates" Time. Time «s existence relies on the interplay between the CPU-general and the AFF .

The following should also be kept in mind:

Every classifyed something is "assembled" based on and in accordance to the decision of the CPU-general , and is "passed on" to the AFF where it becomes conscious or unconscious.

And it is precisely for this reason that every classifyed-something on its own is timeless.

Why?

Because Time first comes into being through the result of the CPU-general in the AFF ; andTime is, furthermore, only enabling--so determinations (= classifyed somethings ) are not dependent on Time , but rather on the CPU-general , the AFF and the original-determinations (of which we do not yet know how we arrive at them).

Since the CPU-general and AFF are "independent" of Time (afterall, it is they which creates Time in the first place), that which they "compose"--every composition on its own (classifyed somethings )--is also independent of Time .

(This is also clearly applicable when a determination itself is not only made of classifying assimilations and Space , but also of Time . Because in this case, Space, Time, and the classifying assimilations ensure only the construction of this classifyed something .

Still this classifyed something remains to be considered as a whole and on its own (i.e. without being considered in connection with further classifyed somethings) to be independent from Time , and in this way, also independent from "Time" (as we understand it in everyday life). )

Consequently, when we arrive at an impression, not only is the CPU-general at work, (which first decided to put this impression together into that form as we register it through the "reflection" in the AFF) but we can also find in the AFF every previous classifyed something that was ever "brought to the AFF " by the CPU-general .

Why?

The AFF itself is not a notion of subjugation. That is, the description of "transitory" or any other concept does not fit as a precise definition of the AFF .

Simultaneously, every classifyed something on its own is likewise "independent" from Time , and with it, too, "Time."

We further know from our practical experience that the classifyed somethings have to be in the AFF .

What can then be concluded from this fact runs as follows:

As classifyed somethings have to be present in the AFF, we know something indirectly concerning the AFF : It must be procured in such a way that in its "practical results" (this means in the way that it effects us (as Bewusstseins) ) it ensures that the classifyed somethings are "in it."

As this AFF itself is not subjected to any conceptual limitations--including not being restricted by Time --something (here, its the classifyed somethings ) that was "once" in the AFF must (considered from our point of view (i.e. from us as Bewusstsein ) resulting only from the determinations in experiences) "always" be in the AFF !

Although this is so, not all classifyed somethings are processed the "same" way within the AFF (which comprises--as we now know--all of those classifyed somethings which were ever "assembled" by the CPU-general ).

Some are totally conscious to us. Several conscious. Most, however, are unconscious.

The question that arises here runs as follows:

How does this inequitable "treatment" of the classifyed somethings occur within the AFF ?

For although the CPU-general and the AFF , as well as every classifyed something on its own is "independent" from Time , it is not comprehensible ahead of time how particular classifyed somethings become totally conscious at specific moments, which then turn out not to be "later:"

How is it that different treatment of the classifyed somethings takes place in the AFF , and how do the diverse changes of various classifyed somethings occur between being totally conscious to be conscious to being unconscious?

The answer is not difficult to see.

We know that our awareness has access to the "conditions" of total conscious "knowledge," conscious "knowledge," and unconscious "knowledge."

We also know that we have "access" to the classifyed somethings of the AFF through the now-CPU and the future-CPU .

The question is now: What determines the difference between being totally conscious and being unconscious?

Let us look at that "point" when a "new" classifyed something (= a new experience) is created:

There are good reasons to assume (i.e. there are empirical factors to prove this assumption) that we do not only register an impression totally consciously , we also take in parts of this impression completely unconsciously. (For now, we will be satisfied with this empirically-backed assumption, and later we will determine if it is necessary to derive this empirical assumption from our existence as the Bewusstsein .)

In assembling a new impression through the CPU-general , events must take place which make a part of an impression totally conscious and another part unconscious.

Whether an impression is registered as totally conscious or as unconscious within the AFF , one thing is clear: In both cases, every experience has to be put together by the CPU . And wherever the CPU assembles, the CPU-general first decides what will be assembled.

We still need an event which "is able" to differentiate between a totally conscious impression and an unconscious impression--the process of condensation is unable to carry out this decision. For in this process, a decision is already made (namely "what" (i.e. how) the CPU assembles).

Where can this decision take place? What is left over?

We still have the process of "bringing" all the classifyed somethings to the AFF.

The event of composing the classifyed somethings and the process of "bringing" these classifyed somethings "into" the AFF are the only two processes which can "divide" a classifyed something into a totally conscious part and into an unconscious part.

(Being conscious regarding the construction of a classifyed something has no meaning. For in this construction, the classifyed something is either totally conscious or not-totally conscious . Which means little else than unconscious, practically speaking. For if the classifyed something were conscious from the very beginning, then in its "construction"--i.e. where the CPU deals with this classifyed something "for the first time"--this would lead to it becoming totally conscious.)

This division has to be expressed through the CPU-general . For the CPU-general , as opposed to the AFF , is the "active" ability of awareness .

That means that the division of the classifyed something takes place through the function of the CPU-general within a totally conscious part and unconscious part in the process of "bringing the classifyed something into the AFF." That is, then, when that from the CPU «s "constructed" classifyed something comes "into the AFF " "at the same time."

(This process takes place "outside" of "Time" and any other conceptual form (because anything conceptual first arises from this very process); observed from our present "conceptual" standpoint, we can define this process in other terms as "indentical"; "at the same time.").

This special function of the CPU-general in the AFF decides what part of the "just" created classifyed something becomes totally conscious and what part will not be totally conscious (i.e. unconscious).

Because this special function of the CPU-general is decided upon in the AFF , we will call this process the "AFF decision" from here on out.

From now on, we will describe that decision that the CPU makes, which "says" what it should put together as the "decision-1"

The AFF decision which decides if a classifyed something becomes totally conscious or unconscious is the "decision-2."

The process of making totally conscious or making unconscious with the formtion of a new classifyed something functions in the following way:

Decision-1 decides what the CPU should assemble; the Decision-2 works "identically" in the AFF where it decides, through the "focus" on the formed classifyed something, if this classifyed something will become totally conscious or not totally conscious (will not be "focused on").

Sketch:

There are still some questions to be answered:

Every classifyed something that came once into the AFF (and, therefore, into awareness ) came either as totally conscious or as unconscious.

We know that every classifyed something, considered on its own, is "timeless."

As the "creation" of being totally conscious and being unconscious is brought about by the interplay of the CPU-general and the AFF, being totally conscious and being unconscious, on their own, are likewise "timeless."

The question arises:

Why don«t all classifyed somethings, which were once totally conscious , remain totally conscious ? (As we know, this is not the case, for we are not even totally conscious of all the classifyed somethings "at the same time" which we ever had totally consciously ).

One thing should not be forgotten here:

In view of the contents of our awareness (this is where it should be considered since without the contents of our awareness, there wouldn«t "be" being totally conscious nor being unconscious ; nor "Time," nor classifyed somethings ), the CPU-general is of building character.

That is, the CPU-general "continuously" (= considered from our standpoint of the perceivable description) puts further classifyed somethings together.

But because, as we now know, being totally conscious and being unconscious are only achieved through the effects of the CPU-general (through the process of assembly, as well as the CPU-general «s decision2 "in" the AFF ) as well as the through the existence of the contents, the very existence of being totally conscious and unconscious are dependent on the formation of classifyed somethings through the CPU-general in cooperation with the AFF !

That is, being totally conscious only exists when the CPU-general puts something together; and the decision2 "focuses on" this something (= classifyed something ) "identically."

Being unconscious only exists when the CPU-general puts something together without the decision2 «s "focus" on this something "identically."

Let´s look at this fact from another perspective:

This fact is due to the building character of the CPU-general and the fact that not all classifyed somethings which were once totally conscious can remain totally conscious (as shown in pratice).

If being totally conscious (and, of course, being unconscious as well) were not limited to the new creation of classifyed somethings , then everything that was once totally conscious would have to remain totally conscious !

For because being totally conscious as well as a classifyed something , as well as the CPU-general and the AFF are all "timeless" considered on their own, being totally conscious should not "discontinue" to work.

Practice teaches us, however, that not everything that was once totally conscious remains totally conscious (for proof of this, it is enough to point out a single time when a totally conscious classifyed something was no longer totally conscious ).

There must be something, therefore, which makes being totally conscious (although it is "timeless") at one time applicable to one particular classifyed something and at another time applicable to a different classifyed something.

And this necessity can only be fulfilled if it comes, solely by the process of a new creation of the CPU, (i.e. the "newest" condensation) to being totally conscious (and in this way, also being unconscious ).

Being totally conscious and being unconscious are conditions that can only take place where the CPU and the decision-1 have just created the newest classifyed something.

This is the sole explanation for why particular classifyed somethings are totally conscious at one moment , and not any longer during another moment (See appendix).

If we now ask how a classifyed something is first totally conscious and then not later--the answer is as follows:

With every experience where one is totally conscious , the CPU-general constructs a classifyed something . This is why being totally conscious can always only be there, where the CPU-general had just assembled "the last one." Everything that came before this last condensation of the formed classifyed something remains in the AFF, but is then no longer totally conscious .

Likewise, unconsciousness can also only be something that the CPU-general "just" put together (without making it totally conscious).

How does the fact that we only have unconscious classifyed somethings when they were "just" put together hold up to the way in which we use the concept of "uncosciousness" in everyday language?

What does this new knowledge about "unconscious classifyed somethings" mean for all classifyed somethings which were not totally conscious in their formation--though clearly are "afterwards" (= as soon as the CPU-general put further classifyed somethings together "afterwards) in the AFF ?

What does the term "unconscious" actually stand for as we have used it to now, considered from our present source of knowledge?

We now know this: Total consciousness can only be a classifyed something which is just assembled.

With unconsciousness in its everday use, we describe classifyed somethings which are already in the AFF , but which cannot be made totally conscious by us; that means, they cannot be "identically" assembled again as before, and at the same time can be focused on by the decision2 .

With consciousness in everyday language, we mean also the classifyed somethings which are already in the AFF. These, however, differ from the unconscious classifyed somethings in that they could be made totally conscious at any time; in other words, they can be newly and "identically" (or at least similarily) put together, and at the same time can be focused on through decision2 .

Our common use of this concept of "unconsciousness" generally concerns a condition in which the classifyed somethings were already in the AFF , and describe whether we have total conscious access to these classifyed somethings regarding a subsequent total conscious experience with these classifyed somethings« adequate "formation." It doesn«t matter if these were totally conscious or unconscious during their formation.

The "true" meaning of "unconsciousness," however, only applies to those experiences which are "just" formed and are not totally conscious .

We should keep this double meaning of the concept of "unconsciousness" in mind.

As the practical implication of both meanings is the same--namely, that we actually cannot have these classifyed somethings totally consciously (at the very most, we can experience them totally consciously indirectly through the now-CPU and future-CPU )--we can continue to use "unconsciousness" as we have to now. But now we know of it two meanings.

The question not yet sufficiently explained is as follows:

How do totally conscious experiences result in a very specific succession of classifyed somethings ?

Let us not forget that the CPU can put many "units" (classifyed somethings) together which stem from the original assimilations (we have yet to find the original classifyed somethings). The CPU is always constructing.This means, the CPU starts with the original determinations and comes to evermore complex determinations (although not every newly-formed classifyed something is "more complex" than all its former "predecesors," every one is "put into" an ever more "complex" "environment" (actually, all "formerly" assembled classifyed somethings which are all connected to one another in some way (through awareness ) ) ). That is, only from the continuation of our awarness « contents which is done because of the effects of the CPU, does a specific determination of the sequence result.

During the formation of the particular classifyed somethings , the particular place value of this newly-formed classifyed something is formed according to all the other classifyed somethings determined to that point.

Why?

Due to the constructing character of the CPU-general, the classifyed something is not only "defined" by its construction, but is also "described" by the sequence of its formation in relation to other classifyed somethings .

We can consistently observe in reality that it is possible to "consider" classifyed somethings in this way (and we do so continuously). The classifyed something "car," for example, differs from a house very clearly based on its construction (e.g. tires, wing mirror, etc.). And a car which is first near the ocean and later in the city, is "continuously" assembled as the classifyed something "car" by the CPU-general . First of all, it is in a different environment (ocean) than it is later (city). And other classifyed somethings are totally consciously put together "at the same time" than those put together later.

That is, even when every single determination, considered on its own, is "timeless," a clear laying down of the sequence is given in an experience which consists of multiple determinations (e.g. the car drives from the oceanside to the city).

This sequence comes into being purely through the constructing character of the CPU-general .

Nothing which once entered the AFF can ever get lost. Complex experiences (e.g. the drive from the oceanside to the city) can result from classifying assimilations and Space and Time ; but anyways, these experiences are not subjugated to "Time" in the sense that the CPU-general wouldn´t have access to them any longer.

For the CPU-general and the AFF , as well as the assimilations themselves are all "independent" of "Time ."

This is why the CPU-general always has "access" to everything that it ever created (and transfered to the AFF ). (Moreover, this is pointed out because of the fact that the now-CPU and the future-CPU have "access" to former experiences.)

Because the CPU-general had access to all experiences in the AFF, one could also say that it "knows" of all its previous experiences as well.

Clearly, the CPU-general only knows of those experiences which it previously had (i.e. which are in the AFF ). For the CPU-general can clearly not know anything it hadn«t yet put together--i.e. which was not yet an experience.

This "knowledge" of the CPU-general is "always" there. It "knows" how the sequence of the experiences« formation is developed. It knows how all of these are constructed.

The CPU-general has this "knowledge" with every new formation as well. And because it is a decision1 , which informs the CPU of what it should construct next, it is the decision-1 that knows what experiences have existed before.

As the decision2 is also a decision made by the CPU-general (although it functions within the AFF), it, too, knows of all previous experiences.

Supplied with this knowledge, the CPU-general creates a new classifyed something and transfers it to the AFF . As we«ve said, in doing so, both decision-1 and decision-2 know all of the classifyed somethings , which were constructed up to that one most-newly formed in the AFF .

Once this "new" classifyed something enters the AFF , decision-1 and decision-2 (both belong to the CPU-general ) "compare" the "previous" classifyed somethings , and decision2 is able to "recognize" which classifyed something is that "new" classifyed something "at that very moment"--and with decision1 and the CPU (which "just" "created" this classifyed something , and which transfered it into the AFF ), focuses on this new classifyed something .

(This interaction between decision-1 , the CPU and decision-2 is understood to take place "at the same time." For as soon as the CPU "assembles" a classifyed something and transfers this to the AFF , without decision-2 "identically" taking part, the interplay of the three parts of the CPU-general is not functioning anymore in such a way that we would be able to be totally conscious of this classifyed something .

That is, in this case, we cannot be totally conscious of this classifyed something . Rather it enters the AFF unconsciously.

(Of course, an unconscious classifyed something , just as all totally conscious classifyed somethings , gets its precise place value in the AFF . The fact that the CPU-general is of constructing "matter" during the time of the creation of its contents is clearly not just the case at that time when a classifyed something becomes totally conscious to us, but also for all classifyed somethings (even if we do not consciously know anything of their place values) which the CPU-general assembles).)

The next classifyed something which will become totally conscious follows the same principle.

Decision1 and decision2 focus on this classifyed something "at the same time" with its "formation," and make it totally conscious in this way.

If the CPU (as always "directed" by the decision-1 ) were to focus more than the decision-2 "focuses," for example, on a complex assembly of a determination (= classifyed something ), which comes from so and so many sub-determinations (e.g. a street scene we observe from a restaurant), that too much is "expected" of one«s decision-2 to focus on this determination (or decision-2 doesn´t focus on that because of other reasons)--than only that which the three "parts" of the CPU-general "works out" "together" will become totally conscious; the other will become unconscious.

In summary, we can say: The sequence, in which we take in totally consciously is first made at all possible through the fact that the CPU-general --regarding the grouping of our awareness « "contents"--is of "constructing" nature.

And it is first possible to make a classifyed something totally conscious not only because decision1 "creates" the classifyed somethings with the CPU, but also in that decision-2 "identically" focuses on this "just" newly-created classifyed something.

XIII.

The time has come for us to deal with the classifying original-assimilation .

As we know, all determinations, and in this way, everything that we can have as experiences lead back to the construction of the combination of various original-determinations .

Then it must be--as we have already shown--that with our very first experience, we had to have had the possibility to arrive at all the possible assimilations within us.

That is, our Bewusstsein must not have just had special abilities from the first experience on, there must have also been at least one original-assimilation (probably several) available. An original-assimilation (and probably more original-assimilations), together with the "abilities" of our Bewusstsein, constructed further assimilations.

Every determination stems at the very least from Space and the minimum of one classifying-assimilation .

Why "at the very least"?

As we have already established, individual determinations are not subject to "Time." Nevertheless, some determinations can be made is such complex ways that these determinations themselves consist of classifying assimilations and both enabling assimilations .

Let us take the memory of a moving car. Assume that this memory takes approximately 5 seconds of "real" Time. This memory is a determination. It consists of complex condensations which are not only "simultaneous" (e.g. the car and the street), but which are also "in succession" (e.g. the car is first there, then there).

That is, the very specific arrangement of specific assimilations (Time, Space, as well as classifying assimilations ) constitute this very special determination.

Still, this determination is "independent" of "Time." For this determination was created by the CPU-general in coordination with the AFF . And "Time," which itself is nothing more than a determination, is also a result of this union--just as this determination is; therefore, "Time" cannot claim any "dominance" over this determination.

Of course determinations which consist of Space and classifying assimilations are just as possible. Yes, determinations themselves as those with the moving car are first possible through the condensation of a multitude of sub-determinations , which themselves only consist of Space and classifying assimilations .

As we have already shown, Time first comes into being through the CPU-general «s progress in building classifyed somethings. And the individual classifyed somethings , considered on their own, which only consist of Space and classifying assimilations in connection with one another, first make that possible (of course, only through the effects of the CPU-general in the AFF ), which is actually what Time is in the first place: the possibility to further condensations.

That is, even though there are determinations which consist of Space , Time , and classifying assimilations , these still consist of innumerable sub-determinations , from which each originally consists of Space and classifying assimilations . Through the CPU-general «s activity, these sub-determinations are connected to a single determination nevertheless, which, through the CPU-general «s effects, consist not only of Space and classifying assimilations , but also of both enabling assimilations .

Let us now address the following question:

Which are the classifying assimilations ?

Let us conduct an intellectual experiment of sorts which we want to solve with the help of our knowledge up to this point (throughout our examination).

We ask ourselves, which original-assimilation must be present with the minimum of a first experience?

In any case, the determination of the "self" must have at least been present. For without this, one could not even know of his "self" (=his Bewusstsein as a unit, which is actually the "self").

For all of one«s experiences (= all the contents of one«s awareness ) consist of classifying and enabling assimilations , which are combined into classifyed somethings by the CPU in order to be "reflected" (i.e. registered) in the AFF .

And in order to have any kind of experience at all, one must first have a determination, which establishes and makes one conscious (or unconscious ) of the "self" existing at all. For if one«s "self" didn«t exist--i.e. if one didn«t have any comprehension of his "self"--then he couldn«t comprehend anything else either.

And, thus one needs a "self"; i.e. the determination for "self-awareness."

This determination also exists as a Unit. Because the "self," as we understand this determination here (as it must be "defined" with the first experience) means: "the sum of all abilities and their results make a Unit."

If the determination "self = unit" didn«t exist, then there wouldn«t be any "knowledge" within one that he exists.

If there isn«t any "knowledge" concerning this in one«s awareness (whether conscious or unconscious; direct or indirect) that one«s "self exists"--then one cannot exist at all (for all that exsists for oneself (and that is precisely the point here) has to be an experience, and with that--as we already know--has to be in one«s awareness). If the "self" is not present, then one could not even register anything further.

That means, the very first experience demands a determination, a rather complex one at that: namely, a Unit which takes in everything that one "is" to this "point in time."

That means, one needs that the very first experience conscious (or unconscious ) is the knowledge that his "self" exists.

In "practical terms," however, this means that one needs a determination which arranges and points out that all of his awareness « "abilities" belong to one another (Awareness must be present with the first impression "onwards," as we are examining it here, for before there couldn«t even have been an experience, i.e. wasn«t even awareness (in that way as we have defined awareness to now). ).

A determination that points out that these abilities belong to one«s "self"; that means, to he, who "senses" this determination, which is condensed through the CPU (since we are dealing with a determination here and not a pure classifying assimilation , it must have been the CPU at work) and reflected in the AFF .

That means that the knowledge that the "self" "is"--is triggered by the "reflection" of this Unit within the AFF (this is clear in any case since one cannot "know" anything (i.e. one is completely void of experience) "before" the reflection in the AFF (in order to make it totally conscious in the interplay between the CPU and decisions 1 and 2 )).

It is striking here that the CPU --in arranging absolutely every determination--has the ability to make Units. That is, in making a new determination, it connects sub-determinations to themselves and through this makes a new Unit. And this skill of the CPU to construct Units (= to create determinations) is an ability which exists solely through the CPU «s effects.

That means that for each determination the CPU makes this; and these Units are formed by it in such a "tangible" "lasting" manner that the connected units are not only comprised of sub-units , but also these sub-units can be found as continued units with the appropriate investigation at any time.

(Let«s take the "picture" from the small village with houses, flag pole and flag, etc.. Altogether the impression it gives is a Unit . At the same time, this Unit (= impression) consists of several sub-units (houses, flag pole, etc.) and these are then divided into still more sub-units (window, doors, etc.; pole, colors, etc.) and so on.)

This also means that this Unit , which we must have with the first experience, must have been "created" through the CPU «s effects.

This means still further that one--in order to have this determination--actually needs Space (= an enabling assimilation ) and classifying assimilations (or at least one classifying assimilation ). The classifying assimilations are not able to be registered on their own; rather they first become an experience in combination with Space .

Because this first experience is actually made up of this determination ("the self as a unit"), classifying assimilations (or at least one classifying assimilation ) and Space must be present. Where can it be found in relation to the unit of the self ?

The solution is a simple one:

The "awareness « abilities" function here as classifying assimilations (i.e. those which fix the the contents of the determination)! That is, the fact of the existence of the CPU-general (with all of its possibilities) and the fact of the AFF «s existence is the classifying assimilations!

And it is precisely these--observed on their own--which cannot be registered!

Now the question is, How are they registered?

Simply through the CPU «s effect (the CPU is "part" and in this way, also "everything" (we have already explained that the CPU-general as well as the AFF , because of their character of building determinations (that means, first bringing contents to our awareness ) cannot be governed by any determinations. That is, determinations such as "everything" and "a part" do not apply to it. But on the other hand, seen from our point of view--namely that we can only "operate" or "think" with determinations--this "part" and "everything" are one and the same if those determinations are used to describe the relationship between the CPU-general and the CPU .) of the CPU-general and thus, also has "access" to the AFF (through the decision-2 in making totally conscious from the contents and through the now-CPU and future-CPU in dealing with those contents). Because the CPU condenses all the abilities of our awareness (=the CPU-general and AFF ) as a Unit .

(The reason why the AFF can be "condensed" into a unit of the self as an ability of our awareness through the CPU-general is because the CPU-general works "within the AFF " (the now-CPU , future-CPU , decision-2 ), and everything it does (even in the case of condensing to the unit of the self ) can first become totally conscious or unconscious through its contact with the AFF .)

This most original Unit (What could be more original than the Unit , which is comprised of those contents which first make all Units and their contents possible?) is "reflected" by the CPU in the AFF . And it is through decision1 and decision-2 «s "activities" that one«s "self" beomes totally conscious of itself.

(Because the CPU-general is "active" from the very first experience onwards (in other words, its abilities are employed), we must assume that from this point it functioned with all of its abilities.

Why?

Because although we could conclude indirectly that individual abilities of the CPU-general exist, (such as the now-CPU , future-CPU , CPU , etc.), this does not change the fact that all of them find their roots in the CPU-general .

That is, the CPU-general is a something which we can, because of its outcomes here in reality, based on our (also put into motion by the CPU-general ) concepts, only indirectly describe (namely in that way, as we notice its effects in reality); the CPU-general itself (that is, how it "really" is; i.e. independent from those possible descriptions we could ever assign to it), however, remains an indescribable something.

If we were now to ask: Were all of its abilities activated with the first experience (even though it is possible that all of the abilities of the CPU-general didn«t have a field of activity, through which we could somehow become indirectly totally conscious or unconscious of them) or not, the following should be noted:

An essential trait of the CPU-general here with us (that means, how we can obtain experiences from it) is its incessant "activity" (i.e. observed in practice as the fact that something is continuously occuring within our awareness ) (We can not say, of course, that "activity" is a characteristic of the "real" CPU-general , rather we can only say that its entire effect with us (i.e. all "activities" of our awareness ) notifies us only with (and through) this "characteristic.").

Because all of its abilities, which we indirectly realize through our experiences, lead back only to the CPU-general itself, it cannot be argued that it sometimes simply "deactivates" some of its abilities with us (= with all of our experiences). Instead of this, we have to assume that all of its abilities with us are always activated.

As a consequence, this does not mean that one cannot register something unconscious (that is, to "do" something in which only the decision1 is involved). For if one were to take something in unconsciously , he would still register something else totally consciously "simutaneously!" That is, decision1 and decision2 are "always" active; only decision2 does not always "comprise" all that which the decision1 "comprises."

As a consequence, this means that all the beings which we define Bewusstsein (i.e. as we define these here) are also always totally conscious. This also means that we ourselves are always totally conscious.

The objection could arise here that although one is totally conscious during the day, while sleeping one does not describe his own condition as totally conscious .

The following can be said about this: the line of reasoning that Bewusstseins are always totally conscious holds up in pointing out that the CPU-general is active here “with us“ (= through the activities of our awareness ; our Bewusstsein )--and that is why it is inconceivable with us here ("with us" is our only interest here; we do not want to know how the CPU-general "really" is, nor can we really know this) that some of the CPU-general «s abilities are inactive for a certain amount of time. For everything from the CPU-general (i.e. all its abilities) is "timeless." And in this way, we can say that all of the CPU-general «s abilities which we "detect" with us here at one point always function here with us.

It is of course possible that we don«t notice certain abilities, but all of the CPU-general «s abilities which were once detectable prove in this way that they always function here!

And, thus, all that is left for us to accept is that even when sleeping, we are "continuously" totally conscious . What we can do here is only explain how this total consciousness in our sleep takes place. (This is not meant an argumentation (this has already been given), but rather should only help to make this fact more comprehensible.)

Let«s think that even in the case of a baby, we can say that it is totally conscious . For it shows all the characteristics which are distinguished as total consciousness : the absolute and exclusive presence of the respective perception (whether this perception were brought about through the actions of others or through its own actions).

The only diference between the total consciousness of a baby and that of an adult is that the baby«s total consciousness occurs on a completely different awareness level than that which the baby later as an adult would have.

We can also distinguish between the baby«s total consciousness and unconsciousness. Unconsciousness is a collection of all the experiences which the baby had to that point, but which the baby cannot make total conscious . And total consciousness is that which the baby feels "now," "directly."

It is similar when sleeping. One feels “directly“, “now“ while dreaming. At the same time, one does not have total conscious access to everything unconscious while dreaming. That shows that there is a diferentiation to be made between a dream experience and that which is unconscious .

The dream-state is fundamentally the same condition as the awake-state: one feels directly; but has no conscious access to much of that in one«s awareness .

The only difference to reality (connected to this, consciousness and unconsciousness ) lies in the fact that the scope of the conscious possibilities in a dream is usually far more limited. That is, that one has a completely different awareness level in the dream-state as in reality.

Let«s turn back once again to our very first experience. How can we be sure that we are totally conscious with the first experience, and not unconscious ?

With the first experience, this differentiation is not at all noticable yet. Simply because the first experience is the absolute only content within awareness to this point. Since all abilities are activated though, it can only be being totally conscious.)

That all of awareness « abilities with the first experience can be condensed into a Unit --and can be done through these abilities themselves!--is only possible because these abilities are not subjected in any way to classifying (= conceptual) limitations. And these abilities can do all of those things we described. (And since we must assume "the self as a Unit " with the very first experience, these abilities must have done exactly just that).

The Unit itself is not a classifying assimilation . For it expresses nothing of the "contents." In this way, it must be an enabling assimilation . For in the end it "condenses"; that is, makes determinations first possible in that it gives the classifying assimilations "form," "cohesion." It also does not (as is proper to an enabling assimilation ) declare anything concerning its "contents."

A while ago, we stated that at least Space and at least one classifying assimilation are necessary for a determination. And it is precisely that which we have here. For how is the "possibility to condense into a Unit and still keep all former Units within their Unit (actually setting multiple Units `side by side«)" (for that is precisely that, which the CPU does when it creates a Unit ) any different than that as we describe Space !

We can, therefore, say: Space is nothing more than the practical effects of the CPU in that it "forms" a Unit . Through this, Space "comes into being" (through the CPU«s effects).

One could object now in the following manner: Space shows through this, that one can find more than undifferentiated (i.e. no longer "seperable") Unit in this.This means, at least two Units exist.

This is not the case here, however. For the condensation to the unit of the CPU-general and the AFF cannot be "broken down" any further. For the CPU-general as the AFF are themselves the "content" of this Unit . (The CPU-general as the "actual content" and the AFF is "represented" in the CPU-general through the decision2 as well as the now-CPU and the future-CPU . The AFF is also the "content" of this Unit because it is needed in the process of making these contents "aware" (because of the AFF «s ability to reflect).)

These themselves do not depend at all on "determinations." The CPU-general and AFF can, therefore, neither be "broken down" nor "seperated" nor can one define them with any other definition. That means that this Unit here cannot be "broken down" any further.

Is the unit of the self , then, not even "within Space "?

The question isn«t appropriate.

The unit of the self is first made possible at all by the practical effects of the CPU (including, too, their reflection in the AFF ). This, in that the CPU forms "unit" through its effects. And this "formingUnit, " which first makes this original-determination at all possible, makes that--as soon as more than a only a single Unit which cannot be broken down any further (i.e. it cannot be broken down into still further sub-units ) is "there"--which we define as Space (namely, the possibility of being side by side).

That is, the unit of the self may not be "within Space " (in that way as we define Space in our investigations), but it is first possible through that which Space "forms"; namely, a Unit .

As we have already pointed out, the unit of the self must be an original-determination of the very first experience.

For only first through this can awareness get knowledge of itself.

Only that can exist, however--as we have shown--from which one can have a determination.

Thus, without the unit of the self there wouldn«t be any awareness .

As we know though, we have awareness , and so the unit of the self must have been the (or one of the) original-determinations with the very first experience.

The question thus arises:

Which further original-determinations must have been present with the first experience? Which original-determination , in addition to the unit of the self , must have it been in order to give awareness « abilities the possibility to construct the world as we know it?

(We have already explained that all forms of experiences are only "created" by determinations, which the CPU-general arranges.)

In this context, it should be noticed that the unit of the self is created only by our awareness « abilities.

For it is the ability of the CPU-general to construct units, which, with the AFF, first makes it possible to know of itself.

That is, the unit of the self has exclusively the existence and abilities of the CPU-general and AFF to thank for its own existence.

How does one get Unit of all the Bewusstsein «s abilties (the CPU-general as well as the AFF)?

Namely in that the CPU-general, which is also present and works in the AFF (as the decision-2 , now-CPU , and future-CPU ), "reflects" itself and through this process makes total consciousness because all of its activites are active (including decision-1, the CPU, and decision-2).

(As we have already explained, all of the CPU-general «s abilities, which can ever be found with us (i.e. in our awareness ), must have been actively "there" with the very first experience.

(From now on we will describe the "CPU-general «s abilities" as those "parts of it" which we are able to notice here in it«s effects. (To now these are the now-CPU, future-CPU , the CPU , decision1 and decision2 ).

In addition, with the "effect of the CPU-general" (or the effect of the CPU-general «s abilities) we will mean all of the results of its modes of operation (e.g. Time , Space , classifyed somethings , etc.) which could ever be found with us.)

However, it can also occur that particular abilities of the CPU-general still do not have an "expression" (= were not yet indirectly obtainable by a determination). Simply because no (or too little) content has been accessible to awareness to this point.

This does not change that fact that every ability of awareness which was "once" there is always there. For all of awareness« abilities are "timeless." And because the CPU-general is "active" (here with us) and not subjected to "Time" (here with us), every ability of the CPU-general is always "there" and always "active.")

But on the other hand, one cannot notice the CPU-general itself as "content" (the first determination) at all. For it itself cannot be totally consciously "observed" or "seen" "by one«s self."

What we can do, however, is become totally conscious of the CPU-general based on its effect: namely, through its Unit .

The Unit is on one hand, "with content" (namely, everything which the abilities of our Bewusstsein is); and on the other hand, we cannot become totally conscious of this "content" in such a way as we have "content" today. For we can only notice the abilities of awareness themselves by their effects, and not ourselves "look at" them total consciously .

This, however, doesn«t mean anything. For only the fact that Unit (= an effect of the CPU-general ) exists, and one is totally conscious of it, makes it possible for one to have a "determination" of oneself (namely, the unit of the self).

Practically seen, this determination is nothing more than the knowledge that everything that is a Unit --"is the self." (Which is clear since one only has to "do" with his CPU-general ). That is, the CPU-general doesn«t only produce Unit with every condensation , the CPU-general "is" it as well! The CPU-general is the Unit , is the "self."

Now the question: How was it that one had his first experience? How could it happen that "first" there wasn«t any total conscious knowledge that one exists (as Bewusstsein, as we understand this concept); and that "all of a sudden" this "knowledge" was totally consciously "there" (in other words, that the first experience took place)?

Who "made" or "made possible" that first experience?

The CPU-general and the AFF .

This, in that the CPU-general stands for the ability of the Unit ; for everything what one can "sense" from the CPU-general through its effect--is it (because the CPU-general is the "single most" "activity" that one«s Bewusstsein can ever "sense" (due to its effects in the AFF ) ). It carries one«s "individuality" "within it." And it does this "before" one«s Bewusstsein exists.

(The CPU-general carries one«s individuality "in itself" "before" the Bewusstsein (as we define it) existed; as we can determine from our "present" standpoint (= from our Bewusstsein ); but "how" and "what" this individuality was "before" is something we cannot define, nor know.)

(It would be interesting to take a look now to determine how the "being of self" came into being: simply because an active unit-producing-something can reflect itself in the AFF , and so it itself becomes totally conscious .

That is, the "being of self" (as we know it today) was constructed, in practice, because of the ability of the something (= the CPU-general ) to make "Unit“.

This means that one«s "individuality" is indebted to the CPU-general for its "beginnings"; namely indebted to the CPU-general«s ability to build an active Unit. This means (observed from our standpoint), that the ability to construct Units in the CPU-general was "first" there. And first "afterwards" did the "being of self" "emerge" due to the reflection of this Unit in the AFF .

If we say that the CPU-general already carries "in itself" the ability to come to one«s individuality "before" the Bewusstsein was there; then it carries that (whatever "that" migt be; we cannot recognize it directly nor describe it), at the very most, in itself which later (only then when the CPU-general "belongs to one«s Bewusstsein " (= is one«s Bewusstsein ) ) ensures that the active Unit functions. And not that, which ensures that later "one«s self is." For "the self" is actually only the practical result of the active Unit , which reflects itself in the AFF .)

Still, the CPU-general is not enough to also make one totally conscious of his individuality. For this, one needs a "reflection" in the AFF .

How is one to know, however, that "his" AFF is actually "his" AFF ?

With the decision2 ; that is, a "part" of the CPU-general , which functions within the AFF in order to "arrive" at total consciousness . Though, it is not at all "important" to the AFF to "whom" it "belongs." It is only important that it reflects. And one«s CPU-general becomes totally conscious of itself through this reflection.

That is, the CPU-general carries the individuality and all the abilities of one«s Bewusstsein along with it. But it is first with the reflection in the AFF (= through the unification with the AFF ) that the CPU-general itself is able to become totally conscious and also utilize its abilities "in practice."

We can, therefore, say:

The unification of the CPU-general and the AFF "creates" our Bewusstsein . It is the connection if these two--later--abilities of our Bewusstsein (the CPU-general and the AFF ) which first "form" the "Bewusstsein."

The determination of the unit of the self is nothing more than the practical result of this unification. Through the "effect" of the CPU-general , which was able to become "practical" at that very moment when the CPU-general was united with the AFF .

Let us not forget here that we ourselves cannot directly "experience" or "notice" the CPU-general (in other words, we cannot directly understand it).

We can only "experience," "notice" the CPU-general through its effect. With the unit of the self, this is the Unit which stands for everything that "does," "is"; this is to say it represents one«s Self. That means, the Unit "represents" all of the CPU-general «s activities. In other words, with the unit of the self , form (Unit ) and content (everything that the CPU-general stands for) are identical.

(Why are form and content identical?

They are so through the practical outcome of the function of the CPU-general in the AFF .

For Unit is the expression, through which every time we have experiences, we are able to "experience" that the CPU-general functions, in other words, that the CPU-general is there at all; and also to "experience" that we exist (as we are conscious or unconscious of ourselves).

If Unit is not supplied with some concrete content (e.g. "car," "house," etc.), but rather completely void of "tangible" content (such as it is in the case of the unit of the self ), then this (so to speak, "empty" (of course not truly empty; we mean "without concrete and tangible content" here) ) Unit represents only that which it "created."

We already stated that no conceptual description can be given to the CPU-general . We are only able to "indirectly" describe it by the effects with us (= in our awareness ) in the sense of its mode of operation (= that, which we experience from it).

The question then reads: How can this Unit represent "all" of the abilities of the CPU-general (= actually the CPU-general itself)? Why not just for the CPU ? Or other CPU-general abilities?

Simply because we need the determination "that one«s Self exists at all" for the very first experience.

And the "self" "is" all of the abilities of the CPU-general ; everything of the CPU-general .

And that is why we "know" that this Unit (unit of the self ) stands for the CPU-general , and not simply for "any" of its abilities.

This can also be shown in a different way:

Let us say that we are speaking of different abilities of the CPU-general ; but which altogether could just as easily be described as a "single" ability. For all the abilities of the CPU-general exist only because of the existence of an ability of our Bewusstsein: namely, the CPU-general. That means that wherever we see an ability of the CPUgeneral at "function," we know through this that the CPU-general exists here!

Let`s have in mind, that all of the CPU-general «s abilities are "active." But that the Unit is the most original outcome of the CPU-general «s activities in cooperation with the AFF . In this way, Unit stands for CPU-general . For since all of the CPU-general «s abilities exist, it is the same (in looking back to our present problem) if the Unit originates from a "single" ability of the CPU-general or from "all" of the CPU-general «s abilities.

It is simply the fact that the Unit exists, that we know of the CPU-general «s existence. And if a "single" abilitiy of the CPU-general exists, then the "entire" CPU-general must exist (i.e. practically seen, all of the abilities must exist).

If a Unit were to be so to speak, "empty" (i.e. without any special content), and if it becomes totally conscious to us, then this would mean that, practically speaking, the CPU-general exists. And this means nothing more, in practical terms, than that the "self" must exist, too!! (For the CPU-general is there (which first "creates" the "self") as well as the AFF (from which one "first experiences himself" (i.e. that Bewusstsein can become) ). ).

(Because the AFF alone has the function to "reflect"--i.e. actually, in contrast to the CPU-general , it is "inactive" itself--it alone exists as the following function: to make the CPU-general «s effects totally conscious or unconscious ; that is, together with the CPU-general to be "awareness " "Bewusstsein " and to make this Bewusstsein «s contents possible.

The AFF «s "content" in the unit of the self is precisely to reflect the effect of the CPU-general . The decision2 , the future-CPU , and the now-CPU are, moreover, the CPU-general «s abilities , which work "directly" within the AFF .

With that the form and content of the unit of the self are created only by the CPU-general.

The AFF is nevertheless "integrated." Namely, once, through the decision2 , the now-CPU and future-CPU (which "all" "belong" to the CPU-general ) and also when it permits by way of its own "existence," this unit of the self to first "be in awareness " by registering it).

Let us now return to our determinations: which original-determination do we still need in order that awareness has all that necessary to construct the world as we find it today?

There has to be the unit of the self; it already carries within it the necessity of its existence starting with the first experience. Are there yet other indispensable original-determinations? Or are the units of the self and the abilities of awareness not sufficient in constructing everything as we know it today?

Let us observe this from the other side:

What all are we able to do with the unit of the self , which is "automatically" built with the creation of the Bewusstsein , and the abilities of awareness ?

(The following idea lies behind this attempt: we will see how far we come with it. Afterwards we will be better able to see which additional original determinations we still need for the construction of the world as we "find" it.)

We know that the CPU-general makes Units . Because we know that the CPU-general does it today, we know that it always has to do it (as long as we are awareness, Bewusstsein ).

Furthermore, we know that the CPU-general «s once constructed Units remain in the AFF . (That is, each Unit which was ever created, stays--beyond every influence through the arrangements or determinations (such as "Time," for example)--in the AFF .)

That means that with its construction, the Bewusstsein became totally conscious of itself through the unit of the self .

Subsequently, the CPU-general created further Units .

But what exactly can the CPU-general create? What materials for what combinations does the CPU-general have at its disposal?

It can make Units as often as it will or wants to.

In other words, with all of the CPU-general «s construction of Units , is the only resulting declaration that of the "self exists"?

No.

Of course, with every Unit that the CPU-general constructs we are "informed" each time once again that the "self exists."

But beyond that, with the second experience, the CPU-general also has actual "components" with which it can construct "systems." More precisely, the units of the self !

Let«s look at the following example for understanding:

The CPU-general "creates" a Unit (unit of the self ) which is then "reflected" within the AFF .

"Parallel" to this, though, it makes a further Unit (unit of the self ) which is likewise "reflected" in the AFF .

(We have already explained that the conceptual limitations on the CPU-general itself--which first creates all of the conceptual determinations as the result of its effects--cannot be put to use. That means, the CPU-general can create as many Units as it "wants to" "simultaneously."

The fact that it can build Units (as we know from reality) is proof enough to show us that the CPU-general not only can do this "at any time," but it also shows us that the CPU-general can do this simultaneously as often as it so chooses. (To better understand, look at the T.V. picture: simultaneously, we have the Unit of the house, Units of other houses, the car, etc..).)

In doing so, the CPU-general "creates" Space , in the sense as we have defined it through words.

That is, the possibility of "Space" comes into being (is manifested) at that moment the first unit of the self "is."

But as soon as we have "two" Units , we can refer to Space in the sense as we have defined it.

"At the same time" the CPU-general forms these two Units (unit of the self + unit of the self ) together into another Unit .

In addition to this new Unit (let«s call it Unit 2 ), the CPU-general arranges a "normal" Unit.

In addition, it assimilates all of the Units together into a single Unit .

The "formula," thus, reads as follows in this case:

( (unit of the self + unit of the self ) + unit of the self ) or (Unit 2 + unit of the self )

What should this illustrate for us?

Now we have two meanings of the unit of the self .

The first is that every determination which is constructed by the CPU-general is a Unit. In the sense of its form, this Unit is always a unit of the self .

At the same time, depending on the composition of the individual Units , their "contents" will differ. In this way, the unit of the self acts as the contents of Units.

And through the union of the CPU-general «s Units --which themselves are made of sub-units, which sub-units themselves are made from still other sub-units, and so on down; and in which contentually, all of the Units consist of the most diversified arrangements of units of the self --the CPU-general can ccomplete the most diverse of determinations!

To better explain, the following "formulas" are given:

Unit 8 = ( (unit of the self + unit of the self ) + (unit of the self + unit if the self ) )

Unit 7 = (unit of the self + (unit of the self + unit of the self + unit of the self ) )

Unit 8 is a Unit consisting of two sub-units !

The same is true for Unit 7 .

Altogether the contents of Unit 8 are 4x unit of the self .

The same is true of Unit 7 «s contents.

And still, both Units , which came into the AFF through their construction, are not equal. Each has a different construction, and the CPU-general can distinguish the two based on this difference!!

That is, this original-determination of the unit of the self (which itself was first "created" by awareness « abilities) and the abilities of awareness are really enough to build all the many and complex Units ever desired.

That means we can form classifyed somethings (= Units ) in this manner.

These classifyed somethings can be differentiated based on the construction of their contents (actually, from which sub-units they were constructed). But can also be distinguished by the context in which they stand to all former classifying somethings. That is, based on other classifyed somethings that existed before they were created and which association they had to them when they were "created."

This implys that a "true" (but probably only in unconscious existence) connection exists of all formerly-created classifyed somethings.

And that a conscious connection, but actually only partly "recognizing the true connections," exists between each classifyed something and all other classifyed somethings.

Reality, as we experience it daily, is "created" in the same way with these conditions!!

There, an impression consists of many different classifyed somethings. These classifyed somethings, each on its own, are Units . Each which once again consistes of still other sub-units. And the connection of these Units to one another is ensured through the construction of their contents as well as through the manner in which the CPU-general assembles these Units into bigger Units (to manage that classifyed somethings can be distinguished from one another, since the CPU-general «s ability is in constructing Units, no more than a single original-determination is necessary. In this way, all of the differences are perfectly expressed.); as well as through the context in which every newly created Unit stands for all former created Units.

In reality, we differentiate between an unconscious knowledge about the connection of all the classifyed somethings to one another (which then more often than not leads to consciously unexpected results ) and a conscious knowledge of the connection that only recognizes a small part of this connection.

That means we do not need any further original-determinations because with the very first experience, it is possible to form all of the conceivable classifyed somethings with the abilities of awareness .

It is fascinating, seen from an everyday point of view, that not only do we create our own experiences, but also that every experience is nothing more than an attitude of our own awareness .

For each experience (as we have already said) is only totally conscious when it is "just" newly-assembled. Each arrangement, however, represents the precise ordering and grouping of diverse Units , which themselves, as well as their contents, only emerge with the CPU-general «s activity at exactly "this moment."

And with that, also each extended experience ("extended" understood in a contextual sense) is an "extention of awareness ."

It is clear that one«s awareness can produce one and the same "effect" on a regular basis. Afterall, its function is not subjugated to the original-assimilation (and in this way, neither subjugated to the connected-assimilations (= connected-determinations ) ). That is, terms such as "often," "infinite," etc. are simply connected-determinations and cannot, therefore, "state" anything at all concerning awareness (= CPU-general and the AFF ). For it is awareness that first "creates" the connected-determinations . And connected-determinations cannot prompt the "restrictions" of their "creator."

And thus, without even knowing where the CPU-general and AFF "come from," we can say the following: We do not only make the world into that, which we take in (i.e. let the world be whatever it might be, but only "describe" it in a very special way), we even "create" the world in the first place!!

That means that without Bewusstseins --which are first able to come to agreement and then carry the agreed upon out; and make "experiences" within their arrangement because of the abilities of the CPU-general , that functions within the AFF --the "world" wouldn«t even exist!

It is also now clear that everything that was once present (namely, that which the Bewusstseins, with which we are in agreement with, could once hold as an impression) can actually become an experience again at any time. (Reality shows that this is not "normally" the case; but this does not change the basic possibilty that it can occur.)

Throughout our investigations, it has also become clear that principally, we are able to make all of the unconscious experiences we ever have had and all the actions of other Bewusstseins with whom we were in agreement with, and which actions those Bewusstseins set within our agreement, totally conscious any time.

XIV.

Let us address the fact that today we (= our awareness ) live in continual contact with our fellow human beings.

Because we (as we have already proven) are only first able to produce "reality" based on the agreement of our CPU-general with the CPU-generals of other Bewusstseins, the following question arises: How are we actually able to distinguish between the creation of "one«s own" CPU-general (= where one "creates" classifyed somethings which other Bewusstseins must "imitate" (based on the terms of agreement) ) and the creation of other CPU-generals (= the classifyed somethings which "one«s self" does not "create," but which other Bewusstseins do, and one«s CPU-general only "imitates" (in following the agreement) ). For the fact that we can do this is a simple fact.

Because of the fact that all people must have the same original-assimilation (the unit of the self ), they have the same "source" of "fundamental material" and with that, they can have the same "assimilation-combination" for the agreement.

Still, the question remains, How can one distinguish in reality what one "does" and what others "do" (seen from the standpoint of our reality)? For one must assemble both "within oneself" (i.e. one«s CPU ).

We will establish a further definition at this point.

This “part of the CPU-general which "creates" "reality" with the accord of other CPU-generals will be named the CPU of reality (= CPUreality ).

The CPU itself still remains the condensation of all recall- and extra-experiences (that which only the "self" possesses); but the CPU will no longer incorporate real-experiences .

Classifyed somethings will continue to represent all the possible experiences which exist.

But from this point onwards, classifyed somethings A will represent the real-experiences which have come into being as the result of one«s "own" original creation. They include, too, all recall- and extra-experiences .

Classifyed somethings B will indicate those parts of real-experiences where other Bewusstseins set the actions and oneself´s CPU-general only imitate those classifyed somethings because of the coercion of other Bewusstseins .

An example will help clarify that presently described:

One goes to his local farmer«s market to buy fruit. The selling farmer picks out a piece of fruit and one "sees" it. In actuality, however, one only "senses" his CPUreality within the AFF , which has "identically" assembled the farmer«s actions for him.

That is, in this case, the farmer is the "creating" part of that which one«s CPUreality has imitated. But because both of these CPUrealities are "identically" put together--how does one "know" that he is the "receiving" end, and how does the farmer know that he is on the "giving" end?

And if one were to then reach his hand out to take the piece of fruit, then both he and the farmer are "taking action." The farmer, in that he has picked out the piece of fruit, and the subject because he takes the fruit.

The action of the farmer picking out a piece of fruit is a classifyed something B for the subject. And the subject receiving the fruit is a classifyed something A.

That is, the CPUreality works in two ways. First, it puts together that which other Bewusstseins originally create (in this way, "passive", and from this point forward will be repesented by the term passive CPUreality). In a second respect, the CPUreality itself "is active within reality" (active CPUreality ).

It is clear that one knows in reality who picks out the piece of fruit and who takes it; in other words, who oneself is and and who oneself isn«t. It is just as clear that the CPUreality is necessary for the "construction" of all impressions.

We can, therefore, ask: How can one differentiate between the active CPUreality and the passive CPUreality within the AFF (in which decisions 1 and 2 make total consciousness )?

As the CPU-general is responsible for assemblage in both cases, the distinction must exist "within oneself" (= one«s Bewusstsein ) which indicates what the clasifyed something A is, and what the classifyed something B is.

An impression is, therefore, constructed of units of active CPUreality and units of passive CPUreality (how many units "participate" in each impression depends on the impression at hand; it is not restricted to a particular number.)

Seen from the standpoint of reality, an impression occurs as follows:

Everywhere where the active CPUreality "works," one "is active" himself (= active CPUreality ). And one creates classifyed somethings A, which are “real“ for all Bewusstseins with which one is in agreement.

That is, these classifyed somethings A (which were assembled by the active CPUreality ) are not only there when one does something "physically" (e.g. lift one«s hand, turn one«s head, etc.), but are also objects, which one "physically" "produces," which the active CPUreality puts together (for example, when one makes his own chair; assembles a model airplane; prepares his own meal, etc.). Even when these classifyed somethings A themselves are composed of sub-classifyed somethings B (that is, that one does not represent the "creator" (= the active CPUreality ) of the wood for the chair, nor of the pre-prepared pieces for the model plane, nor of the ingredients for the meal, but rather one acts only as the "receiver" (= the passive CPUreality ).

And everywhere where the passive CPUreality "functions," one is "compelled" by the terms of agreement. If one "sees" the wood for the chair, the parts for the model plane, a car, etc., then all of these are classifyed somethings B. Likewise, all the "actions" of others which one registers come into being through the effects of the passive CPUreality .

Something should be pointed out here: When one sees the action of a Bewusstsein --this action "occurs" at that very moment. That is, the action takes place and the passive CPUreality sees to it, that this becomes totally conscious for the subject.

On the other hand, when one sees the pre-cut pieces of wood, a car, a house, etc.; these classifyed somethings are simply the "products" of former actions of other Bewusstseins, but, these classifyed somethings already "were there," "existed" before one becomes totally conscious of them.

We know that we can only have that as an impression which our CPU-general ; based on agreement; put together for us. That means that if wood, a car, or a house "suddenly" "appeared" which one had never seen before (i.e. that one was never totally conscious of before), he would not even be able to "see" the object if his CPU-general had not participated in assembling it (namely for oneself) during its "creation." For a piece of wood, a car, a house, etc. themselves are not Bewusstseins which "take action," but rather only the effects of these active entities--and in this way, one cannot "copy" these "products" in "retrospect," but rather must--with his CPU-general --have been "there" during the creation of these "effects."

Our awareness , therefore, has two types of classifyed somethings B .

The first are either those classifyed somethings that become "immediately"--i.e. at that very moment when they are "created" by other Bewusstseins --totally conscious of one«s awareness . Or those classifyed somethings which are now totally conscious of one«s awareness, but were not actually totally conscious of awareness during their "creation."

These are from now on the classifyed somethings B.

Another type are those classifyed somethings which by need become "understood" by our CPUreality ; based on the necessary agreement; and enter the AFF at "that moment" of their "creation" (through other Bewusstseins) . However, they are not made totally conscious there (that is, decision1 and the CPUreality "understood" (= carried out together) these classifyed somethings and transfered them into the AFF ; but where decision2 was not at work simultaneously. If decision2 were working, we would be totally conscious of this action.)

From this point onwards, we will give the term classifyed somethings BB to this type of classifyed something (to show that they were "understood" but never conscious ). And the CPU-general , which manages this process will be termed the passive-passive CPUreality .

It is first through the existence of classifyed somethings BB that one is able to be totally consciously informed so-to-speak "in retrospect" of the effects of Bewusstseins, which were "created" at a particular "time" when he was not totally conscious of this "creation." (Actually, in that one«s passive CPUreality converts the classifyed somethings BB into classifyed somethings B .) see appendix.

All of this is necessary. For otherwise it wouldn«t be at all possible for each person to be able to find the same objects at the same place.

With this, we also have proof that the CPU-general is able to arrange classifyed somethings, which are actually not even conscious , but which nevertheless come into the AFF .

This process of "becoming totally conscious " functions in the following manner (is only able to do it in this way): the passive CPUreality "takes" a classifyed somethings BB and "arranges" it "new" (i.e. once again), but with exactly the same contents as before. In contrast to "before," decision2 also "takes part" in the process. This classifyed somethings BB becomes totally conscious .

(The process of making something which was previously not conscious, totally conscious, means that this process of making totally conscious is a further and new experience.

For throughout the constructing-character of the CPU-general, every totally conscious experience is only in the moment possible when this determination is being "assembled".

The fact that something is totally conscious shows us that this classifyed something is being "newly" "arranged" at that very moment. Even if it«s contents are the exact same as that which had once been put together as unconscious.)

One could now rightfully inquire how it comes at all to this agreement. How is it that all people have the same chance to see the exact same object at a precisely determined place at a specific moment in time? In other words: How does one«s decision1 of the passive CPUreality and decision2 know when they are supposed to "convert" a classifyed something BB into a classifyed something B (= should make it totally conscious )?

This is also quite easy to understand: Let us not forget that our Bewusstsein, as far as the contents of its awareness are concerned, is of "constructing" nature. And out of this, as we have already shown, arises an "ordering" (totally conscious as well as unconscious) of classifyed somethings. But as Time is a product of the CPU-general «s effects in the AFF --through the agreement of all the CPUrealities of all Bewusstseins (which have enetered into agreement) Time and in this way, an ordering that is applicable to all Bewusstseins in agreement, can be "created."

That is, the ordering is done in such a way that all classifyed somethings are coordinated precisely to one another.

Furthermore, as already covered, we actually "create" Space with the CPU-general «s ability with every condensation to make a Unit . And, with the help of diverse determinations, we can decide which "intervals of space" we give from some classifyed somethings to others.

As the facility to "decide upon intervals" is a facility of the abilities of the CPU-general (more precisely in the case of recall- and extra-experiences it is the facility of the CPU; where with real-experiences it is the CPUreality ) (which altogther "give" their outcomes (i.e. here, the determinations of "deciding upon intervals") into the AFF ); thus we can make these determinations of "deciding upon intervals" binding--just as we can bind every determination through the agreement with other Bewusstseins --for all of these Bewusstseins are a part of the arrangement.

This means that we can fix the position of the objects to one another (including to ourselves in our physical manifestation) as well as decide their exact sequence (i.e. their "period of time") within the arrangement we have to other Bewusstseins. That is, we can make all of these determinations applicable for everyone who is apart of the agreement.

It is also, therefore, clear why one«s CPU-general "knows" when which classifyed something BB must be "converted" to a classifyed something B. For our CPU-general is "there" with every "creation" of other Bewusstseins with which we can come into contact, and with this, all Bewusstseins can "reach an agreement" on the "intervals" (Space and classifying assimilations ) and the "sequences" (Time and classifying assimilations ) of every newly "created "CPU-general «s effect of every Bewusstsein with all other formerly created classifying somethings!

If were now to ask: Does this then mean that we unconsciously have all of the happenings of the universe within us? We could reply: At least all those that we could fundamentally have as totally conscious experiences are to be found as classifyed something BB within our AFF.

If one is astounded by the imitating which can be done by the passive-passive CPUreality , he must not forget that for the CPU-general, there is absolutely no meaning attatched to concepts such as "infinite," "immesurable number," etc..

One can distinguish between those classifyed somethings that other Bewusstseins "originally" made (i.e. a Bewusstsein which decides to do this, and then does it) and those classifyed somethings which he himself "originally" created.

One sort is that of the classifyed somethings B, the other classifyed somethings A (the difference between classifyed somethings B and classifyed somethings BB lies only in the fact that in the "assemblage" of classifyed somethings BB, the passive CPUreality and decision1 work in the AFF ; but not decision2 . There is no specific distinction between these two types of classifyed somethings .)

From a realistic standpoint, we can say: One knows if it is he who does something (though we leave open the question of why (i.e. under which influence of some former experience) one does this)--that is, one knows, one thinks, one combines, one acts--or if it someone else who does something.

Why can one do this?

The distinction is shown by two of the CPU-general«s abilities. More specifically, once, the active CPUreality , and once the passive CPUreality .

But how can one know what he creates and what he only imitates from other Bewusstseins?

Because one only experiences the active CPUreality as well as the passive CPUreality through their effects (namely, the classifyed somethings A and classifyed somethings B), the question remains unanswered: How can one find out in reality which classifyed something is a classifyed something A and which is a classifyed something B?

Before we explain, let us address another related question.

The following question that comes up is as follows: How does one know with a memory that this memory is a former impression (recall-experience ), and not simply a though combination? (In connection to this, we will also look at the question of how we are able to distinguish real-experiences from recall- and extra-experiences .)

Let us not forget: All impressions are stored within the AFF (and furthermore, everything that the CPU-general has ever assembled, whether it was totally conscious or not). And almost every impression consists of several sub-units. We can "recall" these former impressions through memory (i.e. make them totally conscious through the new condensation (though in "practice" this will never be so exact as it was "before" in reality) ); or we can use parts of these former impressions (= sub-units ) to create totally new condensations with parts of other memories (to have thought combinations).

That is, once stored as a uniform impression, this will "always" remain stored in the AFF as it was put together "at that time." Still, at any time the CPU-general can retrieve sub-units from this impression to carry out new condensations based on the same contents and forms (classifyed somethings A , B ).

Furthermore, let us not forget that the "world" is constructed in such a complex manner that it is possible, as an example, that one can travel 100 miles to come to a some city, where he will find very particular houses, landscape, etc. (i.e. classifyed somethings B which were classifyed somethings BB before he had arrived for the first time) is only possible because his CPUreality , in alliance with all other Bewusstseins, --with which he is in agreement-- (and, of course, with all of the rest of one«s "own" CPU-general «s creations) has "created" a distinct and complex structure from Units (which are all connected in a very distinctive manner); a structure which is applicable to all those who have entered the agreement.

That means that everything real (= all that which corresponds to reality), whether or not it belongs to the "past" or to "this moment," has its own special place within the agreement. That is, every determination (Unit ) is likewise fixed based on further determinations (i.e. products of the CPU-general «s effects) which themselves are found within specific other determinations.

These complex structures (the actual "universe in its entirety"--as far as we are ever able to come into total conscious contact with it) are unconsciously contained within every Bewusstsein as Units of classifyed somethings BB. (Of course, also as classifyed somethings B and classifyed somethings A Units. However, these are only found in insignificant quantities when compared with classifyed somethings BB.)

If all of this were not the case, then with the first visit in an unfamiliar city, we wouldn«t be able to find everything in the same way that other Bewusstseins could, even if this, too, was their first visit.

Due to this, everything of the passive CPUreality as well as the active CPUreality has its fixed place within this agreement. This includes the classifyed somethings BB as well as all former impressions.

Within the agreement, even one«s recall-experiences (which of course, as soon as one had a memory, remained as such in the AFF ) and extra-experiences have their position--but which are purely subjective (except if these were not made within further agreements (e.g. on another level with some Bewusstseins "next to" reality) ). And it is all of this together which makes up the entire "contents" of our awareness .

In consideration of these facts we have just covered, we can further say: We know that in principle we are able to distinguish between recall- and extra-experiences (just as we see time and time again that recall-experiences are mixed up with each other as well as recall - with extra-experiences , without us being totally conscious of this fact). We also know that in principle (even if exceptions could be found to state the contrary) we are able to distinguish between real- and extra-experiences .

How does this work?

The answer is not as difficult as one might think: First of all, we have constructed an extremely complicated structure through our agreement with other Bewusstseins. Additionally, all Bewusstseins are equipped with constructive-ability. This is so both in the sense of making totally conscious (for even when we carry the entire universe up to now, within us, we are not totally conscious of this universe) as well as in the sense that the CPU-general continuously adds new combinations (this ability can function "endlessly" (seen from our "real" world; because, for the CPU-general itself, the term "endlessly" (as every term) is not applicable), because the CPU-general can continue further combining new); it doesn«t matter if these condensations are made totally conscious within the AFF or not.

And this is really the take-off point: everything which was once conscious or unconscious at some point has its very special "place" within the entire "cosmos" of the contents of our Bewusstsein . Which is caused by the constructing "character" of our Bewusstsein .

For every new assemblage (by the CPU-general ), because of its construction, is "automatically" (i.e. it belongs unalterably to the CPU-general‘s nature to also do the following) given its very special place within the already existing "network" of "combined" Units ; independent of whether or not decision2 was a part of this assemblage (the condensation becomes totally conscious ) or not involved (it remains unconscious ).

With this, every Unit also has its own special sphere; its own "personal history" (at what "point in time" within the development of one«s Bewusstsein this Unit was made, etc.).

And if one makes something totally conscious (recall- or extra-experiences ) (this concerns the question one asks about the possibilities of differentiation), then decision1 has already "chosen" what it will put together. That is, the decision1 has adopted a specific Unit from "within" the complex cosmos of the AFF as a "model" (recall-experience), or has put together multiple sub-units for a new, further Unit (extra-experience ).

If decision2 were now to make this Unit totally conscious , then both decision1 and 2 are "totally conscious themselves" of where this new condensation comes from (because decision1 has "taken" this from there, it can and must "know" where this new condensation was "taken from"). And since both decision1 and 2 can make one totally conscious of the "contents" of this condensation, they can also make one totally conscious of where this condensation "comes from" (i.e. They "know" from where the individual sub-units of the new condensation were "taken from" (= from which "place" within the fixed cosmos of one«s contents), and they make one totally conscious of where this new condensation is to be organized (if it is a memory or an idea). ).

However, this total conscious making concerning recall- and extra-experiences - which is done through decision1 and 2 - is only possible if specific further circumstances are available.

The following question arises:

How are decision1 and 2 able to inform us of this "knowledge"? How do we know whether that experience we just had is a recall- or extra-experience ?

In order to know this totally consciously , we must have an experience just for that process. How are we able to do that when decision1 and 2 have this "knowledge"?

All Units (i.e. all experiences) are given their significance through how and where they are found within the contents«cosmos; which other Units are associated with them.

It is precisely this question that one wants to totally consciously answer:

Is this present experience one which falls under the type of experineces we describe as recall-experiences ; or in the catagory of experiences we describe as extra-experiences ?

Decision-1 and 2 are able to inform us totally consciously (for this is exactly what must occur) which type of experience this might be. But, we must be conscious of the kinds of experiences (real- recall- or extra-experiences ) available.

For, if we don‘t have enough conscious access to those types of experiences which are within the contents of our awareness in near relation to that experience which we deal with at the moment, (that experience from which we don‘t know whether it is an extra- or recall-experience) then it could happen that we consciously don‘t have the adequate comparison available.

With this, because we cannot consciously connect this new experience with those experiences which we would need to be informed of the category (extra- or recall-) that this new experience falls into -- we don‘t have adequate comparision available to totally consciously make a decision about where this new experience comes from.

The same, of course, is true of the differentiation between real- and extra-experiences.

To better understand, let«s look at the following example that comes up for some from time to time: One dreams and in the dream, he is not totally consciosly clear (as we have already covered, we "dream" totally consciously , but on another awareness level ) at one point as to whether or not it is reality (= a real-experience ) or dream (= an extra-experience ).

How is this lack of clarity resolved to be a real-experience or an extra-experience?

Decisions 1 and 2 make he who dreams totally conscious. If he who dreams arrives at an experience of many whose content is composed of the following: "Am I dreaming now, or is this real?" and the experience of this question (which is as totally conscious as the whole dream) remains unanswered (since this answer is not totally conscious to he dreaming (clearly, the dreamer«s awareness "knows" this answer unconsciously ; but that is not important here) )--then this is because:

Looking at his awareness level , which the "dreamer" had at this "point in time," he has very little conscious access to all of the other experiencess within his awareness . And if this conscious access is so limited that he is unable to have any (or simply too few) total conscious examples of the real-experience type and the extra-experience type at his disposal--then, because of the lack of enough conscious examples, decisions 1 and 2 wouldn«t be able to tell him the following totally consciously (we will present this "information" in greater detail for the purpose of understanding):

"Yes, this experience I am now having is comparable to that type of an extra-experience ; and respectively, the real-experience type is not fitting."

Why aren«t decisions 1 and 2 able to make our subject totally conscious ?

They are unable to do so because in order to make this statement into a totally conscious experience they must also "simultaeously" make examples of real- and extra-experiences totally conscious, at least as a result (as made posible by the CPU-general).

If they cannot do (or want to do) that (=if awareness cannot (or doesn«t want to) do that), then this statement cannot even be totally consciously "formulated."

It is in this way that the question of whether this is a dream or reality can remain unanswered during the dream.

Let us return to the differentiation between recall- and extra-experiences.

Of course it is possible that a condensation will be "adjusted" to a memory and thus is rather similar to this memory. But still, some Units have been added which do not belong.

(An example of this: One is certain that he saw a woman during a particular bus ride. He felt atracted to her, but he didn«t speak to her because there wasn«t time enough. A much later memory brought him to believe that he had spoken with her shortly (it is true that he had spoken with other women he didn«t know during his trip.) )

It could then happen that decision1 and 2 nevertheless "focus" on this former experience in their process of making total-conscious .

And that this is totally consciously misunderstood in so far as the "focus" is not understood to be simply a large part of the new condensation (which would be "correct") but rather understood to be the entire part (= the whole experience).

If one were to distiguish between reality (i.e. an impression) and a memory, then this would follow the same principle. Decisions 1 and 2 make him totally conscious of "where" this "new" experience should be ordered. For each Unit that one registers (whether a real- recall- or extra-experience ) has its very own place value.

If an experience is not "entirly" new, for example, but rather consists of several classifyed somethings B (and respectively, classifyed somethings BB ) that belong to one«s former "course" (i.e. the "course" which one is continuously compelled to follow by other Bewusstseins (based on an agreement) ) and which actually lead to a "logical" continuation (= further development) of this course--is this is so, then decisions 1 and 2 "know" that he has a real-experience.

If, however, he has an experience that is indeed composed of several classifyed somethings B , but not understood as the logical continuation of the course in which he is continuously compelled by other Bewusstseins, but instead of this the contents of this experience fit more closely to the "earlier" series--then decisions 1 and 2 "know" that the recall-experience is at play here.

As stated earlier, it is also important here that one always has adequate examples of real- and extra-experiences conscious in order that decisions 1 and 2 have the chance to make him totally conscious of the determination of whether this is a real- or extra-experience.

The next question to come up concerns how we can differentiate between the individual Bewusstseins. Is this dependent upon the form of agreement?

We do not know precisely how the agreement is "carried out." What we do know, however, is that every piece of "knowledge" about something else (whether about "Bewusstseins" or something "created by Bewusstseins") first comes about through the passive CPUreality . In other words, we only come to "know" about "Bewusstsein " as well as that "created by Bewusstsein " because of the passive CPUreality .

That means that we are "compelled" by Bewusstseins to view them as Units (as classifyed somethings), just as we are compelled by Bewusstseins to accept their creations (as classifyed somethings ) as Units .

And here, the question arises: How can we distinguish between the classifyed somethings which are a Bewusstsein and the classifyed somethings which make up the "creation of a Bewusstsein "?

The answer is clear if we consider that the cosmos of our agreement has a vast number of Bewusstseins which are continuously "active" within this universe. That is, classifyed somethings "create." In this way the classifyed somethings B, which "from nothing" repeatedly put further classifyed somethings B into the cosmos of our agreement--are the Bewusstseins .

And because every classifyed something only finds its meaning from that which it takes from the connections to all other classifyed somethings , we (i.e. our now-CPU ) can "trace" exactly which "Bewusstseins " in which sequence within the agreement "created" which classifyed somethings .

Thus, not only can we "differentiate" each Bewusstsein from one another, we also know (by that which the Bewusstsein "created" in the agreement as classifyed somethings ) what their "character," their "personality" constitute.

It should also be clear how we can distinguish between the original creations of others and those original creations of ourselves.

For every copy of a classifyed something has its exact place within the cosmos of our awareness« contents (regarding where it comes from, "when" it comes, and how it is constructed); this makes conclusions possible concerning where the classifyed something has come from.

If in reality, one were to raise a chair, for example, he would know that it was he who had done so.

Why?

Because one first wants to lift the chair; then afterwards, sees how his own hand grasps it; he feels the chairs weight, etc..

That is that in reality, the constant presence of one«s body (which is continuously constructed by his active CPUreality within the agreement) helps him to realize immediately if he does something or not.

On the contrary, it is difficult to know whether one created the classifyed something or not in the case where one has created a classifyed something A long ago and then sees it again sometime later amongst many classifyed somethings B, which appear all the same.

If one assembles a dresser from a furniture store, for example, then in reality he has combined a number of classifyed somethings B to form a new classifyed something A .

If his friends were now to put the same dresser from the same furniture store together, and if all of the dressers were completed--then he would be unable to distinguish between the dressers, assuming that he and his friends carried out the same tasks which were required to assemble. This, although his dresser as its final Unit was a classifyed something A and those of his friends all classifyed somethings B.

That is, that in differentiating between classifyed somethings A and classifyed somethings B , we make it clear whether one«s own CPU-general "originally created" this Unit , or if this Unit "only" copied other CPU-generals through their agreement (whatever rules they might follow).

The fact is, however, that the CPU-general is the creator in both cases.

(Now, someone could ask the following questions:

We note some of the CPU-general «s effects which give rise to different consequences. First, we distinguish between the CPU and the active CPUreality , and secondly, we differentiate between the active CPUreality and the passive CPUreality .

Why is this so?

As condensations of the CPU have no direct effect on reality, (i.e. we defined the "CPU " as the ability responsible for recall- and extra-experiences; this means responsible for those experiences which other Bewusstseins do not find in reality. It is not definitively clear today as to whether an unconscious agreement, with reference to coming to understanding of the recall- and extra-experiences of other CPU-generals, exists or not. This all depends, once again, on the type of agreement. The fact is, that recall- and extra-experiences of other Bewusstseins do not create those types of experiences which real-experiences do.); so compositions of the active CPUreality have to be precisely copied by all Bewusstseins within the agreement.

The active CPUreality can only compel other CPU-generals to "copy" its classifyed somethings obligingly as a part of their reality; when the active CPUreality itself puts its Units together with the aid of other, further classifyed somethings. (This fact is linked with the rules of the agreement. We find classifyed somethings which act as helping-classifyed somethings for the active CPUreality in real-experiences as the body of his own awareness in reality, but also as the machines (i.e. classifyed somethings which are created by the awareness« body).

That means that the distinction between the CPU and the active CPUreality is one stated by the agreement«s rules. It would be good to take a look at these rules. But this task is not a part of our examination. Suffice it to point out that these rules exist, in which the CPU and active CPUreality function in many different spheres of activity.

Let‘s return once again to the active CPUreality and the passive CPUreality .

For as both the Units of the CPU and the active CPUreality are originally created by us (even though in both cases, the influence to construct precisely these classifyed somethings could come from an array of possible reasons), with the passive CPUreality, we have to copy the classifyed somethings of other CPU-generals based on reality.

Why these classifyed somethings are obligingly copied, is hidden within the rules of the agreement (which, as we have already mentioned, we do not want to nor can examine here). The fact is, that all three CPU-general abilities build Units.

A possible question can be added here:

Every construction of a classifyed something occurs because Units are made through the CPU-general .

The following could be said:

The difference between the active CPUreality (and relatively, the CPU ) on the one hand and the passive CPUreality on the other hand is so difficult, that what one does (active CPUreality ) and what others do to me (passive CPUreality ) cannot be explained through experience alone (i.e. which positions various classifyed somethings take within the cosmos of our awareness « contents), rather this determination has also to do with where these Units come from.

That is, one asks himself whether the classifyed somethings copied from the passive CPUreality have a Unit, which, purely technically, can be differentiated from other Units (of the CPU and active CPUreality ).

That would mean that the Unit of the Self would stand as technical Units for the active CPUreality (and CPU ); and that we would have to have a Unit with "another code" for the passive CPUreality (indeed, the code that determines that this Unit is from the passive- CPUreality ).

In order to be able to have such a Unit , we must have two original-determinations with us at the first experience:

First, a Unit of the Self for everything that the "self is" (this, of course, would include the passive CPUreality ; because it is also the "self").

Also, there must be a "Unit of the not-of-the-self".

This Unit would represent all that which was not originally created by oneself.

If the existence of these two original-determinations were to exist, then this would mean that the differentiation of what one does and what another does is not dependent upon the position of the classifyed something in the cosmos of awareness« contents, but rather occurs through the technical fixing of the classifyed something, which one has something to do with (i.e. one recognizes whether these are classifyed somethings A or classifyed somethings B through the classifyed somethings themselves).

For this is precisely the assumption of the question (that that which one "originally" creates must have another "code" than that which other Bewusstseins "originally" created). And it is first through this premise that we have come to the question of two original-determinations.

However, reality points out quickly enough that this is not the case.

For the truth is, we are only sure that we have created classifyed somethings A when we know totally consciously that our body was involved, or when this classifyed something has our own special shapes (which we can then recognize that it is something of ours).

That means, we are only totally conscious that a classifyed something is a classifyed something A or classifyed something B when its place value within the cosmos of our awareness « contents is totally conscious to us.

If, on the other hand, the condensation were responsible, through a Unit of the not-of-the-Self, for letting us know that this classifyed something were not from us--then it must be immediately totally conscious to us, returning again to the example of building the dressers, which dresser is one«s own and which belongs to another of all the appearingly identical dressers.

And finally in coming to the simplest and clearest argument against such a presumption (asuming two original-determinations):

It is not necessary to accept the Unit of the not-Self , for this all occurs even without it.)

Let us again observe an example through which we can explain that reality, with all of its facets, only emerges through the interplay of the the AFF and the CPU-general. This example shows us as well how particular new-creations of classifyed somethings have the effect that one, with their help, can have better access to already-existing classifyed somethings within the cosmos of awareness « contents, in order to make these until now unconscious classifyed somethings totally conscious.

For better clarification, the following example is given:

If one assembles a bicycle, his passive CPUreality "finds" the diverse classifyed somethings B (= Units ). These are: two wheels, handles, a light, two pedals, etc.. And the active CPUreality constructs further and bigger Units . First, a wheel will be connected to a chain, then the second wheel will be added, etc.. Until finally, the bike has been put together. That is, a larger Unit "evolves" due to the active CPUreality ; a Unit which itself consists of many sub-units (tires, handles, etc.), whose sub-units are still constructed from further sub-units , and so on. This new Unit (= the bicycle) is actually a classifyed something A "built" from a number of classifyed somethings B .

This Unit (bike) itself was created within a sphere of still further Units (i.e. was itself only a sub-unit of a much larger; namely, one«s entire impresion). Namely, the yard one assembled the bike in; the weather at the time; one«s body, which put out the effort, etc..

These further Units (one«s body, bike, sounds, etc.) themselves continuously change, as do their relationships to one another. Some new Units are added (a new sound, a neighbor turns up, a bird flies by, etc.) and other Units "disappear." This happens because of the agreement. That means that we are "dependent" on others« active CPUreality ; which means that our passive CPUreality is "forced" to "understand" the actions of other Bewusstseins. And the "time" which passes is itself the expression of these continuous changes, which come into being through the actions of all the Bewusstseins with which we come into contact.

That is, while our subject was still busy with the bike (= his active CPUreality ), the world developed further (= His passive CPUreality (and, of course, the passive-passive CPUreality , although he is not conscious of this) imitated the "creations" of the active CPUreality of other Bewusstseins based on the rules of the agreement.)

Now that he has assembled the bicycle, then he can leave his yard and ride to the city or a lake nearby. In doing so, his body (classifyed something A ) and the bike (classifyed something A ) form yet another Unit (classifyed something A ) within his impression (in which his body and the bike are "integrated"). And not only does his body (which sweats, etc.) and bike (whose pedals constantly change their position, whose frame gets worn out, etc.)--that is, the sub-classifyed somethings which construct the classifying soemthings "bike" and "body"--change, also the entire impression around him "changes." That is, he sees more houses (classifyed somethings B ), more cars (classifyed somethings B ), and is even in a totally different environment than when in his yard.

Had the "change" of his surroundings, as long as he was in the yard, taken place without his own participation (= action), then the change of the "surroundings" occurs through his actions (namely, in that he rides his bike and changes the "place"). As this change took place within this "period of time" (namely, in the "time" in which all Bewusstseins , which are a part of the agreement, put X action (X is the "position" for a number) "into place" (which all "coordinate" with one another) ), this change was only possible through the results of the Units of bike and the individual. For without the bike, he could not have managed this specific "change of surroundings" in the same time, purely on physical grounds.

In other words, one has brought "his body" into connection with other Units (= other houses, cars, people, landscapes, etc.) through his actions within the agreement. He has only to thank the Unit "me and my bike" for the fact that he was able to successfully "complete" such a change of his surroundings within this "period of time" (= the period in which all Bewusstseins have put a specific number of further "actions" into place), which is also a determination. That is to say, he has not "strengthened" his actions simply through his body (classifyed something A ), but also through the help of the bike (here, classifyed something A, yet usually classifyed something B ) in order to widen his "ability to act" in specific areas of the very complex "agreement."

He has given Units their specific "contentual form" through the compilation of special sub-units (= a bike put together through a number of parts). Through the use of his actions of a "booster" (the bike), he has created more room for his actions to maneuver within particular areas of the agreement.

That is, the bike first receives its significance (as a Unit ) through all that which this Unit can "produce" in collaboration with its subject. Namely, it allows his body (Unit ) to more quickly (Unit ) change the total impression (Unit ) (e.g. a city) entirely (not any longer city, but something else), in order to arrive at completely new (= not only a gradual displacement, such as if one simply remains in his yard as "time" goes by, but rather an actual change of the entire contents) impresions (e.g. a lake outside the city; one sweats, etc.); impressions which he couldn«t have arrived at so easily without the general known existance of the bike.

What we are able to determine based on this example with the bike applies to all classifyed somethings . With every classifyed something , one can determine its "significance," the "place value" (just as in our bike-example) based on this, and under which circumstances one joins certain other classifyed somethings with it.

That is to say that everything in reality (= all Units ) has its significance simply in view of something else (= other Units ). Every Unit gets its special "place" within the structure of the agreement with other Bewusstseins based on the conditions under which this Unit is "created," with what other Units it is in "connection," and from which sub-units it is constructed.

In reality, no Unit on its own is something beyond the relationship to all other Bewusstseins .

This means that on one hand, a classifyed something gets its significance in reality based on the conditions under which it was built. With this, it is determined where this classifyed something has its "place" within the cosmos of all the classifyed somethings in "reality" (= our agreement).

In addition to this, one can still give a classifyed something of reality his own very personal (actually, supplementary) significance (i.e. somehow associate extra-experiences with this classifyed something ).

(Let us never forget that in reality every one of our actions itself helps to alter reality. Because reality--according to the arrangement (whose individual laws we do not know)--"compels" all other Bewusstseins to "understand" this action through its passive CPUreality .

That means that if the active CPUreality presents us with all of the classifyed somethings necessary together for "riding the bike," then the CPUreality "causes" (based on the agreement) all Bewusstseins , with which we could come into contact, to accept this. And conversely, every action of other Bewusstseins will change reality for us.)

This also means that we can construct reality (as well as recall- and extra-experiences ) with only the original-determination. For reality, as we experience it every day, is put together from such condensations, which as Units only have that significance which is given to them by us. They receive this significance through their assemblage and their consequences, which they have for new condensations.

Whatever one does in reality--whether he attempts survival or wants to enjoy himself--through this process he always changes the "Units" which surround him. That means that everything one does has a "purpose" to come to still other (similar or dissimilar) Units (experiences). In other words, everything of classifyed somethings which "surrounds one" only has its "significance" for him in relation to other classifyed somethings.

Of course, reality is far more complex than recall- and extra-experiences. Simply becasue reality is not only constructed from the "creation" of one‘s CPU-general alone, but also from the "creation" of all other Bewusstseins which enter this form of agreement. That is, one«s Bewusstsein "functions" and "feels" in a complex environment based on all the "creations" of all the Bewusstseins which build up reality (also all of the classifyed somethings BB, which can "serve" one--in unconsciously --as sources os inspiration, creativity, and even new ideas).

All of our experiences, anyways, that our Bewusstsein once had and will have (at least as "Bewusstsein ," i.e. as we know it) evolve purely from the effects of our CPU-general in the AFF .

Let us turn once again to the television; which is stricking in its own special way (namely, by being its own "impression," as well as conveying still further impressions). How does it come about that through this medium, we arrive at impressions of events in reality, which we would have otherwise not been totally conscious of?

Take the example of the small village again. The "reality" in this village is nothing more than a vast amount of classifyed somethings B or classifyed somethings BB . The T.V., however, doesn«t have a dissimilar function from the bicycle in the relationship between us and this vast number of classifyed somethings . Both act as the classifyed somethings "created" by us, whose function it is to make our total conscious access to specific classifyed somethings possible more quickly, which we otherwise could not experience totally consciously so easily (or could not experience at all).

The purpose of the bike in close connection with one«s body (he "rides" it) is that physically, he is able to get to another area much more quickly. In the case of watching T.V., we can only see and hear those "pictures"--not be there physically--but it is theoretically possible to receive "immediate" "pictures" of all around the world.

How does this materialize?

Within the complex cosmos of every Bewusstsein «s contents, which coordinate with one another through the CPUreality , certain other Bewusstseins "altogether" develop particular possibilities (possibilities which make it principally possible for all people to totally consciously experience a classifyed something , which is not conscious to these people, but which through other people who "experience" this classifyed something totally consciously and who use the "aid" of the T.V.«s technology when watching this classifyed something, in order to make this clasifying something principally possible for all people to experience totally consciously ) to be able to more quickly make their unconscious classifyed somethings BB totally conscious.

And, of course, all other Bewusstseins (a part of the agreement) "accepted" this process in putting it as classifyed somethings BB into their personal cosmos through the passive passive CPUreality .

That means that all Bewusstseins came to determinations (= the technology of T.V.), whose existence make it possible for them to have easier access to many classifyed somethings B , to have them more "directly" (= without "detours" through many other classifyed somethings before one finally reaches the particular classifyed somethings B ).

"Units " are thus created within the "rules" of the agreement (precisely television technology), whose job it was to make it principally possible for all people to quickly become totally conscious of particular Units (e.g. foreign cities), without having to go through the conventional, complicated way through many other Units (e.g. the many hundreds of miles one would have to go without "watching T.V." in order to "discover" this city (which actually "in practice" would mean that one would never experience anything in the city and the sporting event taking place there this evening, since it isn«t possible after work to drive there and return in time for work the next day) ).

That means such kinds of "Units " whose combination (= union) with a number of other Units, makes many larger Units (all the people and activities which are necessary for the recording of a scene, and all the "technology" and people needed for the "receiving" of the "signals"), which in turn makes the total conscious access to many other Units possible (= everything one can film).

The television thus takes on a rather similar function within the CPUreality «s creations of all people (but only similar)--still, from far fewer possibilities of access--to the function of some of the CPU-general«s abilities within the AFF: In both cases, the most diverse of classifyed somethings within the AFF are "compared" in order then to make some of these classifyed somethings totally conscious. (The CPU-general as memory or thought combination; the T.V. as the object of recording reality or the transmission of that created only for the purpose of pleasure (films, etc.) .)

This access via T.V. to a number of classifyed somethings BB , which are otherwise not able to be made totally conscious (of course, in principle, it is possible, but it hardly ever happens in practice), does not however occur as they would be found if we were "physically" "there." Technology is not yet so developed (technology=the classifyed something which is created for the purpose for principally all people within the agreement (and in this way, within the cosmos of every Bewusstsein «s contents) to have total conscious access to "distanced" classifyed somethings (seen from the standpoint of reality) ). As it is, we all only receive a transmitted image of reality.

Let us not forget that these classifyed somethings (= all of this technology which first makes T.V. possible) were only created for the purpose to make it possible for us to totally consciously experience "Units " of "reality," of which we would have never totally consciously experienced without these classifyed somethings (although this is, of course, theoretically possible even without technology; seen practically, hardly anyone is able to do it without technology. T.V. took over, so to speak, an "aiding function" for the abilities of our awareness ).

That is, these classifyed somethings (= technology of television) have, within the laws of the agreement, become that appearance which "appears" when these classifyed somethings satisfy the "laws of the agreement" (we do not know precisely what these are, only that they exist) to provide a possibility of access to specific classifyed somethings.

Not in the sense of the physical presence of the individual Bewusstsein, which uses the technology of television, at this "place and position" where these specific classifyed somethings are "positioned" within our complex cosmos; but in the sense of the information (similar to having a blurry memory instead of "real" impression) concerning what these specific classifyed somethings look like.

Because the community of all people have this "possibility to access" all "real" events, which actually takes over the "function" which the CPU-general enacts within our awareness (among others), this possibility«s (= technology of television) "actual" purpose can only be to "transmit" and not simply be there (even though it itself is a "visible" creation of our CPUreality ) "itself" (that is, without its "ability" to transmit).

In other words, the purpose of its "creation" is not simply to achieve its "appearance" (= as it itself appears to us (e.g. diverse colored dots on a two-dimensional screen, etc.) ), but rather is for the purpose to be useful to us, within reality, by being able to totally consciously excercise faster and better access to classifyed somethings (e.g. to see the village on the T.V. screen).

As this possibility is not the CPU-general itself (even though it adopts a very similar position within reality), not only must it (= technology of television) be assembled as a classifyed something and made total conscious; our CPU-general must also be, so to speak, set up "once again" in order to make that from the "real" "television technology" totally conscious of why this classifyed something was actually "created": Namely, to create an "image of reality" that we would not be able to receive, or not so easily recieve, without it.

That means that all that which is necessary in order to shoot the T.V. picture, to transfer it, and wherever a T.V. set is, also to receive it, are special classifyed somethings . For the registering of these specific classifyed somethings, we need, as is the case for all classifyed somethings, "all" (i.e. usual for this) of the abilities of our CPU-general .

In order for the purpose of these special classifyed somethings to be "met," the CPU-general must "work on" their "message" (i.e. the coloered dots on the screen) once again. Namely, it is through a comparison with all former arrangements and "manifestations" of all former classifyed somethings that the CPU-general manages the "most probable" arrangement of the dots to very specific Units.

Every type of communication of Bewusstseins with one another within our reality (whether T.V., language, or sign-language) consists itself first and foremost of classifyed somethings (T.V. screen, volume, two hands which take up particular positions), which through the CPU-general «s effect in the AFF , become totally conscious to us.

It is then the CPU-general that "once again" "works through" these classifyed somethings in order to make us, through the comparison with all former classifyed somethings, totally conscious of the "purpose" of their "manifestations" (that is, for example, to show the impression of a city, the significance of a special order of sounds (of a sentence), the ordering of specific hand positions to execute specific expressions).

That is, communication within our reality distinguishes itself in that the "desired" classifyed somethings are not "directly," but rather made totally conscious through a "further plane."

There are two abilities which are themselves indescribable, but which through their effects with us are indirectly noticable and describable; abilities that make our Bewusstsein , our awareness: the CPU-general and the AFF .

The combination of the two create our Bewusstsein . And the further consequences of these abilities creates the entire universe of our awareness « contents with all all its possible nuances.

From the CPU-general, we come into contact with abilities that we describe as being the decision1, decision2, future-CPU, now-CPU, CPU, active CPUreality , and the passive CPUreality . It is possible that still other abilities of the CPU-general exist which we have not noticed to this point; or for which our awareness hasn«t found an adequate field of activity.

All of the CPU-general «s abilities which we have become aware of up to now are only varieties of two basic abilities of the CPU-general .

In general, we can say:

The fact that The CPU-general functions in the way in which we notice it here “with us“ is because:

it can build Units and

can come to an agreement (or agreements).

(That is, it alone can "create" and can "copy" the creations of other CPU-generals ).

The principle ability of coming to agreements with other CPU-generals must have taken place before the construction of our Bewusstsein . For without this ability, the CPU-general could not "copy" anything at all.

That is to say that through the special order of the classifyed somethings within the cosmos of the Bewusstsein «s contents, we can determine if one originally created this classifyed something himself, or if it was another CPU-general «s doing.

We do not know, however, what rules this agreement, which we call reality, is based on. We do not even know if there are further agreements that are unconscious to us.

What we do know, is that the ability to enter agreements with other CPU-generals must have existed before the formation of the Bewusstsein.

The CPU-general thus has two basic abilities:

The ability to create Units and the ability to enter into agreements.

Why only two basic abilities?

Because it is through the union with the AFF that further consequences result from these basic abilities, which we then describe as the future-CPU , the now-CPU , or decision .

The CPU-general can fundamentally construct Units , and this is precisely what it does.

That means, as we have already said, that the CPU-general, as soon as it comes into contact with the AFF , "continuously" assembles Units. In other words, that it is "active" here “with us“.

Through its bond with the AFF, the CPU-general can become totally conscious (or even unconscious ) of its Units .

Through that first experience, the CPU-general has been able to define (and in this way, been able to create it in the first place) awareness, Bewusstsein, through the construction of the Unit of the Self .

Based on the fact of the CPU-general‘s union with the AFF, the CPU-general creates Units, these Units become totally conscious to it; it becomes Bewusstsein, awareness and is always active.

Through the CPU-general‘s activities that are given because of its union with the AFF, the CPU-general must form Units (Units of the Self ) beginning with the very first experience.

Through this initial situation, this "must" has a vast number of possibilities of which classifyed somethings will be constructed beginning with the first experience.

On one hand, this "must" and on the other hand, the infinite number of possibilities--continue to exist through every new clasifyed something -formation.

The processes which we call decisions (decision1 and decision2 ) are nothing more than the necessities which come about under the circumstances of that “must“ and the infinite number of possibilities with every new classifyed something -formation.

What about the future-CPU and the now-CPU ?

Both have to do with comparisons.

First in the case of te future-CPU : in order to be able to now anticipate all possible combinations of classifyed somethings that can occur in the future. The now-CPU : in order to notify the CPU-general, with the help of decision1 , what the CPU-general should assemble as the next classifyed something; in other words, which combinations of classifyed somethings are desired for total conscious experiences.

That is, both work--mostly unconsciously --at comparing classifyed somethings with one another; creating new classifyed somethings (in order to be able to totally consciously inform us as to what we we would like to have as experiences); or at the very least, at combining former classifyed somethings with one another.

Creating new classifyed somethings and combining them with one another are all special abilities of the CPU-general which exist only because of its ability to be able to construct Units within the AFF.

And what is a comparison? Or: How do we arrive at comparison?

The very first comparison comes into being as soon as the CPU-general forms two classifyed somethings which are totally conscious or unconscious, because of their reflection in the AFF .

That could be, for example:

Unit 2 = (unit of the self )

Unit 3 = (unit of the self + unit of the self )

When situated next to one another, these Units show the awareness, totally consciously or unconsciously, that they are different.

That means that the ability to "distinguish" is "automatically" "created" through effects of the CPU-general within the AFF .

Because of the ability to simultaneously form the most diverse of classifyed somethings and

the ability to bring these together into the AFF,

the awareness is always conscious or unconscious of whatever distinguishes (= is not one and the same).

With this, we have shown that everything which the future-CPU and now-CPU can do comes into being because of the CPU-general «s two basic principles (namely, to form Units and to come to agreements) and because of the AFF «s "ability" to "reflect" (and in doing so, it first makes something "real" or "existent").

XV.

We now know more concerning how our Bewusstsein "was formed."

We also know how we arrive at all of our experiences and also, that every further formation of Units can result in even further, more complexly constructed Units ; in any case, however, every new Unit is "integrated" (purely through its "creation") into an ever more complex environment of Units (= the cosmos of the contents of our awareness).

Here is where our question comes into play: Is this the entire "purpose" of our "existence" as Bewusstsein? Namely, to create more and more (even more complex) Units and to bring them into a steadily growing environment (= the entire cosmos of all our classifyed somethings in the AFF).

Is this not an endless task? Will it not always be possible to arrive at other more complex Units than before? Are our efforts as Bewusstseins endless?

In one word, we are asking about the “purpose“ of everything, e.g. why we have evperiences; why we are Bewusstsein, awareness?

With this question, further questions arise:

First, we have to ask if such a thing as a purpose exsists at all in regard to the activity, the action of our Bewusstsein (and with that in regard to our Bewusstsein itself, for we experience our Bewusstsein (and first with that experience our Bewusstsein comes to “life“ in the first place) because of its activities).

If the answer to this question is yes, then the next question is as follows: Is it possible to look for a purpose which aims to be more than only construcing more and more complex Units? Are we even allowed to demand more of our existence as Bewusstseins than simply arriving at even more complex Units?

What is a "purpose" at all?

To see a "purpose" somewhere would mean, considered practically (= in that way as this event takes place in our awareness ), that there is a specific "goal" to reach. For if a "purpose" exists, one would also want to see this "realized."

And since our existence as Bewusstsein --as we know--leads to ongoing, continuously-made decisions, we must--in order to reach a "purpose" (if we are not in conformity with this) or in order to remain in conformity with this "purpose" (if we have yet reached the "purpose")--continuously make "right" (that is, according to the "purpose") "decisions."

On the other hand, with every decision which is made, an objective is in effect, and therefore a purpose exists.

(Every objective is an objective because the individual who makes it wants to reach a specific goal. With this we can say: Wherever an objective is, a purpose also exists.)

(There is only "purpose"; there are first objectives (=goals) first when these are laid down by either the future-CPU or the now-CPU . For another way would not make it possible for us to even deal with something; that is to decide for or against something.)

Let us now look at whether the assumption--that Bewusstsein «s existence (and in this way, Life) has a "purpose" which goes beyond (higher) simply coming to "new" and always more complex Units--is even "justified." That is, to justify from the very start, if such an assumption is not complete nonsense.

To this we can also say the following:

Wherever the now-CPU or the future-CPU sets up an objective in which it is established to arrive at more than simply ever "newer" and complexer Units (this objective is decided upon by the now-CPU or the future-CPU in service of the now-CPU (in order to keep with particular rules in attainment of a now-CPU decision) ), a purpose exists which goes beyond simply arriving at ever "newer" and complexer Units .

(It should always be taken into account that an objective (a purpose), which aims at more than accumulating ever more complex Units , musn«t therefore be the "highest," "most conclusive" objective for us Bewusstsein .)

That is, it is quite possible that there are objectives, and with them a particular purpose, which go beyond the pure accumulation of classifyed somethings . It is just as possible that the highest and most conclusive goal for us is found in more and more accumulations of Units . Both are possible, and there is nothing which can contradict the investigation of these possibilities.

Each of our "actions" itself is an objective or indirectly so, by being under the obligation of an objective. The reason for this is that everything we do is either for the purpose of survival (Decision-Type S) or because our being unconscious (or being conscious ) "forces" us to act (Decision-Type N and N-2).

Because on the way to reach an objective (whether it is to survive or to fulfill our desires) we are forced to make so many sub-decisions (as we have already explained it is the CPU-general which constantly forces us to decide what we want to experience) that we have to make sure that every sub-decision corresponds to the previously made objective.

And with that, every decision is a “doing“, an action towards a goal (be it to correspond to previously made decisions; be it to set an absolute new objective):

This means that every decision is either desired by us (because of the now-CPU), or at least necessary in order to reach a previously set objective which is desired by the now-CPU (Here, the now-CPU decides the rules to be followed, which the future-CPU drew up in order to be able to come to desired outcome.).

"Total purposelessness"; that is, a decision that is not influenced by the now-CPU ; however, does not exist at all.

(It is true that there are "wrong" decisions, which the now-CPU compels us to and later regrets under other circumstances. That is what is described as "pointless" in everyday language. In reality, though, it was the decision of the now-CPU . And in this manner, it is not "entirely purposeless" (in that way as we have just applied this concept).)

That is to say that if there were a purpose which goes beyond the pure constructing of further classifyed somethings then the desire (the now-CPU ) must exist within us or the necessity must warrant that this purpose be reached (we could only deal with the necessity (independent of whether we already totally consciously know in dealing with this subject that this is a necessity or not), as we have already explained, if this dealing is because of a decision of the now-CPU ).

We can therefore say:

If the now-CPU were to refuse such a purpose, we wouldn«t have the characteristics of a purpose. That is, there wouldn«t be anything in us to pursue this "route." And this purpose would therefore be practically nonexistent for us. (Because the purpose could never be a goal, it could never be a purpose at all.)

Thus, all of our "actions" (which are furthermore dependent on decisions (since it could have at least been decided not to do them) ) must answer to a goal. And with this, are themselves goals. (Either because the now-CPU wants precisely to reach this condition (of the actions); or because these actions are necessary on the way to a goal established by the now-CPU .)

A single decision is just as much a "goal" as an extremely complex objective (i.e. an objective which demands multiple decisions, which are all to serve this goal).

How would one precisely define a goal?

In every reality (that is, in every agreement with other Bewusstseins , independent of how many agreements a Bewusstsein enters) there, a goal stands for the realization of one«s ideas within this reality. That means that one«s extra-experiences (or unconscious classifyed somethings within the AFF, which influence our now-CPU in that way so that the now-CPU decides to transform specific classifyed somethings into an impression) become real-experiences .

The reason for setting these goals can be recognized totally consciously (e.g. does one want to go by plane to visit his relatives since going by car would take so much longer).

Or, the reason can remain unconscious . (One thinks he is a benevolent guy when he helps a friend, but in reality he is scared to anger his friend (unconsciously ) if he were to refuse his friend«s need for help.)

How do the goals that should be reached in the real world (if they receive their final "fulfillment" (=attainment) in reality) actually show themselves?

They lead (purely observed from the standpoint of reality) to the construction of further classifyed somethings (both through one«s active CPUreality and as the other Bewusstseins« reaction to this--also through their active CPUrealities).

The question arises: Are there still other ways in which the reaching of a goal in reality can show itself?

No. Every goal that reaches its fulfillment within reality shows itself (whatever content it has) in the construction of further somethings.

At the moment, we do not know precisely (i.e. we can only assume) why we enter "agreements." (If this occurs on a "voluntary" basis), nor why we are even compelled to enter them (if this is not voluntary). That is, we don«t know if a still greater "purpose" remains hidden within reality than simply arriving at ever bigger and more complex classifyed somethings .

But, if a greater purpose is hidden within the agreements of awarenesses (Bewusstseins), then the definition of the fulfillment of this purpose (and with that, the fulfillment of the purpose itself) is not based on the possibilities which reality offers because reality is too little to deduce such a purpose from it.

This means the definition (and with that the fulfillment) of this purpose has to be found in other “places“. Reality can only be an aid in reaching this purpose. For in reality itself, we can only come to more and more classifying somethings.

That means that all goals (every purpose) which can be fulfilled in reality (i.e. not "serve" a "higher" purpose beyond reality itself) are to be understood, in that they serve the realization of an idea (i.e. the transforming of an extra-experience into a real experience) or the realization of an unconscious desire (who themselves "came into being" through previous decisions of the now-CPU) and lead without exception to the creation of further classifyed somethings.

The now-CPU "knows" what one expects from these types of newly created classifyed somethings.

One of the possible reasons could be that the conversion of extra-experiences into real-experiences can make one more "easily" and more "comprehensively" totally conscious of the formation of his own classifyed somethings .

Another reason could be that one wants to compell others to create, because of his creations, those classifyed somethings B which he wants to find in reality.

Or that one wants, because of his creations (e.g. in moving his body to another place) to transform classifyed somethings BB to classifyed somethings B.

With this knowledge, the next question arises: Is there then a goal which itself is not fulfilled in reality? A goal (or several goals) which becomes realized in recall- and extra-experiences ?

In any case, such goals cannot be founded on the fact that certain extra-experiences are "transformed" into extra-experiences --how this happens between real-experiences and extra-experiences where goals are those, that extra-experiences transform into real-experiences . For if one has an "idea" which he wants to see "realized" in an extra-experience manner, he must not really want to see it realized. For the moment he has the idea--it has already been realized.

What makes a goal a goal (and thus every purpose a purpose)?

That something is "reached" which is not automatically reached from the very beginning and (or) not for always?

And who within one«s Bewusstsein determines that he can "reach" everything?

This is the effect of the CPU-general within the AFF .

That is, even when one has a goal in reality--to define and well as reach--everything is simply the abilities of his CPU-general in the AFF . And in reality, it is the CPU-general «s ability to "create" classifyed somethings , which were copied (i.e. were "accepted") as classifyed somethings from other Bewusstseins in the agreement between Bewusstseins .

What could the CPU-general «s ability in the AFF be, concerning the goals, which are realized in recall- and extra-experiences ?

In any case, this is the ability to make "total consciousness ." For this is a goal which one can imagine without it--simply because one imagined it--immediately "being there" already.

One can think, for example: "I want to remember exactly what I had for breakfast every day of my vacation last year."

The ability to remember this is only possible with the effect of the CPU-general in the AFF . This, because the CPU-general "assembles" a precise memory of this totally consciously . For this was what the goal demanded as far as the content was concerned.

But, that means for goals to be fulfilled in recall-experiences or extra-experiences , we need new compositions--just as we need them for real-experiences (as we know, every experience is newly "composed").

But in this case, we don«t reach the goal in transforming an already-existing composition in reality. Instead, we need to have better total conscious "access" to the abilities of theCPU-general to reach the goal.

That is, although one also arrives at further classifyed somethings here, he still improves --in terms of the objective to have more total conscious access -- his totally conscious understanding of and control of the abilities of his Bewusstsein.

In the case of the vacation-example it was the ability of awaress to be able to recall details totally consciously; that is, to be able to understand to "copy" (i.e. to compose them again) the classifyed somethings in the AFF "correctly" and "completely."

Let«s look at a further example for goals which can be reached in recall- and extra-experiences .

Someone wants to write a song. Someone wants to construct a house. Both cases are concerned first with creating something; not to convert that something into reality. That is, to first know "in the head" how the melody goes or what the body of the house should look like.

The objective is thus: One wants a melody that he likes. Another wants a house that he likes. Both cases, therefore, deal with a goal, which when reached, is solely managed in the manner of an extra-experience.

In both cases, we deal with the fact that we use unconscious classifyed-somethings (namely those classifyed somethings which determine what direction the condensations must go in so that they are desired) for guidance.

And in considering these unconscious classifyed somethings, other classifyed somethings (which could be parts of larger Units which are already in the AFF; but they could also be larger existing Units themselves) are newly arranged totally consciously.

But, it is also possible that completely new combinations of classifyed somethings are assembled (= Units which in this form of condensation has not yet been in the cosmos of the Bewusstsein«s contents).

But, as already mentioned, it cannot be completely rejected that these "Units" already existed as a classifyed something BB in the AFF, and are now put together as a "new" outcome and made totally conscious .

This means that every goal which reaches fulfillment in recall- or extra-experiences can be reached if the abilities of awareness (= CPU-general, AFF) are under control in such a way that the desired classifyed somethings can become totally conscious (it might be in order to indulge in our desires (Decision-Types N and N2) but also in order to survive (Decision-Types S). (This is because there are objectives to reach in extra-experiences which, once they are fulfilled, become converted into reality to help us to survive.))

All of this is holds true, however, for reality:

In reality, the question is also having awareness« abilities under control so that we can "create" all of those classifyed somethings A which have to be imitated by all of the other Bewusstseins (those that are in agreement with us) and in this way indirectly or directly, as a result, permit us to find the classifyed somethings B that we ourselves want to "find" (this means to be able, in the case of classifyed somethings BB, to transform them into classifyed sometheings B; and in the case of the desire to come to not yet existing classifyed somethings B, to be able to bring other Bewusstseins to create those classifyed somethings B); and furthermore, we manage--through them becoming reality--in detail to "make" considerations more conscious , which first as extra-experiences, were only roughly clear.

However, in reality, it is also the case that we are also dependent on those classifyed somethings which other Bewusstseins --with which we are in agreement--compel us to.

Still, the objectives--which should be reached in reality--can always only be as follows:

That in reality, we want to totally consciously "experience" specific classifyed somethings

(Be it through the passive CPUreality which compels us (through other Bewusstseins , which were first compelled through our active CPUreality ); be it through the active CPUreality itself (through the better "visibility" (= making totally conscious ) in reality) which "makes" us more totally conscious (especially in detail) of the classifyed somethings of the CPU.)

And it is only possible to reach those specific classifyed somethings through the awareness « abilities (i.e. we ourselves behave in such a manner that, despite so much resistance from other Bewusstseins , we get closer to our goals).

That means that in order to reach each objective--whether in real- or recall- or extra-experiences --it all depends on having the awareness « abilities (CPU-general ; AFF ) "under control."

In addition to this, any effort to reach an objective--whether in real- or recall- or extra-experiences --leads to the construction of "new" classifyed somethings.

It is possible even that this is our upmost goal, our greatest purpose (namely, to construct further classifyed somethings ). Perhaps this isn«t so bad after all. Still, we have the question: Is there a single goal which goes beyond simply building more classifyed somethings (in all forms of experiences)?

It is certain that everything we "do" (in all real- or recall- or extra-experiences ) is a "goal." Furthermore, it is clear that we are able to set more and more complex goals which become respectively more and more difficult to reach. All of these goals receive their "fulfillment" (i.e. their attainment) in the way that they are reached (i.e. that the desired classifyed something becomes totally conscious).

We can formulate the question another way:

Is there a goal, above and beyond which there are no other goals? There would be no other goals simply because all other possible goals would only be a part of this highest goal.

That is, a goal when attained that both the now-CPU and future-CPU would not have any further demands to make (that is, all of our desires as well as all of our necessities (in the case of survival as well as any other reasons which we are not aware of at the present time) would be completely fulfilled).

This formulation would contain all goals which go beyond the "making" of more and more classifyed somethings (if such goals exist), as well as contain a goal which reads (if there is such a thing): Perhaps there is truly a "final" condensation of all classifyed somethings which can be reached.

This, simply because this formulation intends from the beginning to somehow be the all-embracing and final goal of our awareness.

The question which then immediately comes to mind is:

Can we assume at all that there is a "final goal"?

For our Bewusstsein is comprised of the CPU-general, the AFF, and their effects. That is, it is through the effects of the CPU-general in the AFF that we can even speak of the concept "final." Applying this concept to the CPU-general (the same is true for the AFF ), however, is something we cannot do.

Let us not forget: If we are in search for a final goal (and in this way, a final "purpose"), then we mean in relation to our "actions." That is, the effects of the CPU-general in the AFF.

That is, with the attainment of this final goal, the CPU-general would have "reached" everything "possible" in the AFF.

That is, "finality" would not apply directly to the CPU-general and the AFF "themselves" (which isn«t even possible since both are not even subject to concepts), but rather, it would apply to their effect; in the sense that everything which can be "attained" through their effect--is attained.

That is, that it is not with this absolute goal«s attainment that all of the CPU-general «s abilities in the AFF are "put to a stop," but rather are simply no longer necessary to be applied (at least not on the level of the Bewusstsein --as we have described the Bewusstsein to be). This is so simply because everything that could have been reached would be reached.

It is possible to assume such a final and absolute goal.

Even if it is not clear at the moment that with the construction of classifyed somethings --actually, an infinite process--how a "final" goal can be reached in which all other goals are included (even the continuation of the construction of classifyed somethings (which would also be goals; even if they too were only subordinate to the final goal) ). It is, however, possible to assume this.

Either there is actually a most final goal of our Bewusstsein (as we define the Bewusstsein ) (that is, in the case of the Bewusstsein «s "actions," since only through these, can our Bewusstsein even have goals (= purpose)), or, we can at least assume the existence of such a final goal (for it is principally possible to set goals; and thus, nothing can be said against assuming that an absolutely final and highest goal exists).

At this point, we can formulate our question in this way: which goal is made in such a way that it is the highest goal we can reach?

Because we live with goals, it is without a doubt that goals exist which are “higher“ than others (this means they include more goals than others do).

With this, we can find at least a goal which is “higher“ than those goals which we are totally conscious of at the moment. The question then remains: Can we even find a final and absolute goal?

At this point, another question arises: Independent of whether there is an absolute and "final" goal or only a higher goal than one we normally set in everyday life--why should we even look for the highest goal (i.e. the greatest purpose) possible to us? Why shouldn«t we be satisfied to simply survive (Decision-Type S) and indulge in our likings (Decsision Type N and N2)?

The answer is as follows:

It it simply because our entire set of experiences are based on goals. That is, it is "within our blood" somehow to look for goals; i.e. to "determine" these goals and afterwards, to act on them. Because we are continuously building up our experiences (through the CPU-general)--we also "build up" our goals quantitatively and more complexly; that is, we can arrive at more and more goals of a ever more complex nature (i.e. "higher"). And as we always "determine" goals, we can rightfully inquire: How far are we able to come with our continuous goal-determining? In other words, how far do these goals reach?

That is, this search for the highest goal is the logical consequence of our Bewusstsein«s abilities.

This justification to search for the "highest goal"--on the basis of our "actions"; actually, the necessary outcome of them--is purely a derivative of the way in which we come to our experiences; i.e. to our "actions," "makings" (this means the acting of the CPU-general within the AFF); but there is further proof that it is imperative for us to look into a "higher goal" (i.e. to get closer to this totally consciously) than simply to deal with those goals demanded of us in everyday life.

At times, many people "sense"a feeling of "purposelessness"; when nothing in their private life or at work gives them pleasure. Nothing they think to do (= totally consciously aware of what they can do) can bring them out or excite them.

What is a feeling, though?

A feeling is always based on what happens within the contents of our awareness. This is to say, the now-CPU and future-CPU "compare", "line up" various classifyed somethings, and make the result of this line up totally conscious.

That is, every feeling needs the effects of the now-CPU and future-CPU in its awareness« contents; whereby the process of the now-CPU and future-CPU«s effects are not "focused on" through decision1 and decision2, but rather these decisions focus only on the outcome of these "effects".

(Actually, this is a practical matter: We are able to be informed very quickly of the outcome of the entire "effect" without having to be totally conscious of every single process of the dealing of the now-CPU and the future-CPU with the classifyed something within our AFF (whereby they could deal with so many different classifyed somethings that it would in any case go beyond our ability to make all of those processes totally conscious)).

This means wherever we have a feeling, the process of developing the desire of our now-CPU is not made totally conscious, but rather is expressed totally consciously in its outcome.

How is this to be understood in the context of a "purposeless" feeling?

This feeling distinguishes itself through the fact that the total conscious outcome of the now-CPU and future-CPU is as follows: That everything that we do or are totally conscious of what we could do is not that which the now-CPU --from unconscious comparisons in the AFF --would actully like totally consciously to "do" (at least, in connection to our present awareness level).

That is, this feeling of purposelessness shows that we are not totally conscious aimed in the manner as we principally should be (that is, in "rummaging through" the Bewusstsein«s contents, our present objectives are not those considered necessary to the now-CPU (at least with reference to our present awareness level ) ).

That means that the purposelessness emotion can only come up there, where our awareness "knows" that there should be more (i.e. "another," "further") purpose--could be in consequence--than there actually is at the present moment.

For we can only have a lack of something of whose possibility we at least know of unconsciously. For if we don«t have any "concept" at all of something, how should we have feelings without the concepts which point out that we are distanced from these concepts (i.e. that, which the purposelessness expresses)? This isn«t possible.

The feeling of purposelessness is, therefore, a good indication that more "purpose" (i.e. an aimed action) is demanded by our present actions than that which we do. But who can "demand" more purpose than that totally conscious to him at the moment?

This is the unconsciousness .

But what afterall is the unconsciousness ?

Nothing other than a form of awareness .

The awareness itself--through the expressed feeling of purposelessness--"demands" more "purposeful actions" than those totally conscious to us at the present moment.

It is therefore clear why we are able to inquire--are forced to ask--about a higher goal (=purpose); possibly about the highest goal (greatest purpose) of all Bewusstseins : Because this question is a "need" of our awareness .

This is furthermore a logical consequence, because of the fact that everything we "do," or "act" upon is a goal; and that goals become more comprehensive as more and more complex situations develop. Therefore, the inquiry for a most absolute goal is entirely logical for the very reason of our nature to do so.

How can we--based on our knowledge up to now--find such a "primary" and "very last" goal?

In whichever forms of experiences a goal reaches its fulfillment, the attainment of this goal leads to the condensation of still more classifyed somethings. In other words, with this, there are again "new" classifyed somethings.

If one were now to look for an absolute goal, and were to believe it only possible to be fulfilled if at least all possible classifyed somethings were codensated at least once--then it would be impossible to identify such a goal.

For all combination possibilities of classifyed somethings are infinite. This, because the CPU-general as well as the AFF (which first "created" these classifyed somethings) are not subjected to limitations themselves--as we know them (through the contents of our awareness ). And thus, their abilities are likewise not subjected to limitations. And it is these abilities, which "create" classifyed somethings; can always "create" further. That means that we cannot derive a "final" goal from the contents of our awareness .

Furthermore, it isn«t even possible that such a final goal could be derived from the contents of awareness!

For we are searching for a goal which can embody all of our "modes of operations", "actions" of our Bewusstsein as a final goal. And in this way, this goal cannot be a derivative of the consequences of awareness« abilities (which don«t have to be all possible consequences), but rather a derivative of awareness« abilities themselves.

For if a "final goal" of our Bewusstsein were to be derived purely from the contents of its awareness, it is not determined that with this, a fully final goal of our Bewusstsein can be found. This, because we will never have access to all of the possible contents of our Bewusstsein (since the Bewusstsein can expand the contents and can create new contents) in order to derive such a goal, to which the entire possible contents of our Bewusstsein are subjected.

Aside from this, such a final goal must apply to all of the abilities of our Bewusstsein ; that is, to bear all of its possibilities in mind. Today, we cannot at all claim (simply for the reason of the conscious contents of our awareness to now) to know of all of its possibilities (i.e. all its abilities).

A derivative based on the consequences of the Bewusstsein«s abilities could never conclude with all certainty to have put all the abilities of our Bewusstsein into consideration (we don«t even know if all the Bewusstsein«s abilities get their expression from the present conscious contents of our awareness ; nor do we know whether we understand how to "correctly" pick out all of the Bewusstsein«s abilities from the contents of our awareness up to now).

What does this all mean in concrete terms? How can a final goal be derived?

Although concepts such as "conclusive," "final," etc. cannot all apply to the CPU-general in the AFF , a "conclusive and final goal" must nevertheless be derived from these two abilities of our Bewusstsein . For otherwise, this goal wouldn«t be "valid" (and it is precisely this which we call for from a "final" goal) without exception for all the CPU-general «s activities in the AFF .

The following can be understood:

It is first through the contents (classifyed somethings ) of our awareness that we even "know" --indirectly-- of the CPU-general and the AFF.

Not only are the contents the product of the CPU-general«s effect in the AFF, but the CPU-general‘s abilities (i.e. everything it can do) are also the outcome of the union of the CPU-general with the AFF.

For eventhough the CPU-general already must have had the possibility “within it“ to come to such abilities before the union of the AFF; the CPU-general‘s abilities could first only truly "work"--and in this respect be there for our awareness (and with that to exist at all)--because of the union of the CPU-general with the AFF .

That means that in order, for example, for the now-CPU to be able to "work" at all (i.e. practically speaking, to even exists), the CPU-general and the AFF must first be combined.

And the now-CPU first makes it possible that we are totally consciously informed of particular desires which come from unconscious experiences.

That is, this goal«s claim demands that all of the CPU-general«s abilities within the AFF (where all abilities actually means all the abilities contained within the CPU-general ; independent of whether we "consciously know" or "don«t conciously know" of all of them at the present time) formulate this goal.

What exactly is this goal for all of the possible abilities of awareness ?

With the attainment of this goal, all of the abilities of our awareness with all of its possible effects must be totally conscious to us (i.e. all must be able (at least indirectly) to be total conscious at any time).

Why?

Because as long as the individual abilities of the CPU-general in the AFF remain unconscious to us; not everything has been "reached" yet; then one cannot speak of an "absolute" and "final" goal.

Seen from the standpoint of the CPU-general «s abilities (from these, some or all first make the experiences possible, and so some or all of these abilities of the CPU-general determine all of these experiences), the classifyed somethings serve to make us totally conscious of the abilities that our Bewusstsein has.

This total conscious knowledge of all of our awareness« abilities means that we know of everything which can be "caused" by the abilities of awareness. It does not mean that we are totally conscious of all the abilities of awareness as themselves (as they “truly“ are). For at least in the case of awareness« abilties which first enable us to arrive at the contents, it is not possible for us--actually, through the contents themselves--to make these abilities totally conscious as they "truly" are.

This isn«t even necessary. It is perfectly enough when, on the grounds of all of the consequences of awareness « abilities, we are totally consciously "instructed" of these. That is, when we know in concrete terms what these abilities, each for its own, are "capable" of.

Still, total conscious knowledge of the CPU-general «s ability in the AFF is too little on its own.

For our CPU-general in the AFF "works," that is, "does," "makes."

Thus, a final goal--which are derived from the abilities of awareness (CPU-general in the AFF ) (which first "create" everything else)--must also contain total conscious control over all of the "effects," all of the "actions" of these abilities of the CPU-general in the AFF.

As a consequence, this also means that all of the consequences of these abilities can be recalled under total conscious "control" at any time.

This is to say that all previous classifyed somethings --which we want to be totally conscious of--can "always" be totally conscious. It is also possible at any moment to assemble the classifyed somethings which we want to assemble. Furthermore, every process of every ability of our awareness (e.g. the process of the now-CPU-general «s effect, in which it compares a number of classifyed somethings with one another (a process, from which we today receive knowledge simply through its outcome, but in whose "entire" manner of proceedings, we never experience totally consciously).)

is perfectly totally conscious --that is, in its entire course of events. But this also means that we have limitless total conscious access to all former classifyed somethings which have been "stored" in the AFF (classifyed somethings B, A, and BB).

We are able to formulate a final goal of our awareness, our Bewusstsein. This, because we derive it from the CPU-general within the AFF . And we formulate it in such general terms that actually everything, which is a "part" of the CPU-general (even if isn«t totally conscious to us at the present time), is contained within it.

And as this goal itself is derived from the CPU-general within the AFF , all of the conclusions resulting from the effects of the CPU-general in the AFF are contained! This all-conclusive goal of our Bewusstsein to be attained--which cannot be replaced by any other goal--is as follows:

The total conscious knowledge of all the possibilities of the CPU-general within the AFF . The total conscious control of all the abilities of the CPU-general in the AFF .

That is, in order to be able to practice total conscious control over all the abilities of the CPU-general , we have to first be totally conscious of them. This "knowledge" comes about only indirectly. Namely, through the classifyed somethings (= the Units , the determinations ) which "help" us to experience the abilities of awareness. And it is from these classifyed somethings that we can later determine if we also have all of the abilities of awareness totally consciously under control effectively.

Of course, the total conscious knowledge of all of the possibilities of the CPU-general also means, that such a total conscious knowledge knows all of the consequences which could result from these possibilities.

From this chief goal, over which no other goal exists--and, therefore, there is also no other purpose of all human (but also every form of Bewusstsein which apply to the description we have found for "our" Bewusstsein ) "actions," "behaviors"--the following statement is already a derivative: In attaining this goal, Bewusstseins have the total conscious ability to become totally conscious of every possible consequence of one of the CPU-general «s abilities.

One can point out:

This is the highest goal. And still, the attainment of this goal (of the only "true" purpose of our "existence" as Bewusstsein ) is far from guaranteeing in reality, that we will find what we want to find. Then, this depends on the willingness of other Bewusstseins to allow us to experience that which we want to experience (without being disturbed by other Bewusstseins).

The solution is easy: Whatever we want to find in "reality," we can just as easily with the attainment of this final goal (or even on the way to reaching this goal), assemble it "artificially" ourselves as an extra-experience. For then we have the capability of doing so. Finally, the principle that the "world" (reality) assembles, is exactly the same as that, which extra-experiences assemble for us.

If one wants explicitly to be in agreement with "real" Bewusstseins

(and not with "quasi-Bewusstsein " constructed from his extra-experiences (i.e. a line-up of classifyed somethings which one--through his "former" agreement with other Bewusstseins --was used to putting together when he had something "to do" with other Bewusstseins); i.e. special classifyed somethings.)

then he will also able to do this, at the very latest, with the attainment of the last goal--assuming that he finds Bewusstseins which "want" the same.

Why should one, however, even strive to reach this final goal?

Simply because we continuously set goals in any case. It is a part of our nature to live according to goals. And now we have a goal, under which all other goals are included.

If we want "happiness," this is actually nothing more than a feeling that comes into being from the variety of particular effects of classifyed somethings and the outcome of the now-CPU . In other words, if we were to reach the final goal, then we could totally consciously call up "happiness" at any time. We could "create," be, make, etc. everything we could possible imagine.

This does not mean that in reaching the final goal, we, i.e. our Bewusstsein, will simply stop "doing," "making." It simply means that we have ourselves so far under control that we have access and the "power of control" over all former classifyed somethings . Of course, this also means that we can construct "new" classifyed somethings.

Something is impossible: To "limit" the never-ending modes of operation of the "infinite" CPU-general in the AFF . For this simply does not work.

Still, where the very last goal is reached, the desire to activate further outcomes is as good as non-existent. For when one is totally conscious of everything that makes up the cause of all the possible outcomes, and this is "controlled" and "governed" by him--how is he then to occupy himself with still further with the effects of the CPU-general in the AFF ?

Nevertheless, as we have said, in theory it is possible to "indulge" oneself further in the effects of the CPU-general in the AFF with the attainment of the final goal (although most likely no one who has reached this point would be aroused to do this anymore).

What would reaching this final goal mean for our Bewusstsein ? Does it mean that the Bewusstsein comes to an end with this attainment; that the "purpose" has been exhausted?

First of all: We are able to recognize which condition we must strive for to reach the highest goal. But in order to really be able to understand this condition in its "totality," we have to perhaps have had first reached it.

Afterwards, however, our Bewusstsein would not be faced with "purposelessness," for this only exists -- as we have already shown -- when more of a "purpose" exists than of that we are conscious. Because we would have totally conscious knowledge of all of the possibilities of the CPU-general as well as totally conscious control of all of the abilities of the CPU-general in the AFF with the attainment of this goal, then we would be conscious of every purpose in existence. In this way --since our Bewusstsein then doesn‘t act in non-accordance with one of its goals -- purposelessness is unable to develop.

We should not, however, see the "purpose" of reaching this "final goal" as only to be able to construct all classifyed somethings, and to have access to all classifyed somethings which one wants (although in attaining this final goal, it doesn«t matter what one subjectively wants; it is only important to accept that it is the last goal, and in this way, no Bewusstsein is "saved" from reaching this).

The classifyed somethings "serve" only (observed from the standpoint of the final goal) to make us totally conscious of what abilities the CPU-general has in the AFF ; and they serve us in allowing us to further determine if our total conscious control has an effective "grasp" on the abilities of the CPU-general .

As a derivative of the final goal, this is the "true" purpose of all our classifyed somethings and their production.

It is not "luck" on its own, an absolute value, or something else which can be built by classifyed somethings, but rather the conclusive and "final" task in combining all of the classifyed somethings lies in being an aid to arrive at the final goal.

(This, of course, does not mean that we should do without being happy, or any other mood we desire (now-CPU ); rather, it only means that none of this--in respect of the final goal--represents its own value.)

This also means, however, that it is not contained within reality«s "true" purpose (in respect to the final goal and in considering that which we have learned about reality (i.e. about the goals which we are able to reach because of the reality within the reality) ) to continuously give us further "new" classifyed somethings; it is also not a part of its "true" purpose to "force" our classifyed somethings on other Bewusstseins, or to even hope that other Bewusstseins "create" classifyed somethings in reality (= agreement), which we want to find totally consciously through other Bewusstseins.

Rather, the "true" purpose of reality lies in using it to"increase" our total conscious access to all classifyed somethings within our cosmos, this means in order to gain more and more total conscious control over the abilities of our awareness. (Which, of course, only "practically" ocurs in that one actually constructs further classifyed somethings. But it shouldn«t be forgoten that the classifyed somethings don«t represent any "value" "themselves," but rather their "value" is based on aiding in attaining the final goal.)

It cannot be ruled out--just as how the CPU-general became a Bewusstsein first through the "union" with the AFF --that a further "form of existence" exists "after" the attainment of the "final" goal; a form which goes beyond our "Bewusstsein." That is, the connection of the CPU-general in the AFF could be "altered" totally consciously under control. How this could happen, however, and how likewise, the CPU-general could be changed within the AFF if such a further “form of existence“ would be possible, is beyond our ability to comprehend at the present time.

In any case, we can determine that the highest goal of our Bewusstsein exists. That the "true" task of all Bewusstseins (i.e. all "beings" created as we have "described" as a Bewusstsein , awareness (namely, the CPU-general in the AFF ) ) is to attain this goal.

It is not "useful" for any Bewusstsein to act as though this final goal wouldn«t apply to it: for as long as this goal goes unattained, the Bewusstsein will always be "driven" from one limitation to the next. The Bewusstsein itself will never actually have total conscious control over all that which it really "wants." And it will always return to classifyed somethings which it doesn«t want; but which it cannot prevent because it doesn«t have total conscious control over all of the abilities of the Bewusstsein .

It is first with the attainment of this highest goal that the Bewusstsein will achieve this "condition" that corresponds to its true being.

This does not mean that with the formulation of this goal, it is clear how the Bewusstsein reachs this “highest“ goal, its "true" purpose.

For, if we are to observe our "life" carefully, we first see how little total conscious "access" we have to all of our awareness « functions.

We cannot, for example, make ourselves totally conscious of how we precisely behaved a year ago on a normal day. We cannot remember exactly what we "thought" and "felt" precisely over a period of two years. We cannot manipulate our thoughts and dreams in such a way that we are able to produce extremely "realistic-"seeming structures. And we cannot even make the smallest fraction of the classifyed somethings BB totally conscious in the universe of our contents.

We could do all of this and still far more if we had total conscious control over all of the possibilities (abilities) of our awareness .

In consideration of our present inability, the question arises, How this could ever be managed. This question could be interesting, but it doesn«t change the fact that this task has to" be done."

Let us not forget that we have "worked" on this task up to now--our entire life--even if it has never actually been totally conscious . That is, this "task" cannot be realized "quickly," "at once"; rather, it has to be achieved through continuous "development." Whereby this "development"--as we now know--should be understood in having a precise as possible look at getting closer to this goal.

XVI.

Every Bewusstsein has its own "history."

This is dependent upon which classifyed somethings were ever totally conscious to it; which extra-experiences it had; which totally conscious access it has now on all of its real- recall- and extra-experiences (even reality is "perceived differently"; that is, some experience it "more" totally consciously from an event, others less). That doesn«t only mean that every Bewusstsein itself is an "individual"; not only that it probably has different contents in comparison to other Bewusstseins ; it also means that each Bewusstsein has the most diverse total conscious control over its abilities.

That is that every Bewusstsein has another momentary "interim condition" on its way to its highest goal, its truest purpose (for also if hardly anyone up to now was totally conscious of what this highest and final purpose could precisely be, he would nevertheless "work on" it unconsciously).

Since this final goal is so all-embracing, and because of the way there has to be "laid" "piece by piece"--even when this way doesn«t lead a "straight" path, but instead can proceed in the most diverse manners--every Bewusstsein, in every stage of it«s life, deals with another aspect of its tasks (= getting closer to the goal).

And this is why today (and always) in reality we find a great number of individuals (= Bewusstseins), from which each individual attempts in its own way to get closer to the goal.

Does this then mean that there isn«t a "key" or "formula" that determines how we--each of us--can bring the final goal closer to us?

There is certainly no formula, key which at a particular time has validity for everyone. Let us accept the fact that every Bewusstsein is an individual with its own personal history (not only which "occupies" a personal "position" on the way to the goal, but also developed a very personal manner of proceeding to get closer to this goal); and as a consequence, a mutual "route" at the same "moment" doesn«t develop.

Still, there are specific actions which, for many Bewusstseins at specific "positions" in their "development," are helpful to those Bewusstseins in "coming father" on their paths.

Here is where the starting point is if one wants with time to construct, in a purely empirical way, a "cartography" of the diverse actions which can be done to come a step closer to the final goal.

Just as it is impossible to establish a "pattern," a "formula" which is valid for all Bewusstseins at all times, one can determine, with time, what particular groups of Bewusstseins require at particular times on their way to the final goal. That is, what they have to do in order to get more control over the abilities of their Bewusstseins .

Let us not forget that this goal, which is afterall, clearly proven and formulated (even though this is but a tiny--though important--step on the way to this goal), is a goal because it is recognized as being indispensible for our Bewusstsein.

This also means that our awareness must have at least "known" of this unconsciously, even before this total conscious formulation of the definition for the final goal. This, simply because this goal is our awareness « entire "justifcation for existence." (We could just as well say that the Bewusstsein «s pure existence "creates" the necessity of this final goal. This is one and the same.)

In this way, the Bewusstsein , since the time it "is"; be it with considerable "delays" or few "delays"; has steadily "come closer" to this goal.

We can therefore assume that when we observe reality with "alert eyes"--that for every (or at least, many) Bewusstsein, there are some or a number of "possible patterns" in reality which can be applied dependent on their position of their development at the moment.

That is, if we are to observe our present reality, then we would always be able to find examples in the entire stock of literature--be it works of the esoteric, psychology, philosophy, world literature, and even the comics--that can provide each individual, at specific times of his development, with specific forms of support which help him (until now, hardly more than unconsciously ) to get a small step closer to the final goal.

We can find these forms of support, these patterns, far beyond the pages of literature. Look at the contents of television programs, in which every Bewusstsein can discover the patterns which can further help each individually at the moment (in following the patterns). The same is true for jobs, which with their implementation, can further improve one«s specific totally conscious control over particular abilities of the CPU-general. These examples can go on and on. In other words, we can assume that reality is full of possibilities and patterns which can help all of us on our way to getting closer to the goal. This, where every Bewusstsein itself must take care to understand the patterns and reach the possibilities which are the "right ones" for their present "position" on the way to the goal.

We cannot forget here that our unconscious knowledge about the highest goal, up to now-- at times worse, and at times better--has led us to "come along farther" on the "path" to the highest goal.

That is that when one is not totally conscious of the way he should attempt at the moment to "come closer" to this final goal, he should listen to his own "inner voice." In other words, instead of doing something purely intellectual "against his own inner will," he should nevertheless "listen“ to "vague"--but then "more correct" "suggestions" of the unconsciousness (which expresses itself through the decisions of the now-CPU and the future-CPU).

Just as this is perfectly correct, (it is better to do something based on the unconscious effects of one«s "inner voice" than to take on something against every "desire" because of pure intellectual games (which more often than not, based on the effects of the "spirits of the times," are poorly thought through and badly scrutinized)); one will still need to be careful that the "inner voice" is not "hidden" in momentary emotions, and therefore, "misunderstood"--not helping this goal in the very least.

Every Bewusstsein, thus, has its very "own" "individual" path to discover (whereby they should make use of all forms of support they can "discover" totally consciously in reality) and from now on has an advantage in at least totally consciously knowing the formulation of the highest goal (even though to really understand this in its totality is once again another, much more difficult task), and with this knowledge, possess the chance to "check" whether the inner voice leads too far away from the path to the final goal.

In which case, as it has been said already, it must be understood that with the not yet totally consciously -grasped totality of this goal, more often the "inner voice" demands--even if it doesn«t appear as such--what the Bewusstsein needs in order to get closer to this goal. When one, for example, does something for a few days, weeks, or months, which according to his--intellectual--point of view doesn«t correspond to the "goal"--but which his "inner voice" "demands"--then the Bewusstsein could spend a few days, weeks, or months in "inner peace," which then allows him to "work" even with more power than before on the attainment of the goal.

It should be warned here, however, that an intellectual only half-understanding of the highest goal (whereby the intellectual half-understanding of incorrect philosophical movements has brought about immense confusion throughout the course of history of mankind; where even today, intellectual half-understanding of present conditions seems to be close to something like a fashionable appearance) could lead to one being so intellectually sure of his "business" (= his path), that one entirely avoided the inner voice as an advisor on the way to the highest goal. And through this, one can "in reality" (for the inner voice has--when it doesn«t get mixed up with other emotions-- far better (because "more all-encompassing") access to the "inner truths" than the half-intellectual knowledge could ever have) be horribly distanced from the path to the highest goal.

In summary, one can say that every Bewusstsein must find and follow its own path to the highest goal. And it has both the right and responsibility to choose from the great number of possibilities and patterns, which the free society has to offer, those it wants to use for a short part--or even a longer part--of its path. It is important to understand that every Bewusstsein always knows best which path it is that leads him to the highest goal.

Even though every Bewusstsein "knows" best how it can arrive at the final goal, we cannot overlook something very essential here: We are in agreement with our fellow human beings. Within this agreement, the rules are in control that the active CPUreality of a Bewusstsein "makes" something which the passive CPUreality of all other Bewusstseins have "to accept."

That is, that as a result of this situation, an intersection of the interests of individual Bewusstseins in relation to the attainment of the final goal is perfectly inevitable. For, as not all Bewusstseins can simultaneously follow the identical process to get closer to the goal (why this is so, we have just explained); all Bewusstseins will not "parallel-operate" in order to get closer to this goal in unison (= on the exact same path in exactly the same period of "time") (whereby, even in this case, there would probably be continual intersections of interests). With that, a Bewusstsein«s attempt in reality to "get closer" to this goal will, however, be constantly hindered in doing so (or at least hindered within the process) by other Bewusstseins; be this due to carelessness, a lack of knowledge, egoism, or even spitefulness.

If it were not to matter to one on a short-term basis whether on his way to attaining his goal, he was "continuously" impeding, or even throwing back, other Bewusstseins « attempts; it wouldn«t then matter to him if he himself were affected by this.

If someone is convinced that in reality he can always maintain the "upper hand" in conflicts with other Bewusstseins because of the control of his awareness« abilities; then it cannot be forgotten that perhaps he is able to win the upper hand in some situations with other Bewusstseins, but as soon as it is "recognized" that he hinders other Bewusstseins, he could be up against multiple Bewusstseins "simultaneously." And with this, even if he is not entirely "defeated" in the conflicts with other Bewusstseins, he will be so "busy" fighting that he will never get to following his path.

(A conflict could also serve to strengthen the control over the Bewusstseins« strengths--but instead of this, there is the possibility to carry through this comparison of the Bewusstseins« strengths "just as well" on other levels (e.g. in sports, career, etc.) (and most importantly based on rules set up in mutual agreement). But in "real" conflicts (and not "voluntary" comparisons of the Bewusstseins« strengths at sporting events, in the workplace, etc.) the Bewusstsein, through its behavior, which provokes constant conflict (and through this, "wins" over a long period of time) still only follows a very specific system of its control over its awareness « abilities; that is, it only strengthens its abilities in a very "one-sided" manner.

If this Bewusstsein were to understand to always lay down its conflicts in such a way as to better utilize awareness« abilities (i.e. in following the path to its goal)--then the Bewusstsein would have developed so many "enemies" among the other Bewusstseins in this time, that its effects in the agreement (sooner or later) would become more and more difficult until it was almost impossible.)

His constant inconsiderate persistence for his advantage--even if were to go well for some time--would at some point be "avenged" within the agreement; as all the "intersecting" "used" Bewusstseins could join forces (and what they would also "do" when they were constantly "bothered" by someone in their way), and in working together could offer more damage to the the "wrong doer" than he might well appreciate.

It is also the case that with good intentions--namely, not to disturb others on their way to the final goal, but at the same time, to go on his path to the final goal--the way in which this interplay of all Bewusstseins should take place within the agreement is not defined precisely and generally applicable (i.e. valid for all Bewusstseins).

That means that the longer the agreement between the Bewusstseins continues, the greater the call becomes that it would be in the interest of all Bewusstseins to establish "rules" which enable all Bewusstseins to go their way; and also to "prohibit" all Bewusstseins form hindering another.

In practice, this has been dealt with in the following manner: Humankind has established laws whose purpose it is to regulate living with one another; animals, too, have such rules amongst themselves. Yet still: Even with the best intentions not to impede in anyone«s way, and still wanting to follow one«s own path, one is repeatedly faced with the question of how such "rules," which have to be valid for all Bewusstseins, should read. Is this even possible with such diversity in all Bewusstseins« histories? Is it not an illusion to believe to be in agreement without being in constant conflict with other Bewusstseins?

It has been proven that we have a highest goal, to which all of our "actions" must be directed. It is clear that based on the history of every Bewusstsein, each must be able to find his own way there. It is furthermore clear that where an agreement with other Bewusstseins exists, we need a "modus vivendi." In other words, we need a principle which determines how we can manage to reach the goal without hindering other Bewusstseins and without hang to face others hindering us. For it could thus lead to such circumstances, that we cannot get any closer to our goal because of continuous mutual impediments. Even that we suffer setbacks. Thus, in the end, through agreement; instead of this being useful for all Bewusstseins (which, based on the definition of the final goal, is the only "true" reason for the agreement); this would hinder all Bewusstseins in such a way, that hardly a Bewusstsein in the agreement could "learn" what it wants to (or must) learn here on its way to its goal.

What we need is a principle that should regulate the entire creations of all Bewusstseins in the agreement in view of a "final goal"; without itself saying how this goal can be reached (for the Bewusstseins have to manage this themselves). A principle that is formulated in such a way that everyone (with each and every one of his actions in reality) can immediately check if his actions corresponds to this principle.

In practice, we need a principle that is equally valid for every Bewusstsein in any agreement, and on one hand brings us a maximum of freedom in respect to our efforts in reality to near our final goal, and on the other hand, allows a minimum of restrictions of ours through other Bewusstseins.

This principle is an unavoidable necessity deduced from our investigations. It is a principle in which we want to ensure that all Bewusstseins within the agreement have the chance to come as close to their final goal as it is possible within an agreement.

If some Bewusstseins were to believe that at the present moment (how long this would last, they don«t know) that reciprocal hindrances would help them to enlarge their total conscious control over the abilities of the Bewusstsein --then they could do this "together" within the agreement, and find an activity (sports, a special job, etc.) which corresponds to their desires. They must, however, accept that this desire might apply to them, but because of this, not at all to all Bewusstseins. In this way, they have no right to compel all the others in the agreement to the same "rules of the game."

This also means, however, that the demands laid out above concerning the principle we have yet to find apply to these types of Bewusstseins as well (those, who want reciprocal hindrances). But these see the best possible freedom in their efforts to mutually hinder the like-minded as much as possible.

What does this principle look like which is valid for all Bewusstseins (i.e. as we define "Bewusstsein ") who enter into every form of agreement with one another?

What demands do we have of this principle based on the experiences of our investigation up to now?

That the principle is equally valid for every Bewusstsein in the agreement.

That it is formulated in such a way that with every action it executes in reality, every Bewusstsein can immediately check to see if this action is in conformity with this principle.

That influence will only penetrate the contents of our actions and imitations (= as recipients) as far as one in action (active CPUreality ) wishes with the greatest possible "freedom" and as recipients (passive CPUreality ), with the smallest possible hidrance.

Who can first control us in our actions; who can place us under this not yet formulated law?

We ourselves!

And who in receiving through other Bewusstseins can make demands on the actors? Namely, in the name of the yet to be formulated law?

We ourselves!

In the case of receiving, we want to, we demand that the other Bewusstseins act according to the law.

And in the case of acting, others demand that we act acording to this law.

The law itself should, however, be able to be realized and applied to every action.

This means that we ourselves have to be the authority of our actions!

How are we able to do this in fulfilling the demands?

In that with every action that we do, we see ourselves simultaneously as the recipient (and, too, as the possible recipients; i.e. in the ideal case, this would be consideration for all Bewusstseins and all of their possible conditions at all times; with which we could enter into agreement with) and ask: Do we want to be the recipient in this case?

And first when we can agree (based on our best conscious knowledge) to be each of the possible recipients of our own actions, then we will know that we implement an action conforming to the law.

We can thus formulate the law, the principle, in the following way:

Behave in such a way that you would be able to accept your own actions if you were the recipient of these actions.

This formulation of the principle corresponds precisely to the formerly given demands. In order to better express the unlimited validity of this law, one can additionally include in the formulation a demand of ours--namely, that it is applicable to all Bewusstseins and can be understood by them.

We can furthermore say:

Act in such a manner that you conform to the law which says that you would unconditionally submit yourself at all times, in any perceivable condition, to your own actions as if you were any possible recipient of these actions.

It is clear that both formulations fulfill all of our requirements under one and the same law:

It attempts the ideal balance between the greatest possible freedom and the least possible hindrance.

It applies to all Bewusstseins, independent of which situation they are in.

Everyone can understand this law and strive to act according to it.

XVII

It is already clear from the formulation of this law (= the "law of actions")--which tells us how we are to behave within the agreement--that total compliance of the very same is impossible even with the best of intentions!

For how should we take totally conscious into account with every of our actions that every Bewusstsein , with which we could ever be in agreement, in every possible situation would approve of the way we act?

This is simply impossible.

We can even never be entirely sure that we can take sufficiently into account the circumstances of at least those Bewusstseins , which are directly affected by our actions; and this is because we can never be sure that we treat them through our actions as we would like to be treated in their situations. For for us to be able to "properly" put ourselves in the situation of the recipients, our powers of empathy are not enough. In order to do this, we would have to know their entire history.

Is it possible then to really conform our behavior to this law of actions ?

If we truly wish to execute this in complete and total form--then of course. But this is really not the issue here. Let us observe how an attempt to live up to this law of actions would ensue.

Based on our conscious knowledge of the position the Bewusstsein has within our agreement--that Bewusstsein which will be directly "affected" by our ensuing actions--we still have a tiny stock of material on its history. Its form of behavior further helps me--superficially, but still--to sort everything out. Finally, we are able to deduce on a simple and superficial level, what effects our desired actions could have on this Bewusstsein and several other Bewusstseins .

How do we know this?

Because experience has taught us (i.e. led us to that today we are conscious of) what effects particular actions of ours or others have had. Actions which were comparable to our presently desired behavior.

From this we are able to deduce (actually, make it totally conscious ) to which effects our behavior could lead.

Who "tells" (makes us totally conscious ) us, however, what effects our future behavior could have?

Of course, the future-CPU .

The future-CPU understands how to "work out" all of the "data," "facts" that we can get hold of (included in these are also the memories of similar actions of ours or others and the outcomes they had at that time) in a direction which allows us to receive the desired information , as much as it is totally consciously possible for us to do so. We only call for the desired information when the now-CPU is interested in particular directions in which our actions could be directed.

(e.g. If the now-CPU wants for us to bathe in a river: The future-CPU makes it clear that this river is contaminated and can lead to health ailments.

Or: The now-CPU wants to survive. The future-CPU determines that there are several variations that then come into question.)

(If one were now to inquire: Who is actually "responsible" that I can continually near my "final," and highest goal, and also try to be attentive to the law of actions ? The now-CPU or the future-CPU ?

The answer follows:

Because the now-CPU as well as the future-CPU are both abilities of the CPU-general ; and because the CPU-general itself, as the "active" part of our Bewusstsein , has its "own," "true" purpose in the final goal--so as a consequence, all of the abilities of the CPU-general are "responsible" for being active in coming closer to this final goal and in doing so, follow the law of actions .

That is, the "true" purpose of the now-CPU , just as with the future-CPU , just as with the CPU-general , is to activate such a decision as will lead us to continually near our final goal.)

We have now arrived at an essential point:

One must first strive to adapt his behavior as close as possible to the law of actions (i.e. to conform as much as possible). If one is then to notice that an even better compliance with the law of actions which is the surest, and probably even the only, possibility to get decisively closer to the final goal; then sooner or later (this realization can come very quickly, or could take lifetimes), he will work on this.

And if one wants to "serve" this law, then he can somewhat "employ" the future-CPU to this cause. That is, before every action (in the "beginning" with the most important actions, but then later with increasing skill, with smaller and smaller actions) the future-CPU is not only employed to test the outcomes of the behavior in terms of one´s immediate desires (now-CPU ), it is also put to investigate how far this behavior conforms to the law of actions (this investigation is initiated by the now-CPU ) based on his best knowledge and belief (i.e. as far as this can be totally conscious to him).

This means, of course, that he can never "completely" fulfill the law of actions . Not only because in order to do so, one would have had to have already reached the final goal (in order to be totally conscious of all the data of all Bewusstseins ´ histories; as far as these apply to him with the agreement); also because one cannot know about the other experiences of these Bewusstseins ; that is, those experiences which do not take place within the agreement (the agreement these Bewusstseins have with other Bewusstseins which exclude him can do this; or also, simplyextra-experiences can do this).

It is of course conceivable that when one has reached the final goal, and thus has unlimited access to all of the contents of one´s own awareness --also has access to all of the actions and impressions of particular Bewusstseins in agreement with him--he can, based on the "development" of particular Bewusstseins within the agreement, conclude which extra-experiences they had (it is also possible that it comes to light in reaching the final goal that he already unconsciously copied the recall- and extra-experiences of all Bewusstseins in agreement with him. That he, therefore, knew of these experiences anyway).

That is in any case, that he would have had to have at least reached the final goal in order only to have the chance to be able to actually completely conform to this law of actions . Yet contrary to this, he wants to precisely follow this law in order to get closer to the final goal.

Is this case hopeless? Not in the least.

For just as the final goal can only be reached through constant further development, one is also able to, little by little, near the law of actions through constant efforts to make his decisions more fitting to this law.

That is, in the course of one´s life, he should arrive at greater and greater total conscious control over the future-CPU , considering it´s making of total consciousness , which, in acting based on his own desires, is an effectual path according to the law of actions .

In doing so, he can take care on the path to the final goal within the agreement to conform more and more to the law of actions .

That means that the law of actions , step by step, has to be better "realized" (just as we we can come closer to the final goal step by step). Step by step, it has to be recognized that one must take everyone into consideration to be able to have the chance in all situations, to himself be able to experience "consideration."

Above all, it must be "learned" step by step on one hand, what consideration for others really means (in practical terms), and what, on the other hand, it means not to slow down on his own way to the goal.

That is, it seems, as practice shows, that an "apprenticeship" is needed to find out the right "dosage" between "proceeding ahead" and "consideration of others." But this doesn´t say that these two necessities have to contradict one another.

The consideration in the case of all of one´s own actions means that one strives to think more "globally" with every action. In other words, strives to not only do that, which seems to apply to the law of actions from a momentary standpoint, but also attempts to judge his behavior in a far greater context.

Judging this, however, in a far greater context is only possible with thorough work on one´s own Bewusstsein ´s abilities.

That is, if one puts out efforts to follow the law of actions more closely; then he will have to work to improve his abilities in estimating the consequences of his behavior. If one is able to improve these abilities, then he also develops his awareness further. This then brings him a step closer to the final goal.

Let´s look at an example to clarify this idea: Helping the underdeveloped.

Usually, help is only given because one expects something in return. This then cannot be understood as actual "help," but rather as little more than a form of business.

It occurs time and time again, however, that one is willing to help; but the objectives of providing help are far too short-sided.

That is, either it reaches beyond the abilities of the helper to plan farsighted and more "globally," or due to comfort, the attempt to come to terms with the area--where help should be given--is carried out so poorly that over a long period of time, an actual worsening of this place, for which help had been planned, can ensue.

With that: It is curious that help in the short run often tends to make a good impression, but over a long period of time, leads to even more misfortune.

There might be good intentions behind helping others, but first and foremost, this good will means to work on oneself. In order to better foresee where the help could lead to.

In bringing help to others, one should not deceive himself in believing that this happens out of pure moral convictions. Bear in mind that in the end it is always the now-CPU which expects an advantage from this.

It is more commendable when one lives in accordance with his desires at the present time (this can also be the desire to help others)--and still, use his abilities here in order to better and better conform to the law of actions --than to delude one´s self and others that he only has others´ well-being at heart, when actually one does not want to consider his decisions, which lead to certain actions, according to their consequences in a global context.

One has a form of "apprenticeship" to carry out in the course of his life to better come to grips with the practical (i.e. that which takes place in reality) significance of the law of actions . He can only get closer to this law with continual efforts. He has to have the desire to better conform to it. This, because he discovered how essential this law is in being able to reach the final goal. To conform better to the law, however, it is necessary that one steadily comprehends the connections between all of the Bewusstseins better and better. He has to learn how to be able to "put himself into" other Bewusstseins ´ situations. For that which happens to other Bewusstseins can also occur to him in the same situation. If this seems unlikely due to the present circumstances, then it is still possible that something similar can happen to him in a matter of decades (or even in another life).

That is, the law of actions accompanies him, on the way to the final goal, in making all decisions in getting closer to this goal.

In all of our actions, we must take care to always beome more and more in conformity with this law. This, however, requires a constant learning process. Not only in the sense to discover "new ways" which enable us to get closer to the final goal; but also in the sense of how we can become more and more in conformity with the law.

That means, we have access to a law of actions which must be close to our actions at all times in order to either get decisively "better" at, or simply to move at all at, getting closer to the final goal. Nevertheless, this law of actions itself can only be "learned," just as the final goal, through getting closer step by step. That is, seen from a practical point of view, one should neither despair (because he has the feeling that he is still much too far to be able to even partly understand this) nor believe to have completely "understood" and thus be able to follow it rather well within the period of but a few years.

Instead, one must, in all "good intentions," continously strive to get closer and closer to this.

The important thing is that there is a law not chosen arbitrarily (= based on purely subjective now-CPU decisions), but rather which is logically necessarily derived from the fact of the final goal (which itself as well has been proven). A law which gives one the chance to know precisely how to act in his effort to reach the final goal within the agreement with other Bewusstseins (or at least to get as close to the final goal, as what is at all possible through agreement) in order to actually be able to attain this final goal.

This is precisely the "advantage" of this law: It is proven and clear how one is able to draw practical use from it. Not in that one believes he can fulfill it one hundred percent; for this is impossible. Rather, in that one learns step by step, to become more in more in "conformity" with this law. The "good intentions" serve here to be prepared to make the efforts of "learning" (= totally conscious understanding of global connections) to come continuously closer to this law.

An step in the learning process, in order to better deal with the law, is to understand the following facts:

Children are frequently taught not to lie. They are told that is lying is bad. In principle, this is a commendable educational measure. But far more essential in coming closer to the law of actions is that all Bewusstseins within a given society (of a given state) look to create a system in which everyone atempts to come closer and closer to the law of actions .

That is, to create a system in which everyone, who lives within this system (of a given society, in a given state), is first brought closer to the understanding of the necessity of the law of actions . And then that everybody within this system takes care that the society as a whole steadily learns how to deal better with the law of actions .

This task--namely, to bring an entire society closer to the law of actions --should be forcefully put into operation. That is, through continuous impulses (which have to be effectively transported through the media) it should be pointed out by those, who through their understanding are "farther along" with this law, how and where one can behave in greater conformity with the law of actions by explaining what occurs daily within society.

At the same time, shortcomings of particular laws (which are constructed too little in conformity with the law of actions ) have to be pointed out and everyone has to see to it that these laws are constantly improved (i.e. purely through evolution). And thus, the construction of an ever more "civilized" society (= one which through its behavior gets closer and closer to the law of actions ) is being worked for. A society which becomes less and less "barbarian."

Just as the individuals can be differentiated by how far on their way to the law of actions they are, the individual societies, individual states (i.e. a very large group of diverse individuals) in their behavior have reached different "proximity" to the law of actions . It makes sense that the economical or military power of a given society says nothing of its present position (at the very most, very indirectly) on the way to getting closer to the law of actions . That is, individual Bewusstseins of a given society must accept that they themselves perhaps live in a more "barbarian" state than others do.

As no single state on this earth exists that can maintain that it has come as close to the law of actions as is possible, no Bewusstsein of a society has the "right" to degrade the primitiveness (which is usually misunderstood, since this concept is not understood as to how far one is distanced from the law of actions , but rather is more often than not understood in terms of the economical power of a given society) of another society--as long as the Bewusstsein itself doesn´t contribute anything to the improvement of the "primitiveness" of its own society.

What does this mean precisely?

The fact of the law of actions requires every individual to work as well as he can towards a better understanding of the law of actions ; to better comprehend the conditions necessary in order to aid in better understanding the law. This, in order to, with the following actions, always get "closer" to the law.

Every Bewusstsein has to do this on his own.

At the same time, there is the responsibility of the Bewusstsein to help its children to better understand the law of actions (i.e. to understand the connections better, in which the law of actions apply).

What are the reasons for this responsibility?

Simply because it should be clear that in order to offer all Bewusstseins the possibility to get decisively closer to the final goal within the agreement; the societies which these Bewusstseins make up must be brought closer to the law of actions as well. For the law does not "live" based on the minimal participation of a few, rather it is extremely important that as many Bewusstseins as possible continuously attempt to get closer to this law . That is, as many Bewusstseins of a society as possible must come first to understand that this law is a necessity and then to strive as best as possible to become more and more in conformity with it.

This then means that that Bewusstsein , which better understands this law as compared to other Bewusstseins in its society, has to try hard anyway to improve its understanding of this law even better; then has to teach his children (as those closest to him) how to better comprehend these laws and to excercize them; and finally to check that the society in which he lives comes to better understand this law and to check that more follows in accordance to it.

As a result, the Bewusstseins which understand this law better than others strive to make sure that more and more Bewusstseins come to understand the law as well. As soon as this occurs, it is a logical and natural consequence that more and more laws which the society draws up will better conform to the law of actions .

It is thus the responsibility of every individual to strive to ensure that other Bewusstseins have the chance to understand this law as well.

But as a warning: It remains so that the loudest; i.e. those Bewusstseins who see it their job to "keep others on track" (whether it be through their logical arguments (even if their topics are not viewed or put into the overall scheme) or through the skillful manner of their behavior and tone of voice) receive the greatest amount of attention. One might be much more willing to entrust these types--but "volume," the ability to convince others through their behavior and a certain ability to argue says nothing of to what degree such Bewusstseins have master over the law of actions as compared to their spellbound audience.

Both as a listener or a skillful "seducer" (through their manner of expression, logical processing of various subject matter, certainty of themselves in their behavior), one must pay attention to whether or not the contents brought forward actually help in getting closer to the law of actions . One does himself--and as a direct consequence, humankind--a favor to be truly "certain" of his matters based on the most in-depth scrutiny, before he sets forth to convince others of these matters.

In this way, it is more respectful to be silent and reflect than to open one´s mouth at every opportunity just to voice his opinion. This acknowledgement alone, and the following through of it, is yet a further step closer to the law of actions . A step away from "barbarianism," and closer to "civilization."

At this point, one can ask: How should one then assign greater significance to the law of actions within in his own society? Where does one begin?

The most important thing of all is that before one goes about explaining certain ways of doing things, which concern the law of actions and are not carried out in society as they should, "more correctly"--he should first and foremost be certain to have truly understood the law of actions in connection to these. First then, when one, based on the best of knowledge and belief, is convinced to know something "new" concerning something which should but is not being implemented at the time, does he have not only the right, but the responsibility to to point out this misunderstanding of the actions of particular Bewusstseins within society. Pointing this out, however, should not result in dictation (i.e. dictatorship), rather has to be done in such a way that other Bewusstseins have the chance to understand why certain ways of doing things have to be done more correctly (history teaches us why a dictatorship is to be avoided).

A society is only as close to the law of actions as the average proximity reached by its individuals. In other words, as we see everywhere, different societies have different closeness to the law of actions . In this way, the task of Bewusstseins of given societies which themselves are closer to the law of actions , is to bring particular individuals of those societies, farther away, closer to the way of doing things which are necessary for a better understanding of the law of actions .

Bringing them closer should not, as we´ve said, lead to dictating. Furthermore, this should only follow after one is certain of his matters. If this process goes ununderstood, it could be the result of the "teacher´s" explanation or of the fact that those being taught are too far away to understand. If the second possibility is the case, then the teachers have to give those, who don´t understand, the time they need until they are able to understand. For any "teacher" who, in such a situation, goes about it in a dictatorial manner, has not understood it (= the law of actions ) himself.

This does not mean, however, that a society more barbarian than others has the right, only because it does not understand certain matters, to simply force other weaker societies´ to act in accordance to its will. In such a case, the "civilized" world will then be called in on behalf of the victims to restore "justice."

Let look at our own society. How are we able to assign greater significance here? For a better explanation, let us look at two examples:

These two examples are two principles, which in practice by and large, are not actually carried out as the law of actions would so require.

First is the principle which distinguishes victims from perpertrators.

Second is that principle which judges bodily harm against others more harshly (seen from a law standpoint) than harm against property.

Hardly anyone would challange the validity of these two principles. And yet, both continue to be violated.

Why is that?

The same which held true for our previously dealt with subject of "helping others" is true for all actions:

If one wants to more effectively produce his behavior in accordance with the law of actions , then he has to work on himself.

Concerning the principle differentiating between victim and perpetrator, the facts involved have first to be known.

Here is precisely where the problem begins.

Simply because more often than not, it is inconvenient to search for precise factual information (i.e. one doesn´t want to waste his own energy in doing so; or other now-CPU decisions are responsible for this), one then attempts to avoid the search, or at least to decisively shorten it. One does this in making use of an axiom (of course, an unjustified one at that); namely that it takes two to quarrel. Because this axiom helps to ignore all precise facts in that both the victim and perpetrator equally become the perpetrator.

If facts have to be looked for, this search for facts usually functions in such a way that the now-CPU of the one searching has already decided before the examination of this conflict as to which of the two parties (to the victim or perpetrator) his sympathies belong. There is then great danger--be it conscious or unconscious (based on intention or negligence)--that one points out more facts, which give right to those, to whom the fact searcher´s now-CPU has decided to give sympathy, than facts to those whom thenow-CPU doesn´t like.

In order to be able to estimate the degree of the perpetrator´s offence, one must put himself in the place of the victim to understand what the action meant for the victim. And also this must be trained. It is extremely difficult for those Bewusstseins which never experienced a similar situation to that of the victim; it is even difficult for those who do not consciously recall such (or similar) a situation. Still, it has to be done.

It is not enough to deceive oneself that he has good intentions, but rather, probably even opposed to the present interests of his own now-CPU , he has to strive to consider the problem from as many standpoints as possible to him.

To be able to do this, and to arrive at the right conclusions from the most diverse of points of reference, both have to be learned.

The same ignorance involved in the total conscious understanding of connections concerning the law of actions plays a role in the second principle. Although we are thoroughly conscious that we are not simply a "emotionless machine," more often than not we act as though this were true.

If one, who to this point in time had a good reputation, armed were to rob one in a gas station of some tens of dollars, he would be more heavily punished than one who beat someone up; than someone who sexually molested another.

If one were to observe the victims as that which they are; namely, as sensitive beings; then it is obvious that the lawmaker doesn´t punish in accordance with what injustice is "mentally damaging" against the victim, but rather, completely other criteria (i.e. the totally conscious product of the lawmaker´s now-CPU ) are applied.

For a quick burglary--whereby it was clear to the victim from the very beginning that the perpetrator wasn´t aiming at him, but the money--belongs to an entirely other degree than an obvious attempt to bodily harm the victim; i.e. to directly attack the outward form of his Bewusstsein within the agreement.

If the burglary incident is a behavior hardly in conformity with the law of actions , then certainly a direct attack on the outward form of the Bewusstsein within the agreement is even farther from the law of actions . For all damages of a financial nature can always be entirely compensated for (in the end, allowances can be made when the judgement of the offender is given). Bodily violence on the other hand, is something that can follow a Bewusstsein (depending on the how serious it is) for a longe time. And due to this, this Bewusstsein can be severly handicapped on its way to the final goal, simply because of this negative experience which it cannot let go of; the Bewusstsein could possibly even be thrown back decades. As opposed to this, the victim of a burglary, in which only money was lost (which can probably be returned to him) and where he was not the offender´s target (only indirectly), i.e. he was never bodily attacked, hardly is forced to suffer a loss on his way to the final goal.

But even in the case of the different forms of bodily violence, in practice (i.e. that considered normal today) there is little decision made as to what particular actions by particular perpetrators produce greater "damages" than others to the victims (on their way to the final goal). On the side of the lawmaker, there is also a lack in the manner in a judge is unable to differentiate and understand the situation the victim is in. The judge doesn´t work out or understand the "true" damage done to the victim (which penetrates more deeply than purely "bodily" ones).

(The necessity to get closer to the law of actions alone must compel the judge and lawmaker to improve this mistake. These improvements would simultaneously (if this were honestly attempted with good intention) lead to those who work on the improvements themselves getting more knowledge concerning the connections of the Bewusstseins within the agreement. And in this way, become more totally conscious themselves of the abilities of their Bewusstsein .)

We could easily list hundreds of further principles. we could look at these two principles more closely with quite a few concrete examples. This is not the task of our investigation, however. For this can (and is to) be found in many other books. What we want to attempt with this short explanation of the two principles is to better understand the results of our investigations through their effects in practice.

It is essential to understand that with every action one puts into motion, he has to recognize such principles and has to deal with them more and more in accordance with the law of actions. In addition, everyone has full responsibility for what he does.

That is, it makes more sense that one follows his true desires (in that he hopes that by doing so, he will come closer to the final goal), and with his behavior, submits as much as possible to the law of actions ; as opposed to the one who--partly against his desires, partly becasue he (= his now-CPU ) only wants to use the law of actions to become "important" (i.e. to use the law of actions for other (= his) purposes)--decides to become a "fighter" for the law of actions , and in his excitement, is neither successful here nor is it in his true intentions to truly follow the law. In other words, this "fighter" only uses this law in order to tell other Bewusstseins how they should act; to have influence over others.

Such "fighters" of the law of actions lead a society farther away from this path than those people who only live according to their desires (in other words, "purely egoistically," but in practice no more egoistic than the fighter of the law of actions . Simply because this type of person, unlike the "fighter of the law of actions ," doesn´t want to understand his purely subjective axioms (which are not in conformity with the law of actions ) as principles (i.e. those, which are valid for all Bewusstseins ), but listen to their "inner voice" in order to be able to determine if their actions could be repulsive to other Bewusstseins .

It should be added here, that it doesn´t "mean" anything to want to induce greater consequence from the law of actions if one is not prepared in every case (i.e. in the beginning with "essential" decisions; and also later, when it becomes easier to manage, with "less important" decisions), based on the best of intentions and belief, and that which we know through the course of our investigations, to critically examine his own behavior. And one is totally conscious here that he has made another small step closer to the law of actions every time with this (= every better scrutinized decision).

That is, first and foremost, one has to see that he better adapts his behavior (which should be chosen based on one´s own desires) to the law of actions . First then is one able to begin to compel the society in which he lives to conform their main forms of behavior (= those which occur within a society as such) more closely to the law of actions. And just as every individual is responsible for his own behavior, those groups who do the main forms of behavior in society are responsible for these main forms. If this takes place on a political level (the most important grouping of a state; but not by far, the only one), the circle which makes up this grouping is responsible: the politicians.

It is necessary that everyone has the responsibility to continually lead his behavior closer to the law of actions. Those people, however, who are active in the group (interest groups, politicians, church representatives, etc.) and who, therefore, steer main forms of behavior in society, have a much greater responsibility (as their main behavior can do far more immediate harm (= leads it farther from the law of actions ) than the behavior of individuals) not to direct these main forms of behavior towards short-term contemporary trends; not to decide based on their personal desires; but rather they must decide which main forms of behavior can be molded closer to the law of actions .

The people in the most varied of groupings who steer the main forms of behavior in society (although not all main forms of behavior in society are "made" by groupings; many come into being simply as an "addition" of all Seles ´ trends) must be totally conscious of their special responsibility.

That is, only those people should let themselves be nominated or voted for such positions who, based on their best belief and knowledge, are convinced that they are up to this task. For the "professional" (that is, that which is carried out within this grouping) task of all representatives of any grouping within society, especially politicians (since they have the greatest "power" and the most far-reaching possibilities), is to assign and uphold structures for the people of the country which enable the Bewusstseins in society (but also the Bewusstseins with which the society has "contact") individually, i.e. every Bewusstsein itself, to find its very own path which leads the Bewusstsein closer to the final goal.

That is, there shouldn´t be any stipulations given by the groupings in society (even if they are allowed to point out what they see as the best way to the final goal; they are neither to expect (and especially not work to ensure) that this path is determined for all (or many) by law) of HOW one gets closer to the final goal (for every Bewusstsein knows this best himself); rather, they are held responsible for making such structures available to all Bewusstseins of their society (and as a consequence, all Bewusstseins of all societies), that provide them with a multitude of possibilities in being able to get closer to the final goal step by step.

But in order to be able to offer all Bewusstseins within society a maximum of possibilities and a minimum of restrictions in getting closer to the final goal, it is necessary that not only systems are formed within the society (through all Bewusstseins who desire such) and that structures are created which all Bewusstseins permit in order to continuously near the law of actions ; systems and structures must also be formed that "urge" all Bewusstseins to behave more in conformity with the law of actions .

That is, on one hand, that freedom should be given to the Bewusstseins in society to follow their path towards the final goal as they consider it necessary to do so; and on the other hand, the law of actions must be observed very carefully, whereby first, all Bewusstseins have to be made to better understand it in order that afterwards, the law of actions will better be followed by all Bewusstseins .

The task of the instruction and observance of the law of actions cannot be strictly left to "one´s own discretion" alone. Rather, all relevant groups (powers) of a society have to "urge" that this law of actions is always better realized. (Even though the far-reaching instruction of the law of actions is difficult to achieve within society as this instruction has to be based on convincing the instructed with the logical necessities of the law of actions .)

And as a result, to create better possibilities and structures for all Bewusstseins ; which allow every Bewusstsein to be able to follow his own way to the final goal.

It is even more essential that especially (but, of course, not solely) people, whose actions result in consequences for the law for all Bewusstseins of a society, are totally conscious of their great responsibility. It is worthy, furthermore, of more respect when a politician admits that he is unable to fulfill his greater task

(since for his behavior to get closer to the law of actions , it demands more than simply (but, of course, also) good intentions; it demands an "ability" developed step for step over several decades or several lives);

and refuses to be elected or nominated for a higher political position, than when (as is nearly always the case) the now-CPU of those concerned decides based purely on the momentary subjective desires of these. (Namely, not to assume this position in order to "help" all Bewusstseins --in that one creates further structures closer to the law of actions --to "better" near the final goal; but rather in "reality," pure self-interest is behind getting this position (for even when one himself consciously believes to want to do something "good" and also believes himself capable of doing so--the unconsciousness usually knows that other reasons are at stake). (Of course, it wouldn´t matter if one has the purely subjective desire to reach a particular position--as long as one would have both the good intention as well as the ability to execute his future actions just as the law of actions (seen from a practical point of view) requires him to do so.).)

Another professional group should also be mentioned here; a group whose Bewusstseins are hardly ever aware of what true responsibility they have assumed in their roles: The profession of journalism.

For everything that non-journalists (i.e. in practical terms, this includes nearly the entire population of every state) experience is something that the journalists find worthy to report.

Everyone who views this activity from the point of view of the law of actions will notice that hardly a journalist, in the course of his professional life, puts out the effort to continually get closer to the law of actions ; but on the other hand, it is extremely difficult to increasingly near the law of actions .

It begins with the choice of subject matter, and can especially be seen through the importance given to these topics and the excerpts one takes from these. Within the inquiry as well as the "right" interpretation thereof (both of which should be taught), mistakes happen in their "objective" outcomes for a variety of reasons.

It is clear why all of this important: Non-journalists of a given country experience all essential public topics only through the media. As normally, politicians and journalists (at least in some cases) know each other, this results in mutually influencing one another. Through this, diverse interpersonal structures (which go beyond "friendship" or "enmity"; "ideological agreement" or "rejection"), find their response in the processing of particular topics.

With that, politicians can also arrive at qualities and attributes (as it continually happens), which, observed objectively with necessary distance, are wrong. So that daily, non-journalists have information (which they do not--as opposed to the journalists, it is not their job--analyze for a longer time); information given to them by journalists (this also applies, as to all non-journalists, to politicians). This can, thus, result in (as it continuously does) conscious and unconscious "manipulations" of the journalists.

We could analyze a number of examples which demonstrate journalists´ blatantly wrong behavior. We could point out wrong behavior in the choice of subject matter ("important things," which would help a society to get closer to the law of actions , but which are not journalistically worked through--as well as reports on diverse individuals, whose private sphere is extremely influenced as a result of these reports) as well as in the processing of their topics. But this should be done somewhere else. We shall be satisfied here when only shortly pointing out these problems.

That is, in general we can say: Everyone has to find his path to the highest goal on his own. Everyone, however, should always strive to get closer to the law of actions . In his own interest, he should judge how those, who belong to special groupings in society and who "create" the main forms of behavior, keep up with the contents of these main forms of behavior in getting closer to the law of actions . Respectively, he himself should point out the shortcomings within society (never dictate, only as an offer).

On the other hand, he has the right and responsibility to point out the wrong behavor of those who violate the law of actions and in so doing, affect him (be it in his job, private life, etc.). If this doesn´t help, then he should undertake those measures necessary to defend himself. That is, the law of actions does not mean to passively suffer injustices.

Rather, as one should understand it, everyone who was the subject of injustice has the right to defend himself against the injustice as best he can.

Now we are better able to understand the reason for all Decision-Types N and N2. The "true" reason for these is only to be found in the fact that they should help us get closer to the final goal, or help us to form structures that make it possible for us to get closer to the final goal (in other words, to get closer to the law of actions ).

It is not contradictory that in practice, decisions are often blatantly violate the law of actions (and as a direct result, also run counter to the chance of getting closer to the final goal).

For the "true" reasons for all Decision-Types N and N2 (and, of course Decision-Types S) are precisely these. For these reasons are logical, through on the abilities of our awareness , derivatives of these abilities.

That practice contradicts these "true" reasons for Decision-Types N and N2 due to "wrong" decisions, does not mean that anything more than that in these cases, the respective awareness is not able enough to behave "correctly."

Every awareness is able to persist with the "wrong" Decsision-Types N and N2. At some point, it has to make decisions which are more "correct." For, as already said, no awareness is spared from reaching the final goal.

It is, therefore, our task to strive to make all of our Decsision-Types N and N2 more "correctly" than we have done before.

Let´s deal with a concept which we but briefly touched upon earlier: Art.

As we have said, everything which goes beyond being directly necessary for survival can be described as "art."

Today, the term is used in such a way that it refers to but a part of art. A "more highly developed" part, a "more subtle" part.

Because these determinations are always subjective (some consider something as "more subtle," others don´t), the use of this concept, as it does today, leads to the definition of this concept being extremely vague (since everyone considers something else as being "more highly developed").

Our definition of art in practice, however, includes nearly everything.

Art is just as much a trip as it is to watch a football game. Dime novels are just as much as asphalt streets (when actually this part is a "more complex" form of art; namely, the better and more efficient mobility).

As all people and also many animals (when a dog prefers to lie down on the comfortable couch instead of the heavy blanket in his basket (and when the couch is chosen only because the owner, the attatchment figure, always sits there), the dog decides to enter an elaborate consideration (and behavior) in reality than what would be necessary for pure survival)

are magically drawn to "create" still more than what is necessary to survive, then the unconsciousness must be behind it, which wants to reach better training of the abilities of awareness .

That is, art is the attempt to get closer to the final goal.

And in this way, all freedoms come with art. The "freedom of art" is limitless. An action (which is art) can actually bring us a step closer to the final goal; and then, another act (which is art once again) will bring us another small step closer; and so on.

But as art includes everything which goes beyond pure survival; and every new creation of such a "work of art" not only helps us on our path to the final goal, but can also theoretically (and in practice) help a number (many) other Bewusstseins --one can just as easily express: One´s entire life needs unbounded freedom. (So that all Bewusstseins themselves are able to create and find all the possibilities they believe (conscious or unconscious ) they must have in order to be able to near the final goal:) One can also express: Life--to a large extent--is art.

That is, life is not only in large part art; both (life and art) possess the right to express themselves without limit--as long as the law of actions is not contradicted. That means that on one hand, life is there, as art, to "create" every thinkable form of expression (depending on what the Bewusstsein wants)--but on the other hand, one must always be careful to be continuously more in conformity with the law of actions .

For whoever violates the law of actions also violates the possibilities for other Bewusstseins (directly against the possibilities of the Bewusstseins directly affected, indirectly against the possibilities of further Bewusstseins not affected immediately. And also indirectly against one´s own possibilities) in coming closer to the final goal.

That is, art decisively helps us to get closer to the final goal. If art (= every action which goes beyond survival; every recall- and extra-experience not necessary for survival) then in turn goes against the attempts to get closer to the final goal--then it "goes against" its own "purpose" (namely, to create possibilities which allow it to come closer to the final goal).

We only come closer, therefore, to the final goal when we understand to find paths, which bring the abilities of our Bewusstsein more and more totally conscious in control. Art is in this respect one way to get a grip on the abilities of our Bewusstsein , the "fight to survive" the other (though this is far more limited than art). Necessary in both ways, however, is that we are careful with every action we implement (in reality) to get closer and closer to the law of actions .

APPENDIX

...is still in the process of being translated

Translation by Whitney S. Haycock

with contributions by Jamie Roehm

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